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Int  roduct  i.o11. 
Part 4  of the Hmnorardum  from  the  Cow1ission to  the Council  on  the 
ColTlnunity  Industrial Policy  (Brussels  i9'(0)  stressed the  special 
problems  that arise  i:1  the ruajor sectors of advanced  tecffi1ology 
and tried. tc set  out  tl~e  possible gu.idelinos for a  common  or 
concerted policy of li1dustrial  dGvelopment  in those  sectors. 
On  this basis)  and tnking due  note of the  information gleaned  from 
the discussions  and  cons·-.1.1 tat  ions  tha-t  have  been held since the 
Her,;orandum  'L'JaS  submitted,  the  Commission  carried ant  a  thorough 
Sl~rvey of tb.e  aviatioa sector.  TJ.1is  report  contains the results 
of its anal~ris and proposals  on  the action it thinks  should be 
trucen  in the  common  interest. 
Suc~1 proposals 1.  if the;y are to .carry their full value,  Iuust  not 
be too  rr.inu'!;sl~r  specific,  The  report  therefore tries to define 
a  general  sector-1tdd.e  concept  and to  place  in that  framevmrk  a 
nv.mber  of oojectives and measures  the  implen~entation of Nhich 
Hould IJe  calculated to  improve  the  groHtb prospects of a  sector 
cf importance to Europe. 
The  anal;w:ls a:1d  proposals  contained in this document  are also 
directly in lir,e  1-vi th the declarc..tion '-'Iri  tte~1 into the minutes 
of the meeting of the Council  of the Cowmunities  held on 
26  Ja~ma1-y  '1972 Y  according to vrhioh: 
"In regard to  Protocol  XVII,  in annex to the agreement  concerning 
the  estab~.i.shment of List  11G"  in annex to  the Treaty,  the 
l:.J.stitutions of the  Community  will  in  1972  undertake an  examination 
of the situation,  in the  light of acquired experience and vdth a 
vie'lor  to  t;;Jdng  such measures  as  ma,y  be necessary for the  grovrth 
and competitiveness of the 11uropean aviation  industr~r,  with  due 
reeard to all the interests  involved~  including those of the 
airlines  •• ,". 
* 
*  -)(-- 2  -
The  document  is COi1cernecl  cvi th the aviation industries in the 
wider  sense of the term - airframes?  engines  1  ecpl.i pment  - but 
at  the a.ircraft  construction level;  at  a  later date,  special 
reports will deal  with the problems  of the various branches, 
notably that of engjnes.  Similarly,  the aviatio:1  i:1dustr.ies 
are considered from the angle  of their activiti8s as  a  wholes 
including  1  for instance  1  tl1e  activities connected  ~Ti th  space 
pro,::,Tam:rr,es;  but this report  does not  tackle the problems  of 
the  sp8..ce  policy,  on  vrhich a  special  report will be prepared 
in due  course. 
Among  the activities of the aviation industriesf  miJi-!;ary 
aircraft  occupy  a  ver-J  important  position.  ConseqLlently, 
ui  thout  going into  considerations  in thEJ  field of defe•1ce 
pC)licy,  this  report  points out  that  in order to d0fine  a 
policy valid for all sectors it is necessary to  incorporatB, 
as far as possible  1  the data concerning military contr::-csts. 
The analyses  and proposals  contaL1ed  in the  report apply to  the 
enlart;;ed  Community  ensuing from  the  signing of the Treaties of 
Accession. 
* - 3 -
CH"\PTEH  1 
----~~~ 
·].  The difficulties 
... ...::a.-..-: ...  -..-.:..~-..r-~-----=-
TLe  ti"Jb.g sitt·.ation '.Jhich  the aerospace  ind·J.st:cies  of the Member · 
States of the  Cormmmi ty  (of Ten)  have  experienced since the  end 
of the  second  ~.Jorld Har is readily illustrated by the follmving 
observations. 
At  the ontset of 1rnov  the  formerl7 powerful  T~uropean manufacturers 
had only  a  small  share  1  9. 5%  (of which  5. 77':  was  accounted for by 
the ux:)  of the ;<Jest ern.  v-rorld  marke-t;,  the rest being occupied b:r 
the Unitecl States.  Their deliveries ou  their  o'!rm  mark:et  are 
likeHise  on  a  small  scale,  as  regards  tl.1e  Six at any rate - 15~ 
ltJhereas  the British menufactu:..'ers  sti_ll provide over  70'1~ of the 
equipment  purchased in the UK.  As  to the American narket,  ltlhich 
alone represents noarJ.y tNo-thirds of the  ~mrld·market 1  Europe's 
share  in it i:J  a  deriso:..7 2.  ·1~. 
Thus,  in spite of the efforts of the manufacturers and the 
eoven1ments,  and  li1  spite of their teclli1ical  quality,  ~uropean 
products have  in general  sold badl:r up  to  r.oT,;.  The  leading 
positio~1 of Ar.lerican  ha.rdt-J?.re  on the market  is partly due  to the 
fact  t!w.t,  apart  from the VC  10,  lont;·-haul aircraft are not 
manufactured· in IBurope  (this type  of aircraft  has  accou.~.'1ted for 
over  50S'~ in value of the  market) ;  but  this fact  merely  serves 
to  hie;hlight Europe 1s  inability to  capture a  substantial  fraction 
of tho  m:"'..rl:et  for tho  other ty:;_Jes  of aircraft. 
The  same  hard truth is to be  seen  in the chief indicators of the 
le7el  of activity in the  enlarged Community. - 4 -
Al  tho'J.gh it is true that  the  aggree:,at8  turnover of the Six 
countries'  aerospace  industry gr0vr  a  good  ci.eal  faster than those 
of the  UK  and the  USA  bet  He en  1960  and  ; 968 1  there  i::;  still a 
wide  gap bdvmen  t~1e levels of activity of tiw Europoa:c1  and 
American  industries  1  the average tur,wver  ( Com::n.mity  of Ten)  for 
the p0riod  196C--u8  being o:1ly  1  "·~. 3~:  of the  figure  achieved by 
the  samo  industries  in the USA. 
As  to  ti1e  added value,  the proportion  contri1Ju-Ged  by  the  aerospa-:::e 
industry to the  vttlue  added by the  tlki.nufacturL1g  industr-J  L1 
I!,'u.rope  is less than  a  quarter of the  US  figure. 
}i'urthcrmore,  the :european  aerospa~e industry's cont :cibution to 
e:1.rports,  a:-::d  hence  to  tl1e  bala:.1ce  of payments,  is low by 
comparison  1-:i th the United States.  In  1968,  the  USA  had  a 
:7avourable  bala"1ce  of  ~2,  661  millio'1,  vrhereas  the  Co1mmmity  of 
Six had a  deficit of  ;:'~251  r.:illion vis--d-vis  no~-:-mcmbcr countries  i 
tho  h:ro  chief &_,_ropean  :·'ia:.mfactt~rin[i countries  (:"ranee  and the 
UK)  together  o~·1l;yr  achieved a  s·J.rpll'.S  of  ~:424 mill  ion.  It will 
not  be  forcottcn that  the  US  acrospac-::  industr;;r  too  has 
experienced  vRr,::r  serious difficulties  1  due  in large measure  to 
the cutbacks  in the  major rr.ilitai'"IJ  and  space  program.mos.  As 
a  rcsul  t  1  its turnover,  1vhich had been gro,dng steaclily since 
1955,  h2.s  been  on  the. dovmgradc  since  1)'S8.  ':Phc:re  would, 
hm:rever,  seem to  be  a  revival in prospect  in the fairly nenr 
future and measures  to  stimulate this process are no1-v  being 
examined. 
Thus 1  although it has been recovering stcadil;y since  '1960,  t:1e 
aerospccce  industry in  r~urope is relatively  11u:nderdevelopecl11  if 
compnred  vJi th the United States.  This vrould not  be particule,rly 
v·;orrJing if the aerospace  sector could be  regarded as  just  o:1e 
of scvGral;  but  the gravi  t;y  of the  situation is evident  \vhen - 5 -
one  remembers  that this is a  sedor recognized. by the  Third 
Medium-Term EconoL.Jic  Policy Programme  as being of speCial 
importance  to  economic  grot-rth  c:md  technical progress and, 
furthermore,  that it is essential to  defence  and to  fhe  Member 
States' political position in the Norld context. 
Si:1.ce  the  e:1d  of the rmr Europe  has  launched a  considerable 
number of mo,jor civil programHles,  whose  development  and 
produc-~ion involved heav.f  spending.  Only three or four of 
those  progra~nes were  commercially  successful,  i.e., with 
sufficiently long  p~·oduction series to cover the  expenditure 
entailed.  rrhe  E:;_ropean  manufacturerc  hc:,ve  to face  America..! 
fir:-:1s  r:1ost  of v;:hose  progra;n.rnes  have  resulted in long production 
series with a  rapid dovelopn,ent  rate.  Understandably,  this 
situation has  enabled competitors in tho  USA  to  expand  ve!"'J 
fast i  the  quest  ion is  1  >vh:,r  has  a  similar si  t<'.a t ion not  come 
about  in Europe? 
2.  The  historical reasons 
••  ~~-1~...::..,___~~--...---.-.G..  •  ..:....:.t.::s 
The  origin of the present  difficulties can be  traced back to 
the upheavals  of the  Second lrJorld  1'far.  At  the close  of 
hostili-ties,  Eu.rope,  which had previously been  in the  forefront, 
found itself - apart  from  the United Kingdom  -- Hith a  potential 
that  was  largely obsolete if not  actually d.emolished. 
Subsequently the  m::,  vJith  the  momentum  of its v:ar effort behind 
it,  C0!1tinued to display considerable activity  (-though without 
ahvays  achieving the  commercial  results which  i-ts  potential and. 
efforts might  be  said to'have·warr2illted),  while the  French 
industry started on  n.  l-ong  cl.imb  bar::J:,  Germaily  and Italy being 
constrained  to  renounce  a:-zy  significant activity for many years. - 6  -
On  the other side of the Atlantic,  the American  indust:r~,r 1  "Thich 
had  made  great  strides through the v.;ar  effort  1  found  t•,Jo 
pooverf'L'.l  st  ir:rr.lli  to  conversiOll  ar.d  expa:(lsion,  namely,  the  rapid 
gro~~h of civil air transport  ru1d  the military and space 
programmes. 
European  industrialists have  often ble>"med  the distortion of 
competition caused by the  US  military and  space  programm·3S, 
It is quite  true that  these  p:togrammes  1Jrought  the  firms  engaged 
in them  su'ostantial  funds  end teclmological ad7ances  which 
ena~Jled new aircraft to  be  put  on  the civil market. 
Nevertheless,  \ve  no'...r  knovJ  that these advantages  ivere  often 
folloHed by appreciable  drc:n·fbacks,  and  th.~,t  technological 
innovaticn has  no  real  economic  effect unless,  at the  market 
level  1  it responds  sufficiently to explicit  or underlying needs. 
In  a:1~.r  case  1  hovever real it ma.;r  rJe 1  the advantagE::  co:11ferred  on 
American manufncturers is not  enOiJ.gh  to accOUJ."lt  :for the  lack of 
comrilercic..l  success of Europea  ..  '1  aircarft. 
The basic fact  is that European aircrt:::ft  have not,  as  a  uhole, 
managed to achieve  an  equal  footing with A_'llerican  aircraft on 
the  market.  This  competitive  infer'iority is the  more  noticeable 
in that it finds  expression  even in the  :;~'uropean market;  forv 
if we  except  a  feH  special cases Hhere  a 
11counter-preferencc'v 
may  mili  te,te  in favour of the American  products  (aereemcmts  on 
the  stationing of US  troops  in Europe,  or offsetting indc1strial 
investment  with purchases  agreements  which  seeiJl  to  have 
operated mainly  in  rege,rd to military hardvmr2) 1  it is hard to 
see  t·rhy  E-u.ropean  t:.sers  should have preferred to  p·J.rchase  abroad 
if entirely satisfactory European aircraft  had.  been  offcr0d to 
them. - 7  ~ 
Thus  He  hnve  to  ask OUl.'sel ves  two  questions: 
l·Jhy  have  American.  aircraft  succeeded in capturing the market? 
Hl!.y  have  ICuropoan  airc:.·aft not,  on  tho  vJhole,  had the  same 
success? 
(a)  The  riaster card in the Americans'  hand is that  they have  a 
large,  dynamic  home  market ·(see ltnnex  I  for figures). 
The  progl'fl.mmos  they put  forvre.rd  soon  1"0'1  a  substnntial number of 
orders~  making it 'vorth  ~<hile to set up  a  large--scale  prod.,~ction 
1 inc  i  the  product  ion zeries quickly reached l:igh figures  1 
e.llm;ing rapid amortization of the capital investment and eiving 
the  firms  the t,rherei.Ti thal to set about  capturing foreign markets 
~vith highly attractive· commercial  terms  (sGlling pl'ice, 
diversification of tho basic  model  into a 
11f8.mily"  of aircraft, 
a~'tor-sales service,  stocl;:s  of spare··pe,rts,  !3tc~)  and to"prepare 
no~·r pro jocts.  ·'rho  size of the prograrrunes  and the production 
requ.ircments  a.lso  affected tho  industrial structures  1  '!~There 
mergers  enaoled  standarc1.iz:"ttion to be  carried as far as possible. 
'l'his  outline inakes it clear that  the  US  aircraft  industry was 
able to  reap the full benefit vf economies  of scale  made  possible 
oz•  the big home  market  y  without  VJhich  the production of 
high--technology aircraft becooE:s  an intolerable burden. 
(b)  In Europe  vJe  find the very opposite of the American  situation, 
as  reza.rds both the market  s·~ructure and the  volume  and  d;ynamism 
of demand, 
In contre.st  to  the United Stnte8 1  large  single market  dominated 
"by  competition 1  the Eu,...opecn  JJlB.rket  is to· a  great  extent 
compartmented.  Aclmi ttedly the  Conl!llon  1.!farket  has abolished 
..  . . .  . - 8-
customs  duties  D..ilCl.  quota restrictions  bet~·rcen its members 1  but 
even within the  Co:nm1L1i ty the trnd8  in aircraft of European 
origin is on  a  ve~r small  scale. 
l'llili  tnr;y aircr2"ft?  \·.rhich  hitherto have  accOluted for over  so~:/ 
of the market,  depend  on national  gover:1mer:t  purc!2asers  i  even 
so,  there  hc.,ve  bec:1  some  bil:::tteral  (Trar:sCLll 1  J2.&uar,  AlpL.a--Jet) 
or uultilateral  (Atlantic,  HRCA)  progra;mnes.  As  to civil 
aircraft  1  the demand  is piecemeal,  cod.n.g from  a  large number of 
nationa,l airJ.inos  (most  of '-.rhich,  in spite of their statu8 of 
commercial undertakings,  are  de  j~~~ or~~ fa2!2  dependent  on  the 
public anthori  tics for the  fin<-:mcing  of airc1•aft  purchnsoz)  and 
a  grovdng number of fims 1!hose  activit;;;··  is confined to 
non-scheduled flights.  The  most  salutary  dcvelopn~cnt in this 
respect  is the  formation  of the  ATLAS 1  and KSS'J
2  groulJS 1  Hhich 
enter into  .s,grocrnents  on  the  technicC>,l  specifications of orders; 
it cioes  not  appear thnt  tho  i.ntergovernmontal  ru:d  L1dustrial 
cooperative  schen:es  for the production of ncM  .:::.ircro..ft  (Concorde, 
Airbus  1  etc.)  hcwe  themselves  hc.d  13,n~r  effect  on  the market 
patter.a as yet. 
Although  customs  duties and c:uotas  have  been  done  aHay  1,Ji th,  the 
legal  environment  of air transport  is sttll essentiall,y national. 
The  vmrk  aimed at the adop·t;ion  of European  standards  for aircraft 
construction has not been  completed;  nor has  the ;-.rorlc  on  tho 
adoption  of a  b'uropean  aj.:;.~l·rorthiness  code.  The  persistence of 
tech.'1.ical  barriers is nnturally an obstacle not  only to 
intra-;%ropean trade  ( -v.rhich  is poor)  but also to  tho  setting--up 
of  joint co:1struction  progran1'11es  betwecm  t'HO  or ;,1ore  countries. 
It is even  less rational in vim-J  of the  fact  thu.t  Hhen  it comes 
t0  importi:1g aircraft of US  origin,  the  Eurc.~wan coc:ntries  have 
fovnd no  difficulty in accepting in principle the American  rules 
and  standards. 
1ATLAS:  Air-France,  Alitalia,  Lufthansa,  Sabena,  Iberia. 
2KSSU:  Km,  SAS 1  Sviissair,  UTA. - 9 -
Unclerlying the  market  11struot'!.lren  ther8 is,  of  course~  the present 
pattera of air transport  in E-urope.  It is easy to point to the 
example  of the Uni-ted States,  "'here,  in highly competitive 
conditions,  air transport  has  expanded  tremendously~  but  that 
e:::pansio~1 Has  1:1ado  easier by  tvro  factors which  do  not  exist to 
the  sat!le  degree  in Europe  - the long distances bettveen densely 
populated areas  and the virtual absence of  railwe>.y  competition. 
Do  :U:urope's  specific characteristics mean  that  oven in the  long 
term  sl1e  cannot  loolc  forward to  o.  more  vigorous air transport 
s~rstcm? 
Such an assumption  is by no  mee.ns  confirmed and  seems  to derive 
from resignation to  the  structures set up by the  international 
agroemonts  concluded after the  Second Horld Har. 
Tho;:::e  str~.:ctures aro based on the reservation of home  tl~affic 
eEtirely for the national  compffi1ies 1  Hith strict bilateralism 
in the  granting of traffic rights to  international services. 
For national prostic;e and profi  t-maldng reasons  1  priority 
attention has l)een  given to the intercontinental lillks t-.rhere 
the national  compe:.nies  are  in competition,  and the  i~1tra-European 
links  (international or national)  have  often been planned to fit 
in Hi  th the  long-.hau.l  services.  Tb.e  international intra-European 
traffic is subject to tho  IATA  rulos 1  so that the scale of 
charges is restricted by that rigid fraD18Nork.  All these factors 
have  clone  little to help the  grovJth of the  intra-European 
nei:.vrork,  which is virtually concentrated on  a  fevJ  major routes. 
It is easy,  but  m..-er..:.simplo,  to say that  lm-rering the rates arid 
ratio~1alizing the netuork woul<.l  give the  il.J.tra-European  links a 
ne'ir  boost.  The  heavy charges borne by the national airlines 
arc ,,rell knovm  and there is rio  question of blaming their 
management.  Under these conditions,  hovrever,  one  must  ask 
\>That  is the teclmical,  economic  and institutional value of the - 10  ·-
prese~1t  s;ystem1  Nhether the present aircre.ft  and infrastructures 
are  suited to  short-.. haul  rcquireraents,  a.nd  mor·a  generally,  vrhat 
place  should be  ~;iven to air tre.n.spori;  in a  modern  transport 
policy.  Al  thou~;h it :i.s  impossible at this stage to assess the 
effect that  more  rational nir trru1sp0rt  arrangeme~1ts would have 
on  the  volume  and natl)_re  of aircraft demand,  it hRs  to be 
recognized that these qu.es-tions  have  no·i;  received sufficient 
study. 
TJ.1e  excessive  fre.gme:1tation  of the  market  and the  sme.ll  demand 
have  had  obvious  conseque:1ces  for European  J:llE'.,nufact"J.rers  as  a 
VJhole.  They did not  have  the  stimulus that  thei:.~ competitors 
hadi  hence  for most  projects they vmre  not  in a  position to 
cmbCl.rk  on  long production series at fast  rates,  and for m£ny 
firms  this was  the determjning factor in: 
(a) their inadeq-:.1.ate  fLJ.ancial  capacity and productivity,  and 
their perhaps  u::.1duly  hea  V'J  dependenc:e  on  governrr:c.;nt  aiel  (and 
sometimes  even  purchasi11g instructions given to the national 
airlines)  i 
(b)  their programme policy - some  programmes  have been  ill-reasoned 
because of insufficient  co--planning with the  intended users  - and 
their marketing efforts  s  ~-Ihich aro  generally  j11aclequate  to  ~dn 
nmv  contracts  i 
(c)  the  maj_ntenance  of structures that  are too  p~~y to handle 
increasingly large projects at the  level of l'lOrld  competition. 
The  foregoing does not  mean  that no  European aircraft were 
capable of penetrating the market.  A  fev.r  cases have  proved 
the contrary;  but  in these cases  success  1AJaS  only achieved 
because  the aircraft offered had  some  additional  competitive - 11  -
element  (un.iquo  product~  technologici:Ll novelty,  particularly 
good opere,ting cost3)  Hhich  could offset the basic handicap 
mentioned a,Jovo. 
(c)  He  have already a;:nply  stressed the pn.rt  played by the big 
Arneric&"l  '
1hon,e  market
11
•  Some  people nevertheless think it is 
useless to try to  confer the  same  rol~a  on  a  more  open,  d,ynamic 
European  "home  market
11
•  In thoir opinion,  the aviation market 
has already attained international  dimensions  and l·Jestern 
Europe  would no  lon~er be  a  sufficiently largo geographical 
framework. 
There  is  some  truth in this assertion 1  in that aircraft  (apart 
from  special types,  e.g.,  those  intended for the  developing 
countries)  are  intern,J-tional products,  sui  table for selliDg all 
over the  ~:orld.  But  it vJOuld  be  11\'rong  to  say that  on  that 
accOUl1t  there already exists an  international markd  on whicll 
competition  operc:,tes  hri thout  hindrcmco and vJhere  the 
manufacturers  meet  on  equal  terms. 
Leaving aside tho  dominant  position acquired by the  American 
indust  r'J,  there arG  a  i.1',~.r"'ber  of government  measures  Hhich make 
it difficult for Ellropean manufacturers to penetrate the  US  and 
other markets •  . . 
In the first  place_,  there is still a  custor::s  duty  (5~)  on 
aircraft  imports  e:1tering the USA,  whereas  the  Commu..'1i ty,  putting 
its users'  interests fi.rst  1  has  voluntarily suspended the duty 
listed in the  common  external tariff for aircraft of over 
15  tons.  Admittedly the  US  duty is relatively lo-v.r 1  but  its 
effect is particularly marked because  competition has become 
koener and this factor comE:s  on  top of others mili  tat  inc; ag<1inst 
European  produ.cts.  !J.'he  other factors  include tho pert  pl2-yed - 12  -
-by  tho Export-Import  :3anl:  (a  notevmrt:r~r export  credit  instrul:lont), 
the barriers  fornr:;.d  b3r  the teclmice.l  and  air~·mrthincss  strmd<1rds, 
and more  generally the context  ~vhich impe::ls  users  in the 
cmmtry in questio:'1.  to purchase national products. 
An  objective  study re-:eals that there are me2-sures  on  1Joth sides 
~rhich affect competition.  For ii1stancc,  tho  Europe<:-n  cotmt rios 
'I'Tcre  obliged to give financial aid to their industries,  1--..rliich 
'JJere 
11lll1.derdevclopecl
11  in  consequence  of the  Seconcl  ~'Jorld 1-Jar, 
a  measure  Hhich the  US  govcrnnent  had itself proposed  for the 
development  of the  SST  project. 
It is impossible  to  drm-1  up  a  complete authoritative list here; 
it is 1  hovvever1  fair to corlclude  tha·c  in aviation,  compdition 
at the IIDnufacturi>lg level  i::;  accompanied by  a  more  "political" 
rhralry at  governmr:::nt  level,  and that 
11rules of the  gaE1G
11 
c;ivi~1g tl"e  manufacturvrc  genuinel:r  equal  opportunities  could 
only be  introduced  throug~1 co::1prehensi1e  high--level ncc;otiation. 
Both tho  complexity and the high end rising cost  of hardHarc 
call for  incre;:;.singly big production lines.  This  need has been 
felt  more  kecl1.ly  in recent years  as  the  tendency has been to 
tur:>1  the aero  space  industry into  a  a syst  eE;s  indust  I"J11  rc:,thor  the.n 
a  co~1.vent ional manufacturing industry,  (It is now  asked to 
produce  "armament  systems11  or  11transport  systems".)  Even if 
the  company  acting- as project  leader works  with a  considerable 
number  of subcontractors,  it still has to assume  the overall 
industrial  risk and carry the main  development  burden;  hence 
it is preferable for this type  of firm to be  of large tmi  t  size 
and highly concentrated.  This  vie"l:r is borne  out  by the 
difficulties observed in managing programmes  carried out  jointly 
by separate firms. - 13  .. 
Tho  size  rec~irement does  not~  howe7or1  stem solely from the 
programrr;es  cost  nnd the  risk level,  It is also directly 
related to the broaiening of the market.  In Section  3 1  ue 
mentioned the pressure exerted  on  inclustrinl  structures by the 
requiresents  of a  large p-,arl:et;  it nmst  no1rr  be  stressed that 
vihcre  the market  is fT:::gmc:1ted 1  costly  equipment  can  only be 
p~:>o~~.l'ced if tho  vc:·,rious  i:tam:factur:Jrs  combine  tl1eir forces  to 
reduce the diversity of supply m1d  vJiden  the uarket. 
The  more  costl;r tbe  syst0ms  to be lmil  t  1  the  more  thc3r need en 
extensive market  and great  skill  i:n  judging- the  right  time  and 
concli  tions for entering the  market.  Hence  there is no  longer 
room  for large numbers  of medium--sized firms  con:peting 
w~stcfully against  one  another  on  r1nrl~o•·r markets. 
As  can be  seen in A.YJ.nox  II  ( dea  "!.ing  vJith the product ion  set-up)  1 
tJ.1e  Europea:1  aerospace  i~1dusti"J is at  a  s-reat  disadvantac-3 as 
regards  size by  comparison  v;i th its chief competitor.  This  can 
be  illustra·ced by t1vo  points: 
( 1)  fou.;:>  US  firms  each hcve  a  turnover greater than that of ·the 
Hhole  CoEILi>.1.mity  (of Six) 7  i.e,, about  ~~2,000 million  (~~2,000 
million in  1963 r  ~~2 7293  million in  1970) 1 
(2)  tho average  s:._zo  of the five  leadi:10 firms  in the  Commtmity 
of Six is one--seventh  of thG  average  size of the  five  loading 
US  fir:l3  (this ratio· is  I :5.2 for the Commmity of 'I
1en). 
The  need for much  greater concentro.tion  in the aerospace  sector 
has been  recognized by  most  of the Earopean  manufacturing 
countries,  in the chief of  \T~ic:1  U.ere are  no~r to e.ll  intonts ancl 
purposes  o:1ly  tl-.,ro  airframe makers.  But  Iiiurope-wide  concentration 
is only  just  beginning~  it 1rm.::.:  as late as  1969  that  two  agroer.J.ents -- 14  --
vrcre  signed,  one  for V~1 and  l"oldcor  to  set  up  a  holding compo.ny 
in possession of all the  shares  in the  founder  compcm.ics 1  and 
the other for the Dassault-Breguct  .omd  Fol<:Jn;r-.V.lilf  groups  to hold 
the bulk of the  shares  L~ SABCA 1 s  capital. 
The  mergers  carried out Hithin individual  c01mtries  have 
revealed the snags  in this type  of operation.  Cne  can  sec the 
economic,  financi~,l,  fisc:al  and hu:aan  problems  inevitably 
arising out  of a  mel'ger,  and the  result it should produce, 
namely,  a  rationalized production  systGm.  One  can also  see 
that  these  problems  m.9,y  be tougher whore  tra'"1sfrontier groups 
are  formed  and vJherc  p1:blic and private undertakines are 
.  ,  ' 
~nvo.~.vea..  Because  of this,  governments  and firms  have  tended 
to  uorl.-;:  through cooperative agreements,  but  this can only be a 
temporary s"ta  .. ze. 
The  need for this 
firms  cm1cerned. 
is  rccogy1izcd by  t:1e  Europee..:.'1  governments  and 
1 
A  e;·oven1.ment  report  states that "the 
European firms  have  no  choice but  to >'lork  together if they 1,rish 
to avoid shutting themselves  out  of major civil aircraft 
construction for good and all".  No  clearer •·ri tness  is needed 
to  the  existence  of the 
11structural
11  problems  described in 
Section "t  above. 
r.rhe  advantages  of cooperation  (sec Annex III  1  dctc.,ils of 
cooperation and progrD..Imnes)  arc mmrguo,ble: 
(a)  through the pooling of technical  a:.'1d  fin.?.llc ial  resources  1 
more  costly,  higher--risk production lines  can be 1L.YJdortaken; 
1Basic  programme  for the  Geman aerospace  industry 1970-74 
(July  1970). - 15  -
(b)  there is the  cha.nco  of a  lvider market  (bu,yers  in the 
cooperc:d ing countries) 1 
(c)  firms  of differ::mt  cor:ntries  le<'-m  ho1:J  to work together, 
·shus  layin:; the bo..sis  for c1ur2.ble  combinations 1 
(d)  the v2.rious  po.rties  in an  e.dvcmced. project  ac~1ieve a  higher 
level of technolog'J. 
But  coopEm:l.tion.  also lms  ap::~reciable drat:·backs: 
(a)  it generally entails  e::tra costs o.,nd  time-lags 1  1trhich  may 
1rwigh heavily on  the mo.rkdin6  end.  of the  proc;raJalne. 
e::t rc:.s  Iin~r  spring from hw sourc0s: 
These 
(i) vJhere  govcr.a:nents  2-rc  directly invclved  in.  the  coopcratj_vc:; 
scheE!e  9  expcrj_cmce  hccs  s~1otm that  trouble  can ariso from  the 
instabil.i  ~;y  of tl1e  pa:'ties  1  line of  ac~tion 9  from their political 
or br.clgetary indecisions  1  and  from the 
11fair returr1
11  or 
job--spli  t·sing requirements arbi  traril2."  irr.posed  on  2- m£L'1agement 
system which  :i.s  il.lrea,d3r  intric1Sically efficiency--resistmlt i 
(ii) vJhero  cooperation is  'lJet:~oen mr,nufacturing firms 9  its value 
i·lill  dep·::md  on  the  de~;ree of integration of the project,  i.e.~ 
the a::Jility to subject it to  3.  common  antho:city accepted by all 
the  pm~t  ies  e.r:;.r'l.  to  acl1ieve n1i  ty in the development  and prciuct  im1 
1vork.  In this  respect,  the best  cooperative  schemes are 
probably those  I'l.Ul  on  SUbCO:i.1tractor  lines,  out  this solution 
seems  to be  effective only  in cases of cooperation bet·,-men 
parties that are quite  clif:.:'ercnt  in size.  The  joint  subsidiary 
method.  \'Vas  2.dopted successfully in the  ca.se  of the  Jaguar anc1 
the I.1HCA,  'but  although it permits  joint  intec-rn.ted mane..gement 1  it 
is ne'lertheloss liable to  suffer from  the diverging intEn·ests  of 
the pe1rent  companies; - 16  -
(b)  it ho,s  not  tho  sn.UJe  ~mrl:et--pcnotro.tion strength as  a  sin,'?,'le 
firm.  The  customer  can~1ot  form a  lasting connection  Hi th a 
supplier Hhose  idcmtit,;,r  changes  1·:ith  each project;  moreovcrs 
the  customer prefers to  dec.,l  Hi  tlt  o..  firm ,,rhich  has  a  genuine 
individuality a11.d  can ansvrer for its mvn  prodvct; 
(c)  the biggest  drmrback of coopcrotion is that it forms  or:ly 
precarious links betvreen the firms  concon1.cd and does  not  permit 
rational long--term planning of activities and investments. 
rro  St'.m  up,  cooperation offers many  advantages,  more  especially c.s 
it involves a  higher degree  of intet:;ration of  acti"iri-~ies.  But 
it is still only a  half--ueasure  in a  raovemont  in 1·rhich  tho 
requirement  of size calls for a  concentration of potential and 
a  widening of tho  m0.rket,  i.  o. 1  stru.ctural measures  cape,ble  of 
ensuring the  long--tcr!!1  f\J.ture of the  indust!"'J. 
Pouding this restructuring,  the  methoc~s of cooperation must  'be 
imp::.·ovod  as  much  as possible,  o.nd  fol' this purpose the industrial 
char1.cter of such  cooperation must  be  accei?.tuated.  In  effecting 
thio  iraprovement  1  hovwver,  v·7e  must  not  lose  sight  of the  real 
goal.  In the long nm 1  it is clear that  enha:1cccl  productivity 
and  efficiency can  only be  attc:.inecl by  chn...11ging  the industrial 
and  commercial  ley-out  of the Europem1  aerospace  sector. 
This  change  is particularly urgent  because in the  meantime  some 
firms  have been prompted to  form  industrial alliances with 
compaDiGs  in non--member  co1..mtrics  rc:dlwr  than  seck durable  lLJ.ks 
ui  th one  or more  Europec:.n  partners.  There arc,  of course, 
certain adva..'1.tages  in such allim1ccs  -- tra..'1.sfers  of tech.11olor::;y, 
access to  external markets  - but  they entail risks if the 
European pnrty is not  in a  strong enough position to  secure a 
Hell-balanced azrecment,  x..1d  in any case  the;y  may  blocl: the  v!ey - 17  -
to  optimum rcstructu:ring in Europe.  f~fter the  industry's 
structure has  bee11  adjusted to tho Eu:ropo2an  sco..lef  that will 
be the time  Hhen alliances with countries outside the  Community 
will prove  just hm.r  beneficial the3r  can be. 
The  Commission has already recommended1  in the  context  of its 
\'7ork  on  industrial policy and scientific a..1d  te:chnical  rosec;,rch 
policy  1  that  the  opening of o..ny  negotiations Ni  th non-memb,;::r 
countries invol  v:!Eg action by the public authorities  should be 
preceded b;}'  consultation vli  thin the  Conummi ty.  This procedure  1 
which  should  lead gradually to  a  cor,1IT!on  policy for  co  ope rat  ion 
vd  th non-member countries,  Hould be particulc:rly appropriate 
in the a2rospace sector. 
In all the b'uropean manufacturing  co~~tries tho  State is 
constrain·2d to give  su:}stc,ntial  bacld.11.t; 1  by vnrious  methods  and 
i~ various  degreec 1  to the development,  production and  mc;,rketing 
of aircraft  c;,nd  aircraft components  (see  Annr:cx  V).  This 
support  1rJas  and is still vital to  the  recovery of an  industry 
that has  suffered from  the  hr~ndicaps mentioned  o..bove.  It is 
generally accepted that  pt'.blic aid is necessary for the  launching 
of major pr8grammcs  in advanced tecm1oloc.yj  in this connection, 
reference  was  made  earlier on  to the project for aid for the  SST 
programr::e  i::.1.  t~w United S-tates. 
Al  thougr.  indispensable,  this aid has  so  far  alwa~rs been of a 
n<1tion2.l  character,  both·  in the  decisio21--making process and 
from  a  procedural  standpointi  even  in the  case of an 
intergoven1.mental  agreemcnt 1  such as for Airbus,  once  th0 mutual 
commi tBents have been  este,blisheC:.7  the  support  given by  each 
government  to the  firms  concen1ed has  bec:n  provided throug-h the 
nat  ione.l  rJ.achinery. - 18  -
It m::.nnot  be sufficiently stressed that  by maintaiuing nationc.l 
aid systeras  we  actually encourage  the persistence of fragmented 
production potential and small  foncod-off  narl:~cts. 
But  bez,rond  these more  or less indirect  effects of th2 
natio:1ally-structured aid systems  lies the plain fact  that  these 
systems  reveal tlw  vJhole  drift of the policy in  t~1is  sector. 
In 1-Jestern Europe  so  far there hnve  bee..Yl  cf'.ses  of cooperation,, 
but none  of coramon  concept  or common  objectives.  Each  count!'iJ 
has defined its own  policy for the  sector,  usually vli  thout 
looking to  see Hhcther its aims  tallied with those of its 
European partners.  The  relative inefficacy of certain programmes 
is not  surprising1  considering that  in many  cases aid appears 
to he.ve  been given for social or regional  rensons  (maintaining 
employment)  or for defence  (maintaining military capc.city) 
rather than to  cms:.tre  the  commercial  success of an  operation or 
r:1eet  an  existing market  or public  service dema:1d.  lilith  such 
policies the European  countries could scarcely ue  expected to 
,,n thstand the pressure of competition  from  the United States. 
The  considerable  funds  and effort  invested have  not yielded 
proportionate results  1  a  better course would he.ve  been to 
define  cominon  objectives based on  a  careful analy::::is  of the 
requirements,  aim the programmes at these objectives  ~1d be 
ready to abandon  such operations as  do  Lot  meet  a  real need or 
are an  urmecessa!"J duplication. 
The  foregoing  remarks  mainly refer to the past,  and it is 
impossible to  close  without  looking briefly at the prospects 
ahead of the aerospace  sector. - 19  -
Those  prospects  con·I:C'oill  some  c:ncourngiug e.spocts,  but  also  sor,ie 
UJ.1Certnint ies and mntters  for concern. 
If -v.;e  loo\: at tho  t-wrld  sccme  7  a'.1d  2-SSl'lni.ng  that  tho  fears  of a 
long econordc  recession can be  set aside  1  it appears that air 
trcnsport v:ill  continue its adva:1ce  in all ar0as  ~  including 
Europe  7  anci..  that  ·che  demand  for new  civil airCl'aft  1  vrhich  had 
fallen off m-Ji'1g  to the  premat1,re  renGwal  or introduc-tion of 
certain equipment,  will  s~.lrge  again over the next  few years. 
Ho1..Ve\'er 1  beth car:-iers  a~1d :aannfacturers vrill have  to  faco  neN 
cm:straints uhich are likely to affect the pattern of demand: 
the  requirements  of environ:nental  policy  v  the  c:eveloptwnt  of 
high-speed forms  of surface transport  1  planning policies,  etc. 
None  of thE::se  new  conditions exist at present,  but they are 
currently taki:1g shape  and  should be  incorporated in the 
trc,nsport  policy for  1985--2000.  Moreover,  i-t  would  appen.r 
tllat unless  defence policies U..'1dergo  cons:iclcra,ble  chauge8  1  the 
market  for mili  tnry hal'dwnre  ~·Jill  continue to  shrink or at 
least  stagnate,  as 1•Iill  the appropria:cions  for  space activities. 
The  commerci2.l  future of J:;:uropean  in relation to  American 
products is clouded rlith uncertainty.  It should be  added in 
this connection  tha;'c  cortain Soviet  and J<::,panese  products 
could appear on  tl:e o.arkots previously occupied by the  .Aniericans 
and Europeans. 
The  five  major lwropean  prograr:Jmes  about  to enter the  r:Jarket 
(co~corde,  Airbus,  nercure,  Foldcor  F  28  and VP::··J  614)  ~·J01.1  .. ld 
2,ppe2,r  to have  a  reasonable  chance  over a  fairl;;,r  long period. 
Ho1wver1  com:r,ercial  success  L1plies  salGs  outside Europe,  and 
above  aJ..l  on  the American  mr:,rket. - 20  -
In this respect  1  current  dmrelopments  in monetary C.!1d  commercial 
relations may  call for a  certain amou..nt  of reflection.  The 
realignment  of exchange  rates has  had the.:  effect of increasing 
the competitiveness  of US  products ai1d  making it more  difficult 
to  export  to that  cou.."lti"J  - a  situation ageravatod by  the 
continued imposition of customs  duty  on  impo::.~ts  to the United 
States.  One  outcone  of the trade negotiations  has 1Jeen  the 
emergence  of certain tendencies  to:.rards bringing about  a 
situation vmightcd  in favour  of 'products of US  hit5h  teclmolo&v 
whereas negotiations of this typo  should be  aimed at 
re-establishinc true equnlity of opportm1ity  on  a  mutual basis  -
the only valid foundation  for international vJOrk-spli  tting Nhich 
is acceptable to all.  Liket·Jise,  the  implementing of the 
measures  essential for protection of the  environment  could lead 
to tho  iatroduction of novJ  factors of inequality and barriers to 
international tradG.  Only by agreements  on  reciprocity and 
harmonization at an  int(~rnational level  can fair conditions  of 
competition by  ;!lai:1tained. 
Th~ developn1ent  of aerospace activitios in Europe  concerns not 
only  industrial production potential but also  er.1ployrnent 
prospects.  If the  aim is to protect the future  of this sector's 
manpm-rer  as  much  as  posf'ible lvhilc  achieving the  increase in 
productivity necossc>-ry  in order to bolster up  competitive 
capacity,  a  highly vigilant  polic;)' for tho  sector will  be 
required at Commm1ity  level,  as  reg~rds not  only conditions 
of competition but also  cooperation  ~-.rith  outside organizations 
and h'ork-sharin;S" ar.1ong  Europeans. 
IJ.
1here would in particular be  a  serious  risl: of a  su1Jstantial 
expansion  of production capacity  - at considerable cost  - D1 
certain T.lember  States,  1·rhile  excess capacity existed in others. 
There  can,  of course,  be no  question of freezing certain d)1lamic - 21  -
grm·rtl;.  activities o..rti!:icially a:1d  it is  esse~1tial to  contribute 
towards  regional  clevolop~:aent.  Nevertheless,  it is logitimate to 
ask 1·Jhether  such actioil  ~rmulu further harmonious  development  in 
t~lC  Comr:1m1i ty if public  intervention ir<ero  to  render existing 
capacit~r UI'.productive~  vJhen  the  resources  devoted to ll?vl  capacity 
cor:.ld be "bet-ter  cmpl.);~rec~ by c..llotti:1g them to  ot:1er sectors in 
tl1c  cornr.;on  intere3t.  Tne  problen involved in the creation of 
general  problem,  i.e.  1  the extent to vJhich  the j\!Iember  States are 
able to accept  interdepondcm.ce  in the hi:;h-technology  sec-tors. 
Should there be no  such  interdepende~-:cc one  c.::>rmot  hope to  see 
Ji:'J.rope  r.'ake  the best  usc  of its resources and achieve  econocies 
of scale 1  both cf  villic~l  a.re  esse:1.tis,l  prc::requisites if she  is 
to  regain her posit  ion  in the 1-;orld. - 22-
In ori.ler to give the Eu:>:-c,pean  aerosp~ce sector a  genuine  shot  in the arm, 
it will net  be  sufficient to  :::-ecom.rnend  a  totchpotch of measures.  On  the 
cont:ra::oy,  it ic  ess'2!':cial to  take  an  ove:::·all  view of things  a."1d.  clcfine  a 
long-te:cm  str.:deg;y in vJhich. st:::-uctural measures  designed to bear fruit  in 
tbe meclium  or lung ter·!n  a:-ce  linked with projects of a  more  immediate 
nature 1  Nh:ich  are  aimed at  ironing out  individual difficulties 1rhile 
pointing towards  the  same  goals. 
1r'.n.e  fird (ru.estion vrhich arises and vihich certain parties do  not hesitate 
to raise expressly is whether fut'ope  must  endeavour to pursue the 
production of large civil aircraft  and high-thrust  engines,  despite the 
high cost,  bearing in mind the  important  consideration of the 
11international 
division of labour" which it is desirable to develop  in the free world. 
n  ,.;.y:._ld  appear that  a  qualified answer  must  be  given to this question. 
T~e future  outlook for the market  and the relative size of the European 
industry do  not  justify even the  enlarged Community• s  attempting to 
produce  a  complete  range  of la:::-ge-ca;Jaci  ty aircraft and high-thrust 
engines.  Tho  CommQnity  can ccntinue to satisfy a  major part of its needs 
through imports  -;d thout  any  ser:'.ous  drmvbacks  o 
Hm·rever t  the . sD.c:Jesses  already achieved,  the very serious so0ial  and 
regional problems  i·aherent  in a  policy of withdrawal  and the  importance 
of this  sector to the  economy  and to  defence  vmrra.nt  a.11  active presence 
of 'the ·EunY;')E:an  aerospace  industry on  the  world market  o 
Although  taken at  intervals 1  the  decisions  already reached and the 
resultant  laun:'::hing of programmes  ent  e:-ing the market  ( Concorde,  Airbus, 
Mercure 1  F28,  VFW  614;  RB  211  engine) t  which  ~vill be  joined by new 
projectr.,  notably AERITALIA 1  BOEING  and  EUROPL.Al"'JE- (EAC/MBB-SAAB/SCANIA), 
provide·a st2.rting-point  1-vhioh  is fat'  from  being mediocre ·or negligible. - 23-
I  , ". 
In order to  develop  a  healthy,  dynamic  and competitive industry on this 
basis without  excessive cost  to the public authorities,  the  Community  and 
.Member  States will in the  coming years have  to organize the mobilization 
of Europe's resources  in a  suitable mnnncrz  i.e., assist tho  ind~stry 
to consolidate its structures at  a  European  level,  ensure  that the 
European market  makes  a  better contribution to the  development  of the 
European industry,  make  progra~me development  more  systematic  and 
improve the granting of aid  &~d other subsidies,  so  that  as  regards the 
programmes  adopted the manufacturers  enjoy the fair conditions  of 
competition,  which  are essential to the  achieve.nont  of commercial  success. 
Europe  certainly possesses in suffici.ont measure the  resources - human, 
technical and financial - required to recapture part  of the world market, 
but  this goal >-rill  only be  achieved if these resources  are properly 
utilized.  The  experience of tho  last twenty years  (sec the analysis 
in Chapter  1)  shows  that the following three main guidelines are to be 
reoommen:lsd: 
a)  Against  the competition from  the us,  and  soon from  the Soviet  Union 
and Japan,  the factor of  size must  be  exploited to the full.  This 
means  the  size  of the European market,  the manufacturing companies  and 
the States'  aid policies. 
b)  Since the  aim  is competitiveness,  prim~ry consideration must  be given 
to the industrial and commercial  na"l;ure  of the  oper"ltions  to be 
undertrucen.  The  major burden must  devolve upon  industry,  which  must 
be liable for the risks involved  and also responsible for project 
organization and management. 
Action by the public authorities  should continue to be  in  t~o form  of  a 
back-up role and  diminish as the  revamped  industries become  better able 
to hold their own  with their competitors,  Similarly the methods 
employed in such action should allow industry to exercise the greatest 
posJ3:hH'.mco.sure  of responsibility.  The  first priority must  be  to 
dispense with protectionism  and captive markets,  which could have  an 
adverse effect  on the competitiveness of the industry's productsf  and to - 24  -
limit public financial assist:mco  (reimbursable aid and  g'~o,ra."ltees)  and 
c·:hatcver measurc3  rna;1  be  necesce,ry to  countE.ract  interferencG with 
competition as  a  result of action 1:·y  tho public e:.uthorities in other 
co~lx:rtrios.  In this  re.~:pect it -vmuld  be  appropriate to  seek intern.ational 
aereemenl;  en avoiding an  escalation of aid and protection.  On  the other 
b1.nd~  in order to place the firms  concerned in an  t:environment
1
' 
corresponding o.s  closely c,s  possible to market  conditions 1  it would be 
d.esi.r<:cb-.l.e  to  examin.:;. the  o.Gsirabili  ty of ho..ndi:ng  over the granting and 
. mMagement  of public-sector aid to  c>..n  industrial or banking org<:.nization 
employing as far  as possible the methods  used in the pri  v':1te  sector. 
c)  Sine:;  rGsourcGs  are 1imitec1.1  a  highly selective programme policy must 
be pursued which is aimed tow3rds  specialization in the types of equipment 
corresponcli.ng to both the  cco:pacity of tho  :tW.ropean  industry and the real 
need::1  of the market.  This postulates firGt  of nll that programme 
dcoisicns  should not  be  to,kon until exhaustive market  survGys have  been 
carrioci out  which  tr~ko  aqcouJ,.t  of the nueds  of_  anc.  rGstriotions  imposed 
upon the usE.:rs 1  both Thl.ropean  and other,  incorporate  the  requiremcmts  of 
othe-x·  policies such as that for the  environment.  This  also me;:\ns  the>.,t 
useleGs  (1-L,_plication  must  b0  avoided:  Europe  rr:ust  not  squander its 
rosouroos  b;y  fU-"lding  too. great  a  number  of competing programmes.  Finally, 
·sino~:~  the  object  is to re-·ostablish a  foothold on tho  wox·ld market,  there 
must  be  a.  ccrt<::.in proportional  subdivision of the worl-c  in relation to thG 
mnn competitors.  Apc,rt  from  a  simple  nhole-filling11  policy,  collaboration 
vJi th non-mo:nber  ccmntries  cc:m  bn  considered desir0,blc  in certain cases  on 
. condi  'Cion  that it is on  a  b2-lanced basis.  Such  collaboration could thus 
be instituted bet-~;een the reshc::_ped,  European industry and major concerns, 
notably lmoric;;w.'1..  Indusi::l•ial  .:J.greernonts  could involve pro<iuct 
specialization and consequently easier access to the max-kets  of the  two 
~oups of partners.  Cooperation could be  extended. to a.greements  between 
the  authori  tics of  non~-member countries  and those in the  Communit:r.?  thus 
enabUng the  ~'rules of the  game~: to be  defined within which tho 
industries of the various  courrtries  could -.wrk together  and compete  in a 
situa.tion offering equQ.lity of opportunity. 
Action by the  enlarg·2d European Community to implement  these guidelines 
involves  thG  definit::.on of chjootives  and the  setting-up of procedures, 
\..rhich  form  the  subject  of the following  sectioJ.1So - 25-
It vms  seen in Chapter  1  how  fragmented the mu.rket  for  aerospace  equ~pment 
is in Europe  and this  should be  the mo.,in  natural outlet for European 
manufacturers,  as well  as  c.  shop  ~vindow for the promotion of  sc~os outside 
Europa. 
Tho  proc~ement policies of the  armed forces  h~ve always  been fundamentally 
ncttionalistic to d2.te,  but  alloH room  for  cooperation on  a.  bi- or 
multilateral basis in the  case of certain costly items.  The  development 
with:n a  suitable framework  of the  closest possible EUropean  collaboration 
is d0sirable  vJi th a  view to defining and fincmcing  lnrge-sca.le programmes 
which meet  tho needs  of the  armed forces  of Europe  and,  subsidiarily,  are 
c~lculated to maintain or capture csrtain external markets. 
The  market  for  large civil aircraft is assuming increasing signficanae 
for the manufacturers.  1Urcpean companies  should accordingly be  able  to 
find in ~ope not  o.,  patchwork of  &~all orders extending over protracted 
periods,  but  important  customers  capable  of placing substo.,ntial  orders 
~-rhich could form  a  firm basis for  the  development  of production. 
A main  step  in this direction 'l'laS  taken by the  consortia trading under 
the banners of  N.i:LAS1 and Kssu2•  The  object  of these consortia is to  sh<1re 
the cvst  of ma.in+.aining  equipment  and to coordinate technical definition 
of requirements for new  equipment.  Hmvever,  the participating companies 
remu.in  indepe!".dent  as regards purchasing policy,  finance  and the  timing 
of purchases.  Since collaboration within the groups  in r:uestion appears 
to be  complete1y satisfactory,  an attempt  to  extend it to  cover c.ll  aspects 
of  0q,.1ipmGnt  policy  ~·rould be  desirable. 
1ATLAS:  Air-France, Alitalia, Lufthansa,  Sabena,  Iberia. 
~SSU:  KLM,  SAS,  Swissair,  UTA. -·26-
t.nothor matter for  concel~n is tlK,t  of the  dynamism  of the European 
m<:.rket,  i.e.~ the volu1ne  of  dem2....'1d.  There  can,  of course,  be no  question 
of making the air1ines in any  way  subservient to the m.:1nufc..cturers  and 
priori  ties  .-w~ld be  tops;;r-turvy if an  attempt  were  made  to modify their 
struoture or function vii th the  aim  of putting them  in a  position to_  bu~r 
more  aircraft.  H:>wevor,  although we  are deding here vri th a  matter  coming 
more particularly under. tho head of transport policy,  we  need to  examine 
the conditions which  sh:;pe  tho market,  and particularly to try to 
determine  vihat  arrangements 1·rould  be  appropriate for  improving air 
transport  and also would provide  a  stimulus to the  development  of the 
European industry. 
Quite  apc..rt  from  the problem of the market  for aircraft, it is undeniably 
o,  fu.ct  that the  organiz:J.tion of air transpo:rt  in a  Eurqpean  context has 
l  .• 
for many  years been the  subject  of surveys  and projects which it is not 
.  .  .  .  .  I 
':P'ossible  to  rec3.pitulo..t~ here.  r.fuese  v11rious  activities have  concerned 
1Joth the  overc,ll  orgi.lnizr:.tion of .:::.ir  trc.nsport  in the European countries 
and  tb;;;  uay in lvhich this mode  of tr<u1sport  is used within the  g-:.wgr~phioal 
. .  '  .  ,, 
o.,rea  c•f  Europo.  Moreover·,  the problems  etffecting air  tre.nspor~ .are  a 
focus  of interest  just novr  and the 'rransport  Commi tteo of the F.:uropean 
Parliament has  instructed one  of its m8mbors  to drt:uv  up  a  report  on the 
subjc9t. 
The  p~esent doCThT!ent  is not  tho place to adopt  a  fundamental attitude 
to this  ma~teT;  it must  be restricted to pointing up  the principal 
proolems which deserve  examination: 
a,)  Since the conclusi.on of agreem_r;mts :on the  subject after the  second 
.  ' 
world we>,r 1  airspace has been used  on  a  strictly nationo.l basis,  s11.bject 
to treffic e.,::r.ceements  on  2- country-to-cot.'.ntry basis,  and  an operating 
monopoly of scheduled services has  boon granted to  one  or two  no.tional 
Having rego,rd to  the difficulties 
encountered by the  comp2.nies  and to Europe's  overall interests, this structure 
is not  the best  which  c2n be  achioved9  its continued existence would prev·:mt 
rationalization of resources.  It is possible that  as European unification 
progresses this situation will  ch~nge.  It is appropriate to  examine  in 
economic  o.nd  political terms  the gains which  '~<IDuld result  from  the ppoling 
of opere-ting rights  a.'1d  compnny mergers,  as  v.rell  as the  st:J.ges  by "'<hich 
such  a  stu,te  of affairs could be brought  about. - 27  -
b)  The  intra·-Duropea."l routes  seom  to be  oporatocl csscnti::"ll:r  on the 
basis of relo.tions:t.ips  botvmon indi  vid,tal  countries  nne.  evs  a  .:;onrr;;·,l 
rule link ono  capital with c:.nother  or with ::'.nother  me.jor  to1·m.  Moreover, 
tho European flc.g-carriers  appoo.r  to e.ttach less  econorr.ic  importcmoe  to 
intra.-EuropeDJl routea,  Hhich c.re  considered,  to  some  exton-~  at  least,  to 
be  11f0eders11  for  ir1tercon·(;inont<:1l  traffic.  'rhore  .vould  scorn  to be  a  case 
for  explo:dng the conditions in wilich it  '~'>rould  be possible to set  up  a 
European route nohmrk on  a  sco.le taking in-l:;o  2.cconnt  tr::..'1sport 
requirements in Europe  and to  operr:.te  this nctvmrk more  rdion.::.Jly,  using 
the hc.:rdvJare  2:vailablc in the va:cious  cou:.1trios. 
It is clear that the  setting-up of n0w  routes Hould  depend  on th8 
existence  of  sufficient  demand  and that the extent  to which this dem2nd 
showed itself to be  a  function of,  cmong  other thincs,  tho  level of the 
I'aros  and the quality of tho  lin..l<s  botwecn the airport  and the city c.ontre. 
Fare  levols therr:selves  could be  favourc.bl;;,r  influcmc0d by tlw  introduction 
of  specia:J..]y  desit,ned short-haul  c.;.ircr.aft  and  sui  to..bH-.: infrastructUI·os. 
Whutever  the difficulties,  only nn  oxhu.ustive  study b::1sed  on  reliable 
trgffic fo:c-ecasts  o.nd  using simulation techniques will provide clear 
indications of future  pot·enti.:111• 
1  A  vo~y important first  step has  been taken by the  F~onch in this 
respect:  an  intorministe:.·i.~l  cornni ttee dealing with :regional planning 
took the decision on  21  Dacember  1971  to  o:pen  up  routes  botween 
Strnsbourg~ Brussels  aml  ~ondon and  St~C'asbuurg c_nd  1\'lilo.n"  Those 
routes vTill  be  oper<1.ted  by Lir France.  but  their forecast  d.eficit  vJiJ.l 
be  covered pc.;.rtly by the local ;:mthorities  and p3.rtly by regj.or::al 
planning funds.  The  interministerial committee  hc..s  0.lso  expressed 
interest in opcming up  a  r.:.unber  of other routes,  such  c.s  Lille~I!russels­
Arr:st:ordaxn,  Gronoble-Tu:'in,  :;:.,yons-B:cussols,  Hcu.'soilles-Bc.rcelona,  etc. 
Aid  from  public funds  o:-1.  a  depressive  scale  >-~ould be  granted for  up  to 
three years. ..:.  28  .. 
As  early as the  Cu1.moil  mec;:ting  on 4·June  19709  t~1e  Commissim~'s 
representative  h2.d  stressed the need to D.rrive  at  Community-level action 
in the field of air transport,  and had cited improvement  of the intra-
Community  route network as  one  of the major  objectives.  Such action 
would have  to  bo  preceded b:v  a  genera],  systematic  study of inter-regional 
traffic potential on a  Cor:m;uni ty scale.  This line still holds  good  and 
in this connection the  Commission ref-:rs to  the Cour.oil  draft  decision 
vJhich· it forwarded to the  latter on  3 Ju]y 1972.  The  drc,ft  t0xt  in 
c,ruestion,  ~rh.ic.h relates to the fundnmentals  of  joint action in tho field 
o:f  air transport,  is based on Article 84(2)  of the Treo.ty.  'The 
proposal mo.Q.e  to  the,. Counr..il  is that th0  Commission  should be  instructed 
to  exc:mine,  togothc:~ vdth experts appointed by  each of the Member  States, 
the measures io be  t<.lken  at  Community  level in the field of air 
navig~'-tion to  implc::ment  the measures  designed. to nchieve: 
a)  j,~provement of the  schedule  ser;tices -vli thin tho  Community; 
b)  ocnsultation behreen the Nemlier  States  on fares  policy.9 
c)  consultc.t"ion  on policy· for developing services with non-member 
countrjes. 
Industrio,l  agreements  couid involve product  specialization· and 
consequently easier access· to the markets  of the two  groups  of po..rtners. 
Cooperation could be  extended to o..greem6nts  between the  <J,Uthorities  of 
non·-member  countries  and those in the  Community,  thu~ enabling the 
"rules of the game"  to be  defined1  within which the industries of the 
vD.rions  countries  uould Hark  ·i;ogether  and compete  in a  si  tu.ation offering 
equality of opportunity. 
Action by the  enlarged European Community  to  implement  these guidelines 
involves the definition of objectives  and the  setting-up  of procedures, 
which  form  the  subject  of the following sections. ...  29  -
Ch:::.pter  1  has  shown that,  as  compax-ed  >i"i th the industry in non-member 
countries,  the Europea11  industry is too restricted in size  2nd the 
results which  ca::1  be  e;.,.peoteC:..  frorr:  precarious,  acl.  hoc  cooperation 
C:.fsTeements  are  lirni  ted. 
Size is not  <1...'1  end in itself. but  in the  aerospace  sector the  costs 
involved.  ru.•e  so  t;JJ.'eat  and v;id.ening  of tho market  so  essential that  an 
effort  tm-.rard.s  concentration in furope  is nGcessar·y  on  a  sc0le larger 
thc:m  \-.rhc.t  has  been attained in the major  co1.'  .. ntric:s.  Realignments  e:.re 
o.,lso  necessary in order to  form  entities capable  of entering into 
cooperation vr.i.th  the large lunerican  com:.erns  v-1i thout  running the risk of 
quickly being reduced. to tho status of subsidiaries of  sub-contrac·cors. 
The  aim  should therefore be  to direct the trend of production structures 
to1,:etrds  the  form:J.tion  of a  small  number  of large,  transnational  companies 
vJith  sole responsibility for  r.13.jor  programmes.  At  fir  at  sight it vmuld 
seem  desirable  and poss:i..ble  to  seclli'e  the grouping together of two  or 
even threG  lc:.rge  airfrc.me manufacturers  cmd  one  large  engine mu.nufacturer. 
In this respect it is certainly desirable that  conditions  of competition 
should. be maintained in ))Jxope,  out  only  pr~viried massive  concentration 
and the  size of firr:1s  in th0  r8st  of the  world.  do  not  transform the 
mainten<mce  of  int:ca-I~nropeen compcti.tion into a  position of i•redo1.ess. 
It is important  to  examine  the nature  of the competition Hhich  should 
obto.in betvleon t:1e  tvm  (or three)  lc::.:rge  groups  of Blropcetn airfrowo 
mc::;.mfacturers.  In future,  as  at present,  it woulcl  be::  difficult to 
justify in economic  terms the production in ~ope of more  than one  type 
of aircraft for  ec:>.Gh  category of the me.rket  for  l2..~ge  machines.  On  the 
other hand,  competition  c:.t  the technological design and marj;:ct  resea.rch 
stages will remain crucial.  Consequently,  the large Euro,ean groups 
tvould  compete,  e.g.,  in design etnd  market  survey in the field of  QTOL 
(quiet take-off and  lanc'cinb), :~ircraft, while  only one  moclcl  vmuld be 
developed and built in Europe. 30 
Indus'Gri::t.l  combination opera-tions rerp:ire  cautious hr.ndling and connot 
be  ce~rried out  in an 0.uthori  tariaJ:'}:·mei~liier~ .  :  · · Ih order to  ~rield· max:l.rnum 
benofi  t, they must  take  in-to  c~cc>1.ilit·'·fifu}2.J.1·~  t ecbnical  and  economic- factors, 
the  comp:.mies'  ext.Jrn:.:'..l  links  and the special problems  which rriay  urise 
f:t.'OD  diffGrences in their status  (public or private).  Such  combinc'.tions 
mey  come  about  through .a  .trond l.n .which  increasing collaboration leads 
to cllmlf,ramu.tion. 
Although caution and  a  certain omount  of the time will be needed in order 
to  C'..Chieve  worth-while results,  no  doubt  must  be left today as  to the 
course  to be  follo1-reO.  a..""lci.  conditions  and procedures must  be  created 
to  encoura,go  and facil:Ltato rc.::alignmGntso  In this  co~""lection we  must 
not  J.ose  sight  of ·1;he  fact tlmt the State possesses  considerC'..ble  holdings 
in certain corapnnies  2.nd  thus  can  do  more  to influence thoir attitude 
than it  CG'....'1  in the case  of  companies  backed purely b;r private en-terprise. 
If there is a  genuine  desire to progress in the direction outlined C1bove, 
tho Membor  States should decle,re:  themselves  expressly in favour  of  such 
c,  moverr,ent  and the  Commission  should1  in conjunction with the governments, 
be made  responsible for keeping track of trends in the  sector concerned 
and for considering the steps the  Community  o.nd  the  gov·::;rnments  could 
take in o;rC..er  to promote  or facilitate  such mergers  as the industry, 
with 1'lhich  -the  initiative lies, may  t'ITish  to carry oa·~. 
I, 
There is sc8.rcely  any need to point  out  here that 1-1hile  structural 
mergers  can o.:crrentJ.y be  effected by means  of techniques deriving from 
. national  l<tws,  these_ solutions  are far from  being  comp1etei~r satisfactory. 
Representatives of  ci~cles in the drcraft  indust!"'J have  stressed the 
importu.noe  and urgency of h:wing Gdequate  tooln for bringing abo".lt 
tro  .. nsnational morgers  o..nd  cooperation.  The  Coiomlission  can only keep 
strensing the necessity for  speeding up  the process.  He  will restrict 
ourselves here to pointing out  the various types of legal ma.chinery 
currently being developed at  .comr:J.unity  level:  the European  CompGnyv  the 
"g;roupement  d' interet  G'conor::tique11  and the Joint Undertaking  (an extension 
of the  concept  contained in the BurGtom  Treaty);  a  draft  directive 
dealing with  common  tax trectmcnt  for mergers,  the disposal and 
contribution of assets as  beti'ITeen  companies  in different  Member  St2..tes 
1 
and ether proposals for fiscal directives  affect.ir·.g trcms-frontier 
runalgu..raations. - 31 
It is proposed th2,t  the  Cou,"l'Jil  should approve  the  ideas  set  out  o.bove 
by adopting the  :;.~ecommondGtil1n ~coritrrined in No.  1  of tho  e,ppcmded 
1'Implemcnting texts::. 
It HilS  shov..rn  i:1.  Chapter  1  that,  liko the  .3t1~oture of tho  industry, 
public  support  hets  rem~dned essentL::.ll;y- m1tion.::1,l  in its e,ius,  decision-
mu.king proce  sscs  .snd procedures. 
It  w:~s  also  em~hasizcd thLt  this aid  struct'J..I'o  encouragr:Js  the maintenm1ce 
of ncd;ional  struc"curcs  C:\G  rogards production cccpaci ty and mo,rkets. 
Dospi  te the  development  of  forr.1s  of coope:ration,  v;hich are  expedients 
and not  tl1e  result  of  a  comprehm.1si  ve :european-scale  vicn·.r  of the situation, 
the chief suffere:c from  the effects of this state of affairs is progr.:unmes 
polic:J"•  The  piecemeal  nat:J.re  of public  suppor·t,  ie. 7  in f2.ct  of policies 
thcmscl·,_~cs,  runs  count or to the  csscntinl  need~ uhich  ic for  E'u.:::'ope 
to conccntrnto  on a  feN  ro.tionc.lly chosen prO[,'T<J.!1mos 7  thus  securing 
for itself mE..xirrn.un  opportv.nitios  e.s  ret5ards  m.::crket  outlets. 
The  mediw11-torm  objective is t!ms  to  set up  a  Community plalli'1ing and 
financing  system  in which  joint  ccction can be pursued.  In c>rcler  to be 
effective  suGh  a  system will hc,ve  to  include  decision-mo.king.  It vJill 
also nocd to possccs its own  funcls  in order to cover  la.rge···sca.le projects 
concernir:g tho  development  of Eurcpe.'111,  aerospace proO..ucts. 
As  a  first  stngc,  th'"  Commission considers it to bG  of  immcG.ide 
iri!portance  to coordinate tho ncctiona:t  policies,  in particulo.r b:y  thoroughly 
cor..ce:ctr:::d  effort  on nm·J  progr:'mrnos  and  instr·unents for financial  support 
vrhich  \•JOuld  cn~-:,ble  Comm~mi  ty action to be  set up  and I·Jhich,  aHhou[;h 
incomplete  and modest r  Hould be  able to G,ct  as  a  cat:.1l:yst  u.nd  confer  on future 
proj,3ots  a  sort  of recognition that  they vmrk  in the pubEc  intE.;rest  vJhoro 
the  Community is concerned  ( seo  recorrunendat ion in No.  1  of the 
lli;nplOr:Jentinb texts17 )  0 32  -
The  Commission  ~·rill  sho.dly propose that  -the  Council should sot  up  a 
system  of  11Co;,1:,wni'cy  ir.:Jo·~..-c..tivo  and  in~:u=rtrial development  contracts"  as 
an  instrument of inC:+.ustr:l.al  e..nd  technological policy.  These contracts 
v10uld  bo placed in the case  of innovc::,tive  projc;;cts  to be  carried out  on a 
cooperative  basis~ in C1COOrdai''J.C8  i'li th criteria and procedures laid down 
in a  Council regulation and financed out  of a  limited amount  of funds 
vJhich  would. be  deri  vcd  onnu::1lly  from  the  Commu  ..  "li  ty budget.  In viet-J  of 
tho  limited vo2.1:une  of funds  envisag8d for the  initi2..l phase,  such 
contracts would,  in the  ae:r-ospo.ce  sector·~ . be particulo.rly app::.'opriate  for 
indust.J.'in.l  projects concerning the  development  of components  on  equipment 
and possillly for definition or feasibility stuc1ies fitting into the initial 
·phase of development  of the proereJllliles proper. 
The  fUnQ~ng of the development  of large  prqtot~~~s will, at least for the 
initial phaso,  contim.lG  to be  effected by meens  of national aids ·-
applied,  needless to say,  jointly and on  a  coordinated bu,sis -until it 
can  'bs:  done  at  Commnrtity  leve1 7  either vic..  oc:-!tracts of tro..:l  tYJ)c  r;v:mtio::1ed 
;;;:!Jove  c-;;- b;y  J cj  nt.  Undertakings  ( soe page  28) • 
Despite the  incomplete  and  limited nature  of the  aid which  could be 
granted by the  Conm1unity via innovative  and industrial development 
contrc.cts in tlw initial phase,  this aid vlill play an increasingly 
significant role as it is applied to  larger projects:  it will  combine 
national~scale public aid vlith truly concerted action,  stimulc.te mergers 
be·bmen Em'ope.:m  companies  and facilitate the creation of a  useful  join.t 
management  tool. 
Progrcunme  definition is a  central factor in the European aerospace policy. 
The  futuro  of the sector is bound up  with  soundnGss  of choice,  i.e.: 
a) .the  qu~1-li ty of the programme  largely determines the  competitiveness 
of the product  on the mo.rket; 
b)  too many  competing progrrunmes  mean  a  dispersal of effort  n.nd  a  vmste 
of resources7 
c)  the programr:Jes  form  the basis of inter-·cwpa:ny collaboration and a 
sound qhoioe  of programmes will be of partioulm"' value in the promotion 
of realignments  and industrial concentration"  This holds equally good for 
the formation of Europe;an groupings  G.nd  for the  agre<Jments  to be reached 
between these groups  and industry in non-momher  cou."ltrics. - 33-
Hitherto~  such procrrunmes  have  ·tJeon  spc:1.wr1'Jd  by priv::.tc  initicttivc  ru.1d  it 
is mo:r·c  by fortu.ne1te  ncc1.dent  tl:-:'1  b:·  dcsig11  tl1o.t  tho major progrc.11r.Jc.J 
ente:::'ing the ma:clcet  complement  oach other.  Hm-:over  ~  c:,s  regards tho  h;,test 
type of aircrcit the  daL1Gor  that there Hill be too  mc;.ny  projects  computing 
in 1'aropo  under  the  bc.nner  of S':l'()L  (short  take-off  iJ..11.d  landing)  is <:..lroady 
looming up. 
IJ.1he  plo.n...'1ing  of neH production lines is not  only of  import<:mce  from  the 
standpoint  of strengthening the  aerospace  inclt.lstr;n  it should also  ensure 
groat  or  conformity of tho  hardtvc:U'e  produced with tho needs  of  s~'c:iety rmd 
thus  guarantor:;  the qualitative e,spects in the  devoJ.opmcnt  of civil air 
trCll'lsport.  So  far the prinoipal  concerns of the mo..:nufacturors  r:U1d  cc.rriers 
ho.ve  been  w:i.. th increased speed  E'..lld  lm;or user costs. 
are  or:1Grging;  a  red.uction of pollution,  and  above  all noise pollution9 
faster comrnunico,tions  tvith city ce:1tres,  erec.ter security in spite of 
congostoi:l  2-ir  space,  e:tc.  'J:he  sntisfaction of these  nocds 1  which  goe;s 
be;>'Oncl  the purely economic  requirements  of the air tx'CLYJ.sport  sys·com,  can 
only bo  o,chiovod  through  ci  systematic planning process vlhich takes into 
account  all the  factors  influencing project design. 
It is therefore  nocessa::-y to  ca-cry out,  l•ri thin the  frw:'le,.;ork  of the 
Corrmu..."lity's  institutions,  a  genuine  aligi1mont  of tho  Member  Stu,tes 1  c;ttiturles 
regarding tho  1C-UJ1ohing  of ne•v  aerospace programmes  and to  secure coordination 
and hnrmonizntion of fi:-encial  cid on the  b~'..sis  of  joint dete:r:;:inaticn of 
objectives  and methods,  whether  such aid is granted by tho  :Mem1::,or  States 
or by menns  of Community  instrlUnents  (Community  innovative  z: .  .nd  industrial 
development  contracts! Joint  Undert::.kings~  etc.).  It goss  vii-~hout  saying 
that the hnrmonizc:,tion :::-ecommended  above  relates only to tho  stance 1o1hich 
tho pubL.c authorities ivouJ.d  be  caJled upon to adopt  when  examining future 
projects and that there is no  in-:';ontion at  o..ll  of encroaching upon 
responsibilities vrhich are properly those  of the  manufacturers~ upon  vrhom 
the initiative for conceiving and  launching projects  dov~lves in the first 
place. 
Of  the projects engaging their attention,  the Institutions of the 
Community will naturally be p.JXticularly interested in those  of a  trans-
nntional character. _34-
•j 
F:r: Jc;rarw11e  ha::::moniza:ti.cm  in the  sGnsG  envisctged.  above  can only be carried 
th~ough properly if t~w I.Iember  Sta:G~s  c:r;d  Institutions of tho  Commnnity 
hGV'3  in their possessi.on .  ci.il the  • necessary bn.ckgyov.nd  informdion e.nd 
.  . 
It shoul-d be  lc.id down  that.  in order to  11cl.ea.r  the -vmy"  :for  ·.  .  .  . 
--
their work the  Commission vrill  cow:mlt  .:::.11  the interested parties and 
then compile  reportc  inco.rporc.ting r,ll the useful  d.n:ta  n.nd  proposn.ls. 
These reports will be po..rticularly concern8d vd th th8 following points: 
a)  Situation and future  development  prospects of the  e,erospace  ir:clustrjr. 
AYJY.  study of- future prograrru:1es  requires  en overGll  vimv of tho si  tu2tion 
n.nd  future  of the soctcr. 
i1n  an.:::.lysis  of t:1e  vrork-load  end available capo.ci ty of the  Europeo.n 
industry calls first  of u.ll for  e-n  cxamindion of th;;  needs  and purchasing 
pl~s of the  airlin~s with regard to current production  p:rogr~J~os. 
The  information supplied by the users would.  nc..tm'all:r not  constitnt8  a.."l.y 
oblig.:1tion to pu.rchaso  on their p.:1rt. 
Additiom.liy,  realistic prospects  should be plotted b;>r  using all the 
studies concerning· the mcu'ket,  production facilities,  infrastrn.ctures, 
etc.,  as  a  basi~.  Such forecasting should'  to..ke  account  o:f -the  needs 
and trends  emerging' from  the va.rious  policiGS- which  a!-G  likely to affect 
c.ir trnr.sport  and the  c:.erospace  industry (transport,  the  environment, 
regional plc-.nning,  employment,  industrinl,  tGchnological' G.nd  sdentific 
development~ etc) •  fl p.:1rticula:rly importLnt  aspect  is the  examina:tion 
of futuro noeds  in order to map  out transport  strategy for inter-city 
links for the period 1985-2000.  The  result  of the  COST  study (Project  33) 
o,s  regards the  analysis of the futuro  tran;"'!Yort  needs  of pnssengers 
travelling between  large population centres in L'urope  \'fill  be  of spooial 
importc:mce. 'I'ho  studic;s  carrit:d out  .:::,t  c.  nction.:tl  level 1wuLl he-vo  to tc  c·:;;  p:-,r:::cl~  ::.r.r~ 
tho bodies  consultod 1-rould  ha.vr;  to contribute  b;-{  r:1aking  av-:::,ilnblo  th0  dd<1 
in their possession.  The  r';·i<Cesentntivo professicnnl orgcnizo.tions  ~,mulcl 
be  o.bJ.o  to pl:J.y  u.  consider:1blo  pc1rt  in preparing the  inforraation,  which 
the  co:npotent  c:'.ep2..:rtmcmts  of the Commission  could have  consolid2-tod. 
b)  Typos  end charactc7'istics  r.~ost  C..Jproprin.to  to ·tho  forocc~st needs  .c:nd 
demru1cls. 
Th,:;  repC>rts  'muld hc.vc  to  suppl;r .::ell  c.ppropric..to  inform~'.tion oh  the 
proj8Gts likely to find sufficie11t  demCU1d  on the  :Curupec::n  ").nd  world 
markets,  bearing in mind th0 restrictions  jmposed by tho  vz,rious policies. 
These projects would be  defined by their principc::,l  chDracteristics. 
Tho first problem  reC[l.t±l:ing  GXc.<:~incction 1.vould ndurally b~ those  linked 
Hith the protection of the  el'rdrorunont  - reduction of noiso::J  cn1i  go.seuua;· 
pollutc:nts - cmd  2.ir:port  congestion. 
vJuLt:.d  be  closirable  in the near futl'.re. 
i\.n  ini  t i(1l  survey of those matters 
Tpe  dc,ta  supplied by the users  l'muld be  of the greatest use  in this 
connection~  and particip2.tion i.n  this work  would. not prevent  users  from 
mnintc..ining their direct  conte.cts  '1-iit~",  the  vc:.:r·ious  m.:J.nufocturers  in any 
W::l.;)',  both  .::..t  the preli:ninru:y  study  aucl.  the project  implementation  s·(;e;_ge. 
Needless to  scy,  the participation of the airlines in the  definition of 
future  prOg'!'i.'.lnmes  could not  be  C011'3-i:-I'v.ed  as  involving  U.:1Y  obligation to 
purch::-..so  at  a  st3.go  so far removed  from  deli  ver3r  of the  finc:.l  product. 
The  operJ.tors  would only be  called ·upon to ta.'l(c  up  options  and place thC.ir 
ordGrs  as the proe,rrrunme  and tests progressed. 
c)  Funds required for the projects. 
l!i.1e  reports ;-rould have  to proviC:.-:::  information on the fino.ncial,  technicu.l 
and mnr.povmr  capacity for  e::1.<:~bling the projects to be  carTied through 
vri ti1in the deadlines  and costs  clot ermined at the  out set.  ~'hus tho 
pr.·onpocti  ve 1·mrk-load for  tho  Europer>.n :industry over  c  fc.irl:Jr  long period 
(10-15 years)  would  emerge. 36 
Thu  i:1dustrinl cooperation or mergers  nooess~y for the fulfilment  of the 
projects would have  to  be  tc.ken into.considero.tion.  This· survey would 
oonoer:q not  only thr::  inclustrir:.l  structures of the  Community,  but  2-l so 
tho links needing to be  estc.blish8d >-lith  firms  outside the  Commu11.i t~,r  and 
with the  governments of their countries.  Cc..re  should be  tu.ken in this 
connection to  ensure  thi:Lt  reldionships with non-member  countries do  not 
devE:lop  in the  forrr1  of sub-contracting agreements  or situc.tions involving 
dependence,  but  .:-,s  b~la"YJ.ccd agreerJents  reprcsc~1ting an  equitable sharing 
of research and developnont  uork and of the commercial  return.  This 
proposD,l  is part of the more  general  concept  of hc.-rmonizu.tion  of 
industric,l and technologic2.l  c.-greements  with the non-mombcr  countries 
(see report  of tho working Party of Senior Officials on Industrio.l Policy 
and the  Commitlsion1s  proposo.ls under the  heo.d  roms  of and resources for 
a  common  policy on scientific research and toclmologico.l  development, 
forwqrd0d to the Council  on  19  June  1972. 
Finally~  the reports could survey,  in addition to industrial funds,  the 
nature  and  extent  of the finG.llcial  support  from  public  sources required 
for the  irr:p1emer.ctut:Lon  of the projectsr  together .-lith the most  effective 
forms  for  r:r-1ch  support.  It >-lill  be  the  Commission's task to orgo.nize 
the  consu:Ltntions in the light  of tho  o.-otivities described above  and to 
do  so  in such a  way  as to bring about  closer collaboration between the 
manuf.:1cturers 7  operators  and responsible public authorities.  The 
pu.:dicipwts in the  consultations would be represent2.tives  of: 
a)  comp.::cnics  engaged in aircraft:J:,me.n:afo.cture  (11irfromes,  engines, 
equipment)  in the Member  States of the  Commu.:nit;:t; 
b)  airline comp<:mies  (companies  operating sohcduled and chu.rter services) 
in the Member  States7 
c)  the  govern\c)ents  of ti.1ese  St.:t-tes,  by virtue of the various forms  of 
intervention (dr trc.nsport~  industry,  infrastructures,  finu.nce,  ate.). 
Tho  foregoing analysis of the tasks  involved in the harmonization of 
progro.mmes  hc.s  been restricted to civil requirements.  It is,  however~ clear 
the-t  in order to develop  an overall strategy for the  Communi:t;y  aviation 
sector's structure and world-lead it ivould be necessory to take into 
consideration tho milit.::cry needs  ru1d  programmes  which  are  a  very important - 37-
source of c.ctivity in this sedo:r.  It ~-rould bo  desirc.ble if the Hembcr 
stc-~tos  vwre  to  explore:  tho posniu: lity of  cx"GoncLing  D.o,r:;wniz~·.tio::.. to 
include. mi li  tr.ry proc;rrun.:11ez  by  o,pp·:.·opri2,to  p:cocedurcs.  Such  o,n  exte~1sicn 
1-vould  not  appear  to raise  D.n.y  mc,jor  obstacles,  since the  b.rgc·-scale 
production of mili  t<J.ry  e-erospe..co  lv:.rC:.ware  is more  oft  ·:::n  th::u1  not  the 
subject  of bi- or multilntero,l cooperation. - 38 
The:;  steps recomrr.ended  in the  previot~S cha.pter reiu.te to tho  11structural" 
rein!'oroemcnt  o:t the  ue::ospccce  sector in tho  enlarged Cormnurd ty.  Hm·rever, 
it would c.1so  be useful to  examine  whether,  in view of  th"~· problems fcwing 
tho raunufc:.cturers  at tho  moment  - cmd  in p;:1:dicular  as  rego..rds  the 
imple:ment[ttion of the progrm,mes  currently under  development  - the  Community 
is in o.  posit:i_on to provic.e  solutions likely to resolve  either wholly or· 
p.::1:::'tly  the difficu2.ties v1hich  have  been observed. 
As  shovm  abov~, the n-,unufacturing nu,tions  hc::.ve  systems  of public support 
with differences  depending on the scops of their activities - for the R&D 
phc,se  up  to the marketing of the aircrci't  .. the necessity for which  can be 
explo..ined by the level of co,pita.liza.tion  (for R&D  alone tho cost is 30-70 
times the value  of the  series--production drcre..ft). 
If exo.1nined  from  th•a  point  of vievr of their. contribution to the  success of 
the prog;ro.mmc::s  in progress,  these  aid systems  ra~se t1-m  issues: 
1)  !~e the divergences in system between the various countries prejudicial 
to the sector's activities? 
2)  Are  the no.ture  of these  systems  end the underlying procedures best 
sui  ted to the furtherance  of commercial:  suvce·ss? 
a)  The  div8rgences  between the  systems  of aid. 
In generc1l  terms there is hardly c.:ny  doubt  that tho f-ragmented heterogeneous 
nature of the aid syst  oms,  uhich is accompanied by  a  lack of clarity, 
constitute an obstacle to the  expc:nsion of tho  aerospe.co  eoctor in Europe  •. 
With regard to the progrwnmes  currently unde:- wey,  a  distinction should be 
made  betoTeon  those bo.sed  on  inter-governmental  o.greements  nnd those 
conducted by private industryo - 39  -
On  the i'lhole,  the progrrunmes  crisine out  of C{;Tocmorlte  bot:·reon  governments 
ere  on  ~ clea.r  footing,  s:i.nce  the public c,uthori ties h<:1vc  ontorod  ~nt0 
specific corn.r:1itrr.cnts  as  rcgc:.,rds  the  finm1cic:-l  support  to  bo  given to 
industry.  In ge:1ere-l  t;;;rms,  these  same agra-::rocnts  shuuld also pro'.ride 
gtU'.ra.nteos  on the  continu<.:ncc  of the aid until the progr2IP.BO  is cor.1plotecl,_ 
but  experience has  sho1 ,,T!.1  thc.,t  there is a  risk of this beinG cruoried or 
wi  thd..ra~m,  espooial.l~r if it c:_,ppec.U's  that tho  foreco..st  costs or dec:cllincs 
are lb.ble to  bo  excocdod.  ..'l..lthouch  o..groomcnts  of this type  l::,y  do~m '-' 
common  ftLnc.ing  basis1  it i-l'ould  sec:n  that  in cort2.in  c<.,ses  thoy  shov1 
differences from  countrjr to country in proportion to tho  aid grL'.nted.  In 
those  inst<mcGs,  the pi:'.r-Gy  obtr.,ininc; the  loc.st  fo.vourc.bl.l!l  torms  ;orill  tend 
to consider  h~.mcelf to be  loss Hell treated thc:.,n  the other p,.1rt;jT.  One 
cannot  see  from  the facts  hm...r  such clifferences in troc:d:nent  e..re  justified 
as  regnrds manc<facturcrs  be::.ring  c.  proportiono..lly equivalent risk in a 
joint operation. 
Tho  discre:pancics  between aid systems  are l'egrettablo in tho  case  of 
Here the mcmufc.cturors  reach an ag-reement,  ec:.ch  one 
u.pproaohcs  his  government  for  c-id:  ru1d  the  governrncnt  reacts  e..ccorcling to 
habit  or  c~s  dict:cted by tho  prev~.iling concept  o..s  regards the roldionship 
bctvwen  s-tate  ru1d.  inclustry.  The  position of the  cocpere..tin,:; pc·,rtios  is 
no.tu::.'dly loss baliJ.11cod  in thd ce..ch  beo.rs  a  different proportion of tho 
risk. 
Hhen  the  Community possesses its. ot-m  mnchin0ry for  finc..Dcial  intervention 
as mentioned in Chnpter  2  - the  dro...,rbc:.cks  of the  o..nomc.lios  descri-bed mc.y 
be  removed.  In tho meantime  tl~.G  p:>:ogrrunmc  hc::.rmoniz~-.tion procedures outlined 
in Chapter  2  -vrould  hav.c  to be  di:cectecl  tovr3Xds  levelling out  the differences 
botvreon the  systems. 
hbere  programmes  are  in prog:cess,  it is suggested  ~hat the coordination of 
nat  iom::.l  aid should be  proco0deC.  1...r: -th  ns required. - 40  -
b)  The  eff:Jcti  ver.oss  of public  suppo1
1t. 
Genorally  speC'.ki1:g,  the Member  Sto..tes  grant  spcwi:'ic  aiel in order to enable 
tho aircraft mc::.nu.fac-turers  to bear the;;  costs  an&  risk involved in prototype 
development  (i.e.  1  design studies,  dafini  tion,  feasibility studies,  anct 
the building Gnd  testing of prototypes). 
The  tend.ency in the  subsec0-1ent  ph::1sos  i.e., seriGs production D.nd 
mc,rkGtinc;,  2..ppoo..rs  basicc::.lly to le[we  the manufc..cturers tc .take care of 
themscl  ves  r,s  best they can vrith the funds  ·,vhich  they are_  able to  extro.ct 
from  the money market  and the national  oxport-o:i."'edi  t  m<J.ohinory.  Hm-1ever, 
it is during those phcsos that the manufact11rei-s  enco"LL'YJ.tor  certain 
problems which it is essentiL1.l to resolve if they arc to enter the ma1
1ket: 
the need to achieve  a  sufficiently high rnte of output  1  to produce  r;, 
versatile typo  of drcr2-ft which  can be  me.tohed  to the requireraents of 
several customerst  to  cont2-in their prices  do~pite abnormal .P:rico  rises 
ru1d  alterdions in tho  exchange rutes,  end to., off8r every potential 
custor.1er  credit facilities equal to those  offered by their competitors. 
The prinoipo.l airr:  of tho followinG remarks is not to bring about  nn 
· incrense in public  o,ic1  to tho  o.orospaco  industry~  it has been 
spc;eJifically stated in this connection that it should be possible in 
futuro to reduce public aid to firms  in this sector e.s  th1.3y  become 
stronger.  HcWGvor~  such  o.  future  is dependent  upon the reasonable 
success of the progTanunes  in progress,  end it is with rGgC-rd  to thcso 
thnt the public authorities in Europe  r:;hould  ful1y enact  their role of 
"sleeping pnrtner11  in the c:ctivities of industry  (without  fc.iling to 
meet  their obliGdion regnrding repccymGnt  in the  event  of commercial 
success).  it policy of half-moasuros could only have  e,dvorse  consequences. 
( 1  °)  §~.c,\1!;..C,ti,9_11 
In  cortr~in countries the setting-up of the first  series production iine 
anci.  the building of the protoype  nre both funded at the  same  time. 
This  system  of aid recognizes tho diffiouity encountered by European 
m.:muf.:wturers  in obte-ining 2.dec;ruate  funds  on the money  mc,rket  during  e1 
phc:.se  \·Jhen  the industrial and  commerci<::-1  risks are .still considerable. 
Although the Jl.mericen manufacturers  lCi.l.tnch  series production 1-1ith  a 
large nu.rnber  of orders  on their books,  the Europeans generally receive 
their o:=-dors  in  smC~.ll packages over  a  fairly long poriod.  In o.ddi tion, 
the European money  market  would  appear to bo  largel;y closed to operations 
involving a  high proportion of  11technologioal  rif:1k;; ~ - 41  -
In order to  cope  with those problems,  it is cloe1rly  do~irable tho:t  in 
the  case  of aerospace progremmos to  bo  cox!'iod out  OE  e~.  coopore.tive basis 
- other;-ii so  known  as  1'transnational11  progrc:mmcs  - tho governments  of tho 
Member  Ste~.tos  should  cogroe  on: 
a)  e~.  common  concept  of tho aid  oarme~.rkod for  REeD  - such aid havi.ng to 
oOi:or  nll e:xpondi ture,  :i.nclur:.ing tho ini  ti~1l tooling-up for production, 
G.risinc out  of tho  imp)lementc,tion of tho progr;:unm-;  u:p  to tho  t;ype 
c.:..rtification stage  (prototypes of the  vc_rioua  ·.rersions,  st2.tic tost 
e~.irfromos,  g:,·ouncl  ar:d flight  testing)  9 
b)  the gr.:mting of State  gu::c1·c..ntees  for the  lo<..'...l1S  contracted by the 
m2nufG.cturers  Nith fiuancing bodies.  (See  tho  Ccwi·11ission' s  note  concerninr; 
the:  outline plan for dd in lifo.  2  of thG  1:Implomenting texts:') o 
Furthermore,  invol  vemont  on  the:  part  of the  L\J.rcpecm  Investment  Bn.nk 
Nould appear to be highly d.esirablo3  as  demonstrated by  a  recent  cc,se, 
there is nothing t0 prevent it from  becoming  involv·:cd  in the  aorospnco 
sector~  since  one  of its  taG~<:s is to fund projects of  conmHm  int-;;rest  to 
sE:.verC!-1  Tiember  Ste1tes  (Art.  130(c) 7  J:iEC  Treaty).  As  po  .. rt of its 
activity 1mdor tpis  heading~ the Brenk  hns  to.kcn  steps to further projects 
in n  E'1.xropoan  context  b~;,seo.  on mutuCJ.l  dopenC.once  [;.nd  techn.i.co.l  and 
fin<::.ncial  cooporntion,  cmd  ai:ned.  u.t  the  same  time  ;::.t  increo.sod productivity 
through optimum  size.  It htcs  macle  a  point  of underv.rriting v.ctivities 
which in the  sc:me  sp.irit  o.ro  designed to  rm-;eN"  industrial structu.res, 
not2.bly by  e.  spccrling up  0f  .. the intrcdJ.;.ction of  o.dv::cnccd  technologies. 
However,  u:ncler  its  stc:.tute~  the EIB  confines its activity to  inveshlGnt 
projects  (o.go,  plant  construction,  modernize1tion7  etc.)  c:.nd  never  funds 
a  project in its entirety.  FurthermorG,  if it po.rticipntes in the 
funding of projGcts,  the  Bc:.nk  cannot  G.ssumo  a;ny  part  of thG risk which 
these projGcts r,1ay  involve9  it requires  tho  borrcvJOr  to provide the 
usual  ban.ld.ng  sureties.  A State  gunr<.':ntee  in the territory ~vhere tho 
loan is granted may  be  deme..ndod.  Despite these understandable 
res-trictions,  if tne  eovernuonts were  disposed townrds  granting the 
guc.ranteos  requested..,  the activities of the EIB  in the  aorospcwe  sector 
could be intensified,  since recourse to the Bank would in pnrticular make 
it possible to prevent  pc:.rallel procedures  from  being followed in several 
Iviember  States.  The  Cornmission reserves  tho right to mnke  any approprie.te 
recommcndu.tion to the  Bm1k  regarding the intensification of the latter's - 42.-
Finc..ncb.l ·PJ.'obJ.erns  also  <:~Xise  at the marketing stage.  These basically 
conoerb: 
1 •  The  condH ions  o.ttr'.ched to credits grant  eel  to tho customer3 
2.  Tho  clauses dealing Nith prices  (firm or revisc.blo prices). 
a)  l'Jith regard to  exports to countries outside tho  Com.rnuni ty,  thc::J 
ma:nufc.cturers  are hand.icc.pped in relation to their competitors in non-
member  co'.:Jltries  by tile  e.bsence.of  a  Europ8an orgcmization able to provide 
credit  oondi  tions which are  as favourable  as tho  so  accorded by the US  or 
Japanese  Eximbanks. 
On  the othr hand1  the US  Eximbu.nk  (an o.gcmoy  ''rhich is indGpendent  of the 
governmc:mt  but closely ussociatod with tho gen.oro.l  economic policy of the 
country)  ho.s  for yen:rs practised a  consistent policy with regard to the 
exporting of aerospnce  hardwn.re?  its genorr,l  directives  o.re  as  follows: 
1 •  Fi.ve-·year  crodi  ts for propeller-turbine engines. 
2.  Seven-year credits for  jet engines. 
P  1rvf.,·o'  3.  ayment  of  ,v;  on  ~ccount. 
4 •  .A  5~  7/~ rate of interest. 
However,  and  not~bly as  a  result  of  recommcnd~tions submitted by the US 
National Export  Expansion Council,  certdn of these directives ha'JG  been 
vraived:  funds  have  been allotted over periods  of tun years,  there have 
been  contr~cts without  down  payments being made,  etc.  Certain US 
airlinos huvo protested against tho credit  conditions  applie•j. by the 
Exi;nbc.:.11J: 1  thc-ir ·;ietv being  tha~ they ,const:i.tuto  o.  f2.ctor  of ciisto1;tion 
in competition 1xrtween thu  US  airlines  and those of other countries. 
Certain non-member  countries hn.ve  follm-Jed the  e::::.nmple  of the United 
States wd also offer their customers  export  credit conditions t-rhich  clo · 
not  conform ui-th the rolevo..nt  interno;tional  a.o'J'l"eornents. - 43-
There  are metrkcd  differences in tho  !-1r:mber  St2tos  as  re::;o.rds  the r,wthods 
of financing mGdium- c:.nd  lo::lg-torr;-,  crodits.  Those  differences rGlr,te to 
the terms  of the crodits1  the  sw.1s  involvcdi  tho  adv::mc::;s  requirecl,  end 
tho rates of int0rest.  Thc;y  c:ro  pc.,rticulnly resrettable in the  ca,se 
of the  aircrc,ft  industry sinco  they hamper  th<:;  export  of  uircr<1ft  produced 
under  tro.nsnatiom.tl  progrrunr.1es. 
On  27  Octobor  1970g  the  Council  ,'"',dopted  tviO  directives concerning common 
crccli  t  ir.suranc0 policies for  mcdiltm- and  long-terr;:  operdions lly public 
ro1d  private purchCJ,scrs.  These  tvlO  directives set  out  the  frc.:uncwork 
vd thin t-.rhich  the general lines of action by the Memb8r  Stdes as  regn.rds 
credit  insur211ce  must  develop.  Hoi•rever,  it bocuno· cleo.r to the  Commission 
that~  given tho  special problems  in the  aerospo.ce  sector,  specific 
measures  c'imed at  closer harmonizc.tion were::  necessr,ry.  Accordingly,  tho 
Commission is submitting to the  Cou..Ylcil  under  number  4  of thG 
11lmplementing 
texts11  a  proposed  d:Lc-oc·~ive  which vrould  supplement  the  t1r10  directives 
dded 27  October  1970  Kith recard to tr2nsndional Europeen  c:.erospace 
progrommc s. 
F\rrthermore,  the pro"blcm  of tl:.c  g;uar221toos  relating to prices qu.oted 
cxises at tho me.rketing  stage.  'rhe  F.!uropoan  incJ:c1dry  has  drawn  tho 
attention of the  Commission tc tho difficulties encountered as  a  r(;sult 
of the  disp.::.ri ty botween or ;:;,bc0ncc  of the  gucn·c:ntees  offered by tho 
~-krnber St2-tes  agc::,inst  the rislc of  a';mornK'cl  rises in the prime  cost  ~nd 
fluctuations  in exchongc  rates.  '::hese  diffioul  tics ill'e  particuJr,rl;>r 
acute in the  c.erospace  sector ovJing to the length cf the  economic  cycle 
a.YJ.d  the nec1 for the  mnnuf~ctu:cors to offer their hardt-rc,re  for  sale five 
or six yco.rs  in advance  while guarcnteeing a  firm  pri-:::u  ( w:i. th escc,L:"tion 
cl:J.uses  not  exceodi~g 3-4%  a  year).  They  also make  themselves felt in 
tho relations between compcmics  cooperating in a  progriJlT!me!  since the 
relationships  between the pe.ri;ios  2.ro  liabli:t  to be  seriously impaired 
by w:,riations in prices or  exchang-:;  rates. -44-
Ii1ovemcnts  in econor.Iic  conditione  and in p:J.rticul:l.r in labc11I'  costsj 
together with wicle  fluc-tuo:l;ions  in exchc,ngo  rates nrc factors beyond the 
control of tho  indus-try  end cannot  be put  on a  par with the risks 1-vhich 
the firms  in o.  se;ctor  as precarious as  c:,erospace  nre  normnlly c.ble  to 
beG.!'.  Uno.er  these  conditions it woulcl  seem  !:!.ppropriato to  introduce 
r.1eo.surcs  likely to provide  subsequC'ntly at least partial compensation for 
the losses  suffGrod in this respect  by tho monufacturers. 
On  27  July 1971  ~  the  Conmission adopted and  for~<rnrded to tho  Cmmcil  two 
proposals for general directives concerning comr.1ercial  export  operations 
trd th non-mombor  cotmtries: 
1  o  1-Jith rogo.rd to  guo.ra.'l'ltees  ag!1inst  rises in costs, it is provided the.t 
the  Mcrnbc;;r  Sto..tes  wiJ.l  take the necessary steps to bring their code,s  of 
pro..ctice 1  where  thoy must,  into line with certain common  principles. 
The  r;renting of the guarentee  ~-vould be restricted to export  tra.nsactions 
ce.rried out  ei  tl1er under  a  cooperation <'{:,--reement  or within certain 
economic  soc-tors.  The  sum  involved in the  export  transaction would 
have to be at least 1,ooo,ooo  u.a.  and the production dead-time not  loss• 
them  1 5 months9 
2.  f.s  ret;arcls  cxch<.mgc  gu.:J.rantecs,  it is provided that the Member  States 
v:ill  tclce  the necesso.ry  ste:ps to bring their codes of practice into line 
wh;h certa.in common  principles.  The  granting of the gu.:1rantec  is 
gover.nod by the  same  conditions  as for the guarantees  ~gainst rises in 
costs. 
The  Commission considers it necessa-ry to be  expliCit  u.bout  the gonoro::.l 
proposals mentioned above  concerning transnational civil  aoro~pace 
progr3ffimes.  For this reason it proposes to  th~ Council  in f.rticles 4 
2.11d  5 of the proposaidiredive set  out  in No.  4 of tho  17Implementing 
texts
11  more  specific mensures~ the adoption of  ~·rhic.h is an urgent 
necessity in order to promote  sales of the hn.rdware  e.bout  to come  on to 
the  m~rket. - 45-
b)  SaloG  to pur·chascl"S  establis~wd in th0  Community:  Tho  noGd  for public 
cdC.  is  likc~risc mo..."1ifest  if tho  compGti ti  venoss of L'uropo:m products is 
to  be  s<..tfce:,u:".rdcd  vis-:1-vis  cxport-:::.idcd proc
1ucts from  non·-monbor 
countri')S. 
Tho  solution to this problem  c::rmot  be  found  1·ri thin tho  common  com;:10rcial 
policy since  export  subsidios  c2..11  only  appl~r to  sales to non-iJember 
count  ric. s  c:.nd  no-t  to trc.nsactions  vli thin tho  common  mo.rkot.  In 
acl,clition1  o.  valid solution must  of necessity conform 1·rith  th3 provisions 
of tho  l:;EC  Treaty govor:1.ing  competition  o..nc1  not  c;ivc  rise to cny 
disp0.:rit ies  Ni thin tho  Cor.1muni ty. 
I:Iachinery for aid at  Commlll1i ty level would consti  tutc tho most  n.doquo..te 
solution since it l'loulC:.  en.::)Jlc  the  competiti  vc position of the  )i.;uro:!_)c:e:n 
mcmufo,cturers  to be maintnined in the  fo,cc  of tlv:::ir  riv:1ls  ou,tsidc 
the  Communi t;y TVhile  2.-t  the  swne  time  avoiding c1istortion of competition 
CIInong  compcmies  in different  I1cmber  St.::ctcs.  In the  absence  of  such 
Comrauni ty machinery,  and be:D.rine  in mincl  the;  nGcessi  t;:;"  for  ensuring thc.1..t 
Co1:~munity mo.nuf;:;,cturerG  c:.rc  compotitivG  on tho  vwrld mc:.rket,  tho 
Commission considered it o..clviso,blo  to  o.fforcl tho  I·!Gmbor  Sto.tos the 
op:?ortunity of grwting marketing G.id  in tho  Corrmunityt  provide(!_: 
o.)  such aid would  G.PP ly to  s~los of civil  nira~7c.ft  mnnUfc:.ctured 1.ll1dor 
European transnc,tLmnl  progr~11mes1 
b)  this aid vrould consti  tuto uniform,  concerted  support  for tho  ~mrious 
prograx:unc s  on the p.::.rt  of tho Governments  invol  v0cl; 
c)  tho  Commissim1 would reserve tho right to  juclco  o0.-ch  cnso  on its 
merits  from  the  st:mdpoint  of compdibilit3r ~lith the Treaty rules. 
In point  III of 
1;Implementing texts0  No.  2,  the  C0t.1mission  specifies tho 
condi  tiomi upon  trl1ich it is projJ<:.red to  oxtcncl the bvnefi  t  of m2..rkcting 
aids to  transm.~tional progrcmmes,  on the  grounels  of the  exc:eption 
provided for in .f;.rticle  92( 3) (b),  Hhich states that  ~>aid to promote  tho 
execution of an importc.nt  project  of common  I~.n"opean interostn  ma;:r  be 
considered. to uo  compatible with tho  co!Ylf:!on  market. - 46-
2u:h o,icls  m.:Ly  o.ss1.:uTJe  vG.rious  fo_rms:  openi.ng of  lonG'~·t  arm  credits, with 
or  without  interest rebates,  in fo.vour  of the prodcH::or  or buyor7  insu'l."'o.nco 
e.c;:::dnst  commercial  risks3  guo.rantees  agc~inst fluctuations in excho..nge 
rr~tos3  and  ovcm,  1r1hcn  circumsta:.1cec require,  gu"':rantcos  agrdnst  abnorrn<.:1.l 
and.  unforos.oen rises in costs. 
Lids  of this kind,  Hhic~1 rl1CLY  be particulo..rly nocossc.ry during the period 
in 1t1hich  the curront  trilnsndicnal progrr.:rnmcs  find outlets on the mo.rket, 
may  be  considc;red by tho  Commission to  be  compati  blo with tho  corrunon 
mcxkot  by roD.son  of tho  spocific nature  of tho problems with tvhich tho 
l-:-ita~ope3ll  c.vidion industr-y is o,t  present  confronted. 
Guarantees with respect to fluctuations in exchange  rt'.tos  and rises in 
costs  o.ro  ir. p2inciplo  incompo.tible with the  common  mm·kot.  Tho 
e:~ception ackno~rlcdgcd in tho  light of present  circumst2..ncos  whore  the 
aeroz:;xwe  industry alone is concurncd is justified by the combination of the 
following fC!.ctors ~  "the  time  tvhich  elapses botwoon the  signing of a 
contract  and delivery  (several years);  the size of the  m~rkets 
(·crans2..ctions of values rc:nging up  to  several million u...11.its  of ncoou:nt)9 
and,  above  G.ll,  the  state of tl:e  sector  o..nd  competition  (existence of the 
some  conditions of compo"i:;i tion on the  intor''lO.l  mc..rkct  and on external 
m£~-rkets,  in particular b::::cause  of the  absence  of customs protection  o...11.d 
the  dor.limmt .position of firms  . e:l'.lteblished in non-member  countries  on 
t'>'orld  markets). 
The  Commission  lc;.ys  special stress on tho  m:.oeptional nc..ture  t:hich  such 
price and  exchrmge  guc..ro..ntees  must  havo  in the  Common  Market,  account 
bdng ta..li::cm  of the trend towards  econo:.1ic  cind  monetary unification and 
of tho necessity -to  pursue a  policy of stnbility. - 47 
The  cus"toLJs  duty on  a  complete aircTaft  Hi  -th  an  t.mlc,den  weight 
e::cecding  15 9000  l::g  (fixed Lmilatcre,lly = 12/,  or by  trec::.ty  = 5;''.) 
imposed bctvwen  1960  and  31  Docm~1ber 1S'72  is to bo  sasp-:;ndud 
m:tirel;:r  9  whcruas  the Anwrican  industr~r ~,;ill  co:1tinuc  to  enjo;)r 
5f,  tariff protection. 
It 1»Till  be  recc-lled that  in this connrJction the custocs duties 
relating to the  nail~craft"  sector were  fixed via tllc  Acremaent 
on  List 
11 G~'  dctcd  2  r.Tarch  1960  together vri th its  A.nne~~, 
Protocol  ITo.  XVII 1  vrhich  cont2.ins  special provisioning concerning 
tho  products  of the sector in question.  These  provisions 
stipulate in  pC\r-i;i~:mlc:,r that the actual c,pplication of tho  customs 
clut ios  relo,-:; ing ·co  r,ircraf-l;  exceeding  15 1000  k,::s  in 1•Ieight,  is to 
be acco:npanied,  at t·rhatever date it nk'l,Y  becono  opero,tive  1  by 
the  grcmti:clg9  decided upon at  the  tL1o  the  Protocol  car:.o  into 
force  in  19GO 9  of  c.  zero-·duty Coumunity tariff r{uota. 
'I'his  Pro~ocol is still in  force  and its application to date 
ho.s  been  in the  form  of a  total  :3us~yJnsio:1 of custor:lS  duties, 
extended periodically.  Tl1e  current  mo:.~atorium e;:pires  on 
31  December  1972.  If no  other decision is adopted by tho 
C01mcil  for the period followine this elate,  the provisions  of 
Protocol Ho.  XVII  could be  invoiced by all the  t;Iember  States 
concornod.  A  sUJ.--nmar;;r  of the contents of Protocol  Ho.  XVII  and 
of the current  situation as  regards  the  custo;~~s  d:.lt~.es  relatiDE 
to products  of the aerospace  sector (aircraft  1  helicopters, 
engines  9  components  and  spares)  v.ri E  be  fcc;..nd  in fum ex  IV. 
Specific provision 1vas  made  for rreintaini!1g the  Protocol  in force 
during the  entry nogotiati.ons  (sco  A:."ticle  49  (2)  of the  Act  of 
'  .  )  ~J.CCOSSJ.On  • 48 
Hovrever,  the Council. has acl()pted,  in  comwct~on v1.ith  Article  49 
ment ionod above  1  a,  doc1arot.iol1,  1r;rhich, is to be. roco,rd.::Jd  in the 
minutes  of its, ~eoting held on  3.1  Janua!"'J  1972,  making provision 
for the  Commlmity Institutions to Ulldertake  during 1972  an. 
examination of the situation  i1'1.  the light of the  experiqnco 
e,cquired,  with a  ··1iev.r  to  takinG" any  stops o.ppropriate to tho 
dGvolopmont  2.nd  competitiveness of the European aerospace 
indust~r,  Philo duly respecting all the interests involvod,  o.nd 
in  p~rticular those of tho airlines. 
It is therefore desirable to tackle the. problem of the .tc.riff. 
noasures  which  mit_;·ht  havo  to be considered,  bearin~ in rnind both 
the provisions currently in force  and tho terms  of the 
declaration  just referred to, 
The  situation described. above _points  up the  ir.1balance prevailin0 
as  regards tariff, protection between the United St.:1tcs  cind  the 
Communi t:;r  - an  imbalance  1·rh~ch is  vor.~r  ill1.Wh  to the  disadvantage 
of the L'uropea:a  mo.nufacturers,  pr.rticularl7 in vieH .of the size 
of the  US  a:~.rket.  Furthermore,  tho  Co!lli:<uni ty aircraft 
m.onufn.cturers  themsel  vos  have  aclvr:.nced  the idea of re-L1troduoing 
the  clut;;~  Ol1  airorr:.ft  - 1orith  tho  exception of types not .competing 
1-vi  t~1  hc.rduarc  produced  in the Comrmmi ty  1  and components.,  engit1CS. 
a,.1cl  oqt~ipment neeclecl  for purposes  of Jtianui'acture  or operation -.with 
a  vim,J  to usine this as a  bargaining counter as  re&"ards  the 
complete  removcl  of customs  duties  on  aerospace products at  a 
later dntc:. 
'l'he  Europqo.n  !l1L,nufacturers  ric;htly stress the 9-ifficul  ties raised 
b,y  the tariff protection. mentionocl.above  for exports to the 
llmerican  llk1.rket 1  i-rhich  alone cccou.:1ts, for tv;o-thirds of the t·wrld 
market  and in 1;1hich  existinc Lur0penn  programmes  would have to 
find a  suitable niche if they are to achieve  commercial  success. . 49-
It is tr·ue  th<J.t  the  s;{  bo,rrior is  ~10t  very hic;h  cmcl  that  tllC: 
potenti~l custo!n;:;rs  probu.bl~r .:1ttc..cl1'  more  i11port:J.J:1ce  to  thrJ 
opeiT.ti.n<c;  cost  of the nii·crc:;,ft  them  to its purche.sc ·price  i 
however,  sinc'e  the  co:npeti  tion is currG1t1;r  ver~r fierce 1  tho 
arlclition::tl  Sl..'Jn  represented by the dt:ty  could  influence 
purchasers'  decision  to  a.  considoretblo  o::to"tt. 
It VJC"s  stc.,ted earlier that  in  arden~ to  strengthen the :Gnropcu.n 
aerospnce  sector effectivol;y,  it 1-rill  be nocossnry to  dispense 
vii th aU  p:::-otectioniSE1 and  me,rl<.:et  preferences which  i.-IOUJ.d 
hnmper the  essential drive  toH!lrd.s  tho achievement  of 
competitiveness.  In  c.,ddi tion 1  Ci.  reint:c~od.uc:tion of Juties 
uoulcl constitute  Ct  he::vy burden for Ev  .. rope2..D  custoraers. 
Priority must  therefore lle  given 1  not to the actual  reh:t::.'Oduction 
of duties,  but  to  n..  speedy oponbg of ncgoti2.tions  ~vit~1 the 
l:)Tinoipal  outside competitors Nith  a  viovJ to  t~1e  ~;mtual abolition 
of the  to.,riffs.  It 'rould1  haNover,  be  011omo.lous  for the 
Conm:uni ty to  be  deprived oi'  ct~stoms pro·cection  in th8  fut'  .. lre 
while the competing nori--r,1er·1bcr  countries continued to apply 
their protect:!.ve  measures  (see "IHplementing te:ct
11  No.  LJ.). 
This  problem  sho'..lld be  in the  forefront  oi'  t~;,e  trado nogotiatj_ons 
due  to to.ke  place  soon  bctHeen the  Community and the United 
States. 
In  each  country,  eve:r"J  type  of civil ::ircraft  W'LlSt  be  a~vnrded 
by  government  authorities  n.  cer-~ificate of .:oj.n·iorthiness  issued 
on  the basis of conformity with the cdrvJOrthil'wss  requirer'm1ts 
lo,id  dotvn  by these authorities. - 50  ·-
The  lc-.ck  of tmiformity between these  regulations  may  have  the 
effect of setting up barriers to ·the  sale of aircraft ma.'1ufactured 
i~1  one  or more  Do.ropt-)al1  COU.'1.tries  ( Hhereas  such oarriers do not 
exist  f:::>r  .1\.merice..n  aircraft,  since the European  conn  trios have  1 
generally speaking,  accepted US  criteria).  Furthermore,  it 
constitutes  e.  complication 1·rhere  trrmsnational European 
projects are  concor.1cd.  The  cost,  delays  Qnd  uncertainty 
caused by this situe:.tion have  become  a  heav-:J  burden  on 
~onufacturers and operators of aircraft. 
Moreover,  in r:.nticipation  of an  intGmational agreement  v;rhich 
would facilitate the penetration of the  rrtarket  in no:ti·-member 
COl..'.ntries,  a  harmonizing of the poil1ts  of vievJ  of the  interested 
parties  in :&trope  is essential to the  formulation of c.  common 
attitude towards  tho United States  FAA  regulations  on  the part 
of t:w  uanufacturors and authorities. 
TJ.1esc  are the  main  reasons  \'lhich have  led the AICWl  (International 
Association of Aerospace  Eqv.ipment  N"a:1ufactnrers)  ··  an  officinl 
association of European  rne.nufacturers  -·  to propose that there 
should be created in Europe as qaickly as possible a  joint 
airworthiness code  Hhich  is acceptabJ.e to all the official· 
m::.thorities  concerned Hi-Gh  civil aviation. 
The  conntries  -taldng part  in the vv-ork  upon  Hhich the  AICTcifA  has 
embarked· are,  both the authorities and  industry· being involved:  .. 
Belgium,  Frcmce,  ItC'..ly 1  the Nothcrlc:nds,  SvJedon,  the United 
Kingdom  ~nd Hcst  Germany.  A  Joint Steering Committee,  i.e., 
both the  indust!"J and the authorities responsible  for 
certification being  represented~ vms  set up  on  26  June  1970. 
The  outcorr,e  of the r.rork  of this Committee  could form the basis 
for further \vork  on the part of tho  Commission  1  which  recently ·- 51  -
proposed to  tho  Cc·tmcil  ::m  c:dcnsion of  the~  genon:cl  pro.::;rJ.tl!:lC 
for the  r1.;moval  of 1Jnrriers to  trnd<),  vdth  special  rc:ference 
to aircraft mmmfc.cture.  In this coiltext  9  the  Coi·.nnission 
vrill  propose to the  Council  ns  soo:n  ns  poscible  c.,  directive  on 
n  European Ainmrth:i.ness  cocle 1  which  ~muld be  supplcr:~ontGd by 
a  European Certificate. 
The  AICI1.!1  hns  dravm  up  a  number  of recornmendat ions  covering 
vnriouc types  of aerospace hardwnre  and is atter'lpting to  convert 
these  into  stand,::.rds  after pinpointing the diffic,ll  ties on  a 
country-b;y-country basis. 
ThG  procedure  envisaged in this respect is as  follm·Js: 
(a)  Submission  of the  AIC1JTA  stm1dards to tho  CElT  (European 
Coraui ttee for Coordim::.tion  of Ste.nic.rcl.s) v 
(b)  Official  GXC'-l:lination 1  conversion of tl1e  .!UCrii\.  rGcoc.mendations 
into Ji;c,_ropcan  standards by  CJ.iJ:T  procedures i 
(c)  l'Jhen  the  CEJIT  has  adopted those  sto,ndn.rds  1  work will bo 
undertc.kcn under the  supplem.GntaYIJ  generoJ.  programm.o  for tho 
removal  of the teclmical barriers to trade as  proposed by the 
Comni:::,sion  to the Council  in order to asccrtdn the extent  to 
which it is possible to  clraw  up  directives in tr"is field 1  using 
the work of the  AICM.fl.  and the  CEH  as  a  basis.  The  method of 
solving the harmonization problem by "adoption of standards" 
1-rould  appear at the outset  to be  qnito ndcqu<'-te  to the  purpose. - 52  -
3.  Promotion  of  ~-,ct-v·:mced  resea:-ch 
1:-~-~~-~-.4"'"""'-~~...._..-....=,a..,;;z,;-~  .......... ~-
The  production of certain prototypes  incorporating ~~jor 
innovo..tions  (speed,  power,  ,peylcad,  reduced noise and 
atmospheric pollution,  take--off and  landing distance,  etc.) 
involves  the application of the fundam8ntal  knovJho;-.r  required. 
Duri~1g recent years, , technological  innovation  seems  to have 
become  more  closely bound up ;,-.rith  programme  objectives tha.'Yl  with 
the  results of reseRrch carriccd out  in such fields as 
aerody~a:mics,  materials,  electronics,  etc.  This  situation 
is not  1  genc:m""lly  speaking,  open to criticism,  since the 
research expenditure is directed towards  specific applications. 
However,  vle  hc.1.ve  seen the high technological  risks which certain 
advanced prograr;nnes  nmst  bear,  a;1d  also the  re.:>ultant  costs. 
It is therefore clearly important 1  if only in the interests of 
the  success of the. prograurnes  1  to possess a  sound  fou.."'ldetion  of 
scientific skill in the principal fields  deterr:dl1L::lg  the  long-term 
developments  in aircraft production a:'ld  operation.  This 
m1derlying skill is thus necessary for rapid assimilation of 
progress achieved outside the CoBmunity. 
It should be  added that  experience has  shown  that  major progress 
at a  technical  level  is often more  easi:!;y  achiew~d through 
prog:ramrnes  of an  experimental nature than through  progro..mmes 
aimed at a  specific market.  The  latter type  of programme  is 
carried out _under  more re+,iable  ru1d  mere  economic  condi  tioi1s · 
v1hen  based  Ol'l  teclmology which is <1lreacly  h1own.  It is true 
that  a  large proport:Lon  of tho  most  advanced research is 
prompted by military requirements but  a  judicious progranme of 
applied research into general and civil needs  would be of great 
w.lue to the  Corm::Ttmi~y and its ir.dustries. - 53  -· 
For this  reason the  AICJI,J.A  hc.s  it i:1  mind to propcso  tho  joint 
construction of o.  hypersonic 1-'linrl-tv.nnel.  This  proposnl  viOuld~ 
strictly  1  have  to be  considered coacurrently t-Ji th  o.,n  effort at 
adeq1mte  rationalization of the usc  of existing wL1d-tunnels. 
Another project Hhich has been b:::-ought  to  the notice of tho 
Comr.oission  concerns the use  of  data-proccssi~'lg for  inventoT'IJ 
control.  Also  notm-wrtl1y,  although it relat.::;s  to  a  project 
of quite  diffo:::-ent  dLncmsions 1  is the potential Villue  of tho 
space  shuttle in the  solution of problems  inhorGnt  in the use 
of very high  speeds. 
Tho  progrrcmme  alignnent  proposed above  should brL1g out  -che  m.:;ocls 
'1-lhich  will arise in future  procrammes.  HovJcver,  it is desirc.,ble 
that there  shot:_lcl  be  Corrununi  t~r-lc;vel  co:'lsid.ere,tion  of both basic 
or fundai;wntal  resee1rch projects to be  cGrried out,  in order to 
gclarantoe tho  required level of coEJ.potence 1  and  r,tethods  which 
1rrill  enable useless c1uplication  to be  avoic.ed. 
The  n&D  projects to be  undert~kon ru1d  the appropriat3 action to 
be  er.J.ployecl  should be  studied in conjunction 'I·Jith  CoL'J11mity 
activi~ies relating to scientific and tochnoloeical  research  (see 
document  concerning nims  a;·1.cl  resources  for a  conmon  policy on 
scientific research and  tecb.,_"'1ologi.cal  c.eveloprnent 1  fonnrdccl to 
the  Covncil  o:1.  19  J1.mc  19T:) • 
It ,,rould appear that this sedor could benefit nore  thnn  c?ony 
other from  a  special  effort  in the  field. of  statistics~ as 
recommended  in general  terms  in thG  Mcl:1orG.L1dum.  on  Indust:cial 
Policy. - 54  -· 
No  mlid n.nal3rsis  of tl1c  prc·lJlen,s  affecting  t~-18  aerospace scctor7 
and in particulc.,r tho activi  ti..=;s  recorn11e:nded  in Ghc-l.pter  2  ~vi th 
re{?,c:trcl  to progro.mme  alic;nment 1  can -be  performed l-mless it is 
based on  a  detailed lmowl•3dgo  of the situation  a~1d on  as 
realistic a  pro~?,nosis as  possi':Jle.  For this purpose a  fully 
developed  stc:-,tictical  tool acceptable to all parties concerned 
1·:ould  be needed. 
The  Commission  proposes to take all appropriate steps for the 
esta:JlishT:lent  of a  joint stn.tistical basis for collecting and 
processin3' do..ta  relatL1g to the aerospace  sector.  It tvill  cu.ll 
upon  the  c:tssistancc  of g·overni;lental  exports  anc'..  qualified 
persons  repr0S8nting the  industr,y m1cl  operators. - 55  -
L  For the purpose  o:i:'  im:plerDcmting the proposals  contained. in 
the present  document~  the  CoP~uission is subui  tt  ing to the Couricil 7 
i.L1.  the appcmcled  11Iwplo:;1enting texts": 
1.  For adoption:  a  draft  Cotmcil  recou©en~tion on  the coordination 
of the  development  policies of the  Member  States e..nd  on  structural 
alig·:nments  in the c,viation sector (text  ITo.  1); 
2.  For  inforr.~ation purposes:  a  Coll1L1'-mico.tion  from the Commission 
t6  the  Hember States  on  the  Comi:nmity  outline plan for aid to 
reseo..rch and developi.ient,  to  investment  and for sales in the 
Common  NarY::et  in respect  of civil aircraft  constru.ctecl  iJ.1:  the 
Cocmmi  ty w1der  t rcmsna  t ional  progrC'.111iilOS  (text  No.  2) i 
3.  Fo1~ acioption  on  the basis of Article  113 of the EEC  Treaty:  a 
proposal  for a  Cot:ncil  c~irective on  th(~ adoption of COTih'110n 
arrange;11ents  concornin;:s credit  insur211ce,  credit 7  exclKmge 
guaro..ntoes  and guarcntoes  against  rises  in.  costs in respect  of 
exports to third colmtries of civil aircru.ft  constructed in the 
Con-1mtmity  tmder transnntional progrt:mnnes  (text  ITo.  3); 
4.  For tho institution of the procedure provided for in tho 
declnration dated 26  ,Tanuary- 1972·:1-:  a  Comm.unication  fror.1  the 
Cor:..inission  to the  Council  concerning the situation as  regards 
c·u.stoms  duties  on aircraft and related ecruipment  (text  Ho.  4). 
*1Jinterod  in the :ninutes  of tho  CcJlmcil  ~.1eeting held on  31  January  1972. - 56  ·-
II.  Other proposals  form  tho  subjoct  of Geparnte  doc'-l.L,Em-l:;s. 
These are: 
(a)  As  rogare_s  the  studies to be  tmc1erte.ke:1  on air transport:  n. 
draft  Cormcil  llecision on  the initial e.spects  of joint action  in 
the field of e.ir transport  1  forvJardcd to the  Council  on  3  July  1972 
(COM  695  final); 
(b)  As  reb['.rdS  the airHorthiness ccrtif:Lcato and  standards:  a 
general  progm;mw  coverL1g the  removal  of teclmical barriers to 
trade  (proposal  for  o,  Co<.mcil  resolutio:::l  supplenenting the 
Council  resolution dated 2J  rl!ay  1969  lr;ying dm-In  a  programme 
designed to  reraovc  the  teclmicc:cl  bnrriers to tmde in industrial 
products  resulting from  divor,:;ences  auo~1g the legislative, 
regulatory and  a•J.EJ.inistrntive  provisions of the Heober States) 
( COH  296  final  ·- 24  Ha.rch  1972) ; 
(c)  As  regG.rcls  rc;sen.rch:  proposn.ls  for~"Iarcled b:r  the  Con;nission 
to the  Council  on  1  S Jm1o  1972  (  docu.r,1CJ.1t  concerning cims  and 
resources  for a  common  policy on  scientific research and 
teclmological  dovolopme..YJ.t  -- em~ 700  final). IMPLEHENTING  T  E  X  T  S - 2-
Text  No.  1 
Draft  Council  reconmcndetion on 
!_~~.££!dinaj;ion <;>1_!.~~-.A~~elopmcn~icios of the T:fember  Stat-es 
and,.2E.  __ st~~~l  ~l.~~ts  _o.f  firms  in the aviation sector 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  NJROPEAN  CQI.Il'.mJITIES, 
HAVING  REGluiD  to the  'I'roaty establishing the European Economic 
Communi tyi 
WlillREAS  at  the meeting held at  The  Hague,  the Heads  of State  and 
Government  11reaffirmed their readiness to  continuo more  intensively 
the activities of the  Cor:ummity  v!it;~l  a  vim,r  to coordinating and 
promoting industri2.l  research and developoent  in the principal 
pacc·-making sectors",  and  in a  resolution on the achievement  of the 
econo::1ic  and monetG.ry  union ref(;rence is rJado. to "action necessary 
at the structural and regional  level under  a  Cofil.nn.mity  policy vlith 
adequate resources11 ; 
HAVING  REGARD  to the -importance  of the aircraft  industries to  economic, 
technological  and  social dwelopraent 7  to  exterool trade,  and,  in 
general,  to the Qaintenance of the political  a11d  economic position of 
Europe  in the world,  and the difficulties encountered by the European 
aircraft  industries in'competing with producers outside Europe; 
vJHEFI.EAS  it is necessary for a  harmonious  deve.lopment  of the aircraft 
industry in the  Community  that  the Mcr:1ber  States should  coord.iante 
their development  policies in this sector,  having due  regard to the 
guidelines  contained in the  second medium-term  econor.lic  policy 
prograffil!lt:.; 
l-THEREAS  the success of the efforts undertaken "bJ  the  Community 
industries will  depend to a  great  extent  on the  choice  of the - 3 -
prograumes  best  suited to the  deucmd  and  on the  pooliY'.g  of resources 
for  implementing them; 
l-JHERCAS  the  launching of programnes  by  the uridortaki11gs  coYJ.cerned 
depends  basically on the  financial  SUi)port  gra~ted 'them  by the 
authorities,  so that it is necessar3r to align the attitudes of th3 
Member  States lTi th regard to projects for vlhich public aid is 
requested or  contemplated~ 
HHERE!.AS  such alignment  should be  clarified by dotniled studies  1 
carried cut  in consultation with the producers,  users and public 
services  concerned,  on the  c..n<1l,ysis  of rcquirenents,  the  ;-;nrket 
prospects,  the  industrial resources nvailable  and,  in a  vrider  sens, 
the effects of present  and f'u.ture  pob  -~Y  lines  on transport,  employ-
ment,  the  enviro1~1ent and regional  developmenti 
\tHillREAS  the  coiJpotitive  capacity of the undertal:ings  in the  sector 
under  consideration depends  not  only on the size and liberc..lization 
of the nnrkGt  but  also  on the  size of  such unde:daJ:ings;  and whereas 
European unciertal:ings  in the aviation sector cannct  b0  sa,id to  b.sve 
attained the  c,ptiBum  size,  by  com:tx:trison with that  of under·~akings 
in certain third countries  i 
hl1IERF..AS  combinations  in the various EL<.ropean  prcducing states h2.ve 
helped to increase the size of undertN<ings,  but  it is new  necessary 
to unite the potential in Europe  across  natione.l  front0rs  so as to 
secure the formation of a  small  rnmber  of European entities; 
vJHEREAS  only  large transnational  European uncle:rt2.kings will be  c:>,ble 
to obtain the  necessary resources for the  development,  production 
and marketing of large civil aircra,ft  for the world Barket  and v;ill 
in the  long torm be  able to depend to  a  lesser extent  on public 
financial aid and to enter into the necessary  cooperntion with 
undertakings  in third countries; - 4 -
1.  Recommends  that  the  Goverrunen-bs  of the Hember  States,  in order to 
coordinate their developoent  policies in the aviation sector, 
a)  align ,.,;ithin the  Council their attitudes concerning the  choice  of 
new  progra~mes on civil transport  aircraft and  on the engines for 
such aircraft  1 
b)  co~~nicate to  each other for this purpose all necessary information 
on projects submitted to thomi 
c)  carry out this alignnent  on the basis of reports to  be  drawn up 
by the  Cornr:lission after appropriate consultation of the producers 1 
users o.ncl  public services concerned trlith aircraft  construction 
and atr transport1 
2.  Call  upon aircraft  construction undertakings to  sub~it to the 
Cor.J.J.J.uni ty all draft transnational  prograr:unes  of cor:m1on  interest 
from the European point  of vievli 
3. De¢ic9.r.o. th~mse1Nes ·in favo.ur  of i?,'l<·rucj;.utal  ,realignment.s _bet-wean 
the:· ai:rcraf:t :uneler·tak:Lng.s::'in t-he  variout:·JJombor  .. ·S'to.t,es  of:.:-the:.~ '. 
Oo4!L>;J:ilit;y,-1:itb:a  i.!'~ew to .the fom.ation,-_ofa  small  rrumbcr  of 
European undertakings  large  enough to  conpete  on a  world scale; 
Initiate trrithin the  Council the appropriate  consultations with 
a  view to promoting an aGJ'eement  among  the governments  concerned 
regarding tho  reaJ.ignlllents to be  envisagedi 
Step up their efforts to bring about  the rapid adoption of 
Corrmmnity  measures  d.esigrl8d to create a  legal  framework  for 
such European undertakings  and to reduce the obstacles to 
structural regroupings  o - 5-
Text  No.  2 
CoE_!~.iC?..~.Ei..?cction to the  r.~enber  state~ 
the  _..£.9.Elli1~~Y,li ty  outlin~lc:2.for_2;b,d to research 
£!ld~~evel~~~.t..J..o  iny~~tn§.l!Land  _.:f2.r  sales in 
the  Cornnon  r~arkGt in resuect  of civil aircraft  -----__  .,.,_,_~·--.oo-.-........ --.--------------.. ...:-------·-·-
constructed in the  Colill:luni-Gv  under transna.tional 
~~-.,·-~~--~---~~-----~---·--~ 6 
1.1  The  aid granted by the  public authorities for European aircraft 
production is of nater±al  ir:;portance  in meeting competition 
frcm  non-:-.1ember  countries.  Similarly  7  programtleS  planned ana. 
carried out  on a  co0perative ·oasis  contribute substantially to 
the g-£'ovrth  of the  industry. 
The  need for public financial  support  arises from the  amcunt 
of capital tied up  and  the  long lead times  involved in air-
creft  production~ For research and development  alone,  the 
costs anount  to  3Q.--70  times the ve.,lue  of the  series-production 
aircraft.  ~r large-scale development  progrrunoe  for  civil 
aircraft  intended. for operation by  corJ.mercie,l  airlines costs 
several  hundred million dollars.  A  1~ember  S~ate on its own 
lvould  hc:.ve  difficulty in devoting  sucl1  capital to a  particular 
prograr.1Ele • 
lJic.·1.ximum ·cooperation at  EEC  level 7  in various' forras  (such as 
intergovernmental agreements  and agreei:'.ents  between co::lpanies), 
embles the participating manufacturers to enjoy  a  nuDber  of 
advantnge s: 
(a) the possibility, thanks to the pooling of technical and 
··  financial  resou~ces, of carrying out  costly and technically 
advanced production programmes,  without  which the part 
pl~ed b,y  the European aircraft  indust~J would be diminishedi 
(b)  the hope  of  expanding the market; 
(c)  a  chance  to acquire  experience of collaboration betv;een 
companies  in different  countries which could form the 
basis of lasting groupingsf 
(d)  a  rise in the technological  level of the various partners 
in an advanced projecto - 7-
1.2  To  ens1,;.re  effective  cooperation c,nd  facilitate its e::pm...Dion 
the  CouiDission considers it necessary 9  with regard to the aid 
granted.,  to propose to the  l~enber  S-tates  - in the  context  of 
the tasks  a:i.lottcd to  it under Article  93  (1)  of the  EEC 
Treat:r - certain  11appropriate measures  recr..<ired  by the pro-
gressive  developnent  or by the  f1:;.nction::.ng  of the  Cor:unon 
I:I<:>,rket 
11 
o 
T~1.ese  measures are  e,iEled  at  the  Etids  granted by the  r~er11ber 
States to facilitate both research and  development  work  on 
prototypes  and  i"westment  in series production as required 
by the civil aircraft  prograwues  carried out  on a  cooperative 
basis in the  Comcunity  (ioe.,  transnational  progrv.nmes). 
By  the ten.1 
11transnational civil aircraft  programr.1es  cetrried 
o-J.t  in the  Coruiluni ty"  the  CorJ..r:~ission meetns  prograomes  carried 
011t  by associated or nul  tin'--=ttione.l  coopanies  engaged  in 
2.ctivity vlithin the oeaning of the  preceding  para~:;raph in 
t'rlO  or oore Menber  St<c"i;cs  and  in vJhich  each of the pnrties 
ccmc8rned underwrites  a  proportion of the t8chnical  and 
commercial  risks involved in the overall project. 
Prograr;rr,les  for the construction of the  engines  for  civil 
aircraft  arc treated as  aircr<:1ft  construction programnos. 
1 o3  Disparities in the  systoras  of aid or their applico,tion raay 
reduce  the  advantage  of cooperation or,  '1-rhen  such  cooperation 
has  been decided  on,  even llaoper the  execution of the pro-
gl'aDr:lCS  which they  concern.  A haroonized  frar.1ev1ork  for the 
granting of aid may  therefore help to  eA.'"tend  ccoper.::.tion for 
the  purpose  of irJplementing projects of Connunity  interest, - 8-
In the preser.t  communication7  tho  Coruuission sets out  to· 
det err:line  a  rrunber  of conditions lilo.king  it possi  blo for 
the aid granted for these  projects to  conply with the re-
quiroraent  specified above  and to  be  regarded as  conpatible 
with the  Comraon  lfurket  u  'l
1hese  co!lditions  are defined vJith 
a  view to: 
(a)  guiding the Member  States in the planning of their 
(b)  guiding the Comnission in the assossuent  of such aid. 
The  enumeration of these  criteria is,  of course,  without 
prejudice to the provisions of the  EEC  Treaty,  in particular 
those  of Article  93  (3).  It  is no  sort· of. substitute ·for· the 
positiomwhich the  CoDlYJission  mc.y  decide to adopt  with 
regard to aid pursuant  to the  powers  ves-ted in it by the 
EEC  Treaty. 
The  Cmilliission has decided to produce this  communication because 
of the specific features  of the aircraft  industry;  hence the ad  hoc 
nature  of. the solution chosen,  which in:  no  wey  prejudices the 
Comnission' s  attitude t-Jith  regard to aid to other sectors. 
2 o  Con@_icl2,~....0:J.2E;ic~e.b~;2_~~e:E~.1s_<!, fo:r;-.ihe  ~xecut  ion of 
i~.€~E~::~·ytional  ~-_a.:i:.r.£FB:.fj;_.£!'ograrrniles.  car~d out  in the 
_9o~nit;y: 
2.1  The  aid granted to  such progra8ffics  should,  in the  common  interest 
and  for the  sake  of .efficiency1  be ·planned and applied in accord-
ance vlith the  follo't·ling procedures: 
~and  devel2J?_!l1cnt  aid 
For research and  development  under civil aircraft programmes, 
the aid granted may  consist of advances up to an amount - 9-
equivalent  to the tot2l rescnrch nnd  dcvclopDOEG  costs, 
repa,ya"ole  from  the revenue  oot2.,ined  froD  the  sales of air-
crc-,ft  -v.rhen  they are  plc.ceCJ.  on tho  IDE'.ricot. 
Research  t'..nd  Cl.evelopment  costs are ta.lzen t0 moan ell thG 
e::penses,  il1Cludi:r.g those  for tooling-up,  arising froD  t:te 
execution of the  progronnos U) to t;;rpe  certificc:,tion 
(construction of prototypes of various vc;rsions  encl  static test 
airfrru~es,  ground tests and flight tests). 
Imrestr:JGnt  aid 
To  help mamlfacturers to  fiYlilnce  tl1e  jigs and tools required 
for series production,  aiel nay  b8  grantod in the  forD  of 
sureties for  loans  contrncted by the L12nufactur0rs  concerned 
for tho  purnose  of such  fim.nci11[;· .. 
2 .,2  The  aid granted to  prooote the  execution of tra:;.snc>,tional 
civil nircraft projects carried out  in tho  Cor;:.rnunity  should 
be  such as  to  enable all the  partners in the  cooperation 
scheme  to participate in it on equal tel'ns,  enjoying the 
same  advantages  fron the public authorities. 
3.  Aids_!.?___El,Erketin~.}:!i  thj,E.___the  Cor~..r:  .M?-r:~~!_!o!:_air_S£.~f..~ 
.£~~_-:i.}.!.._in  the  ~'!_i.!l._o:tln.£.~2:.-.t  r11.1:~t  ~O~-~  ac:r.~.~..£ 
The  CorJiilission further  notes that the manufacturers  in certain 
non-member  countries receive direct  aid for the sale of their 
products abroado  This  aid enables  func1s  to be  made  availnble 
at  rc.tes  of interest which are appreciably  lcvJer  t:b.-2-n  the 
lowest  rates in the  Comraunity.  Furthermore,  O't"ring  above all - 10 
to the suspension of the  common  external tariff cluties, 
r.1anufacturers  established in the  Conununity  enjoy  less 
favourable  conditions as  rec;ar<'l.s  sales in the  CoE1mon  J'larlcet 
than those  enjoyed.  on their ar,:n  hone  m.:Tket s  by  certain 
marrQfacturers  in non-member  countries. 
'I'l1e  CoEJL>ission  thus feels that when civil aircraft arc 
produced under national  programmes  within the  CoLJ.mUnity,  aids 
to the w.arketing of such aircraft  on the  Conunon  :Market  represent 
a  case for exeptional treatnent under Article  92  (3),  (b)  of 
the  EEC  Treaty  1  provided that: 
(a)  They  are aimed at  placing tho  Cor.mnmi ty nanufactu·rers 
in as  favourable  a  position e.s  that  enjoyed by maim-
facturers  in non-member  countries. 
(b)  These  programnes mcy  be  considered inportant  in the  col.llL1on 
interest fron the  standpoint  of the development  of the 
European aerospace  industry or tho  Cownunity air transport 
industry. 
These narketing aids o.a.y  consist  of measures  in favour  of the 
supplier or purchaser in the folloldng forns: 
(a)  The  opening of long-term credits, with or without  interest 
rebates. 
(b)  Insurance against  cor:unercial  risks  o 
(c)  Gue.rant ees against  fluctue.t ions  in exchange  rates or,  when 
required by  circumstances,  Guarrouees  against  abnornml  and 
unforeseeable  price rises occurring during the period 
elapsir..g bot..reen the  signing of the  contract  and the 
delivery date, - 11  -
ThG  a:pplic.J.tion of g"JJ.o.rantGes  of this  t~;·pc  can,:  :wv1cver, 
onl~,r  be  em'isaged if the  pl'Ocess  of economic  anci  uonotnry 
union has  not  reached a  sufficiently advo3.nced  sto.ge  to· olW.blc 
Comr,mni -ty  nero  spo.ce  firos to operat  o  under uniforn econcmic 
and nonetar;y  conditions. 
V.Jhore companies  engaged  in transnational  prog-.crum::es,  the mar;:ding 
aids thus  6J:1D-ranteecl  by  the Nember  States will have  to  be 
harmonized as  regards  forr.1  and  extent,  so  that the  coDpr'.nies 
concerned p2Iticipo.te  on equitable  conditions. 
The  provisions of Article  93  (3)  conti:mte  to apply to the  aiel 
which the tienber  S'tates  plc;,n  to grant  in accon1ance  with the 
terns and  procedures out lined e.bovE:,  even t,rhcn  such aid arises 
out  of the  ir:1pleuwntation of national  arrcmgewents  alread,y  in 
existence. - 12  -
Text  No.  3 
Pro;e!L~:l- fcr_1!...9oun.cil  directiy~ on  ~he ad<2£tion of 
COiill11<?_!f.  .,E!:O~~ns  !?_Ol1Cerl1~_2di  t  i~_2~_£di,!, 
~cha~_fllarante~~antee~~t rises in 
E.?st_~_J!L~ect~ of  ~orts__:to th~o~ie~f 
~  aircr.2:f:L  ..  £2AStructecl in the  Community  under 
~n~national  :J2!0tSTar~ - 13 -
:Oraftj?.£O.£OBJ11.3z.  ..  ~l:~  .2.?-~~~~io!l_for_a  Q.g;~:S_il  directiv~ 
~_)h~  .. ~J2~i?_!~_?f C_?!:l['~_;_l_<g',£<1.~rucnt~?oncern~.~r~dit 
ii1~~2..1 c:r:_edi  1.t~0:a~~-~~~an~?:....£0~arantees 
.'212:0:-_inst  rises  i~q_,?._st_s~~.!!_r~.E_e_cj_  o:f~~ts to  _jh~ 
co~~ri~s  '"0.'~~civ:_p  ai~£raft_2_ons~ructe<Ll_:t:!.the ComnunitJ-: 
~nde..E_.1r?-nsm.t  ~~12:~-j)_E_~!'f_!Cl.~~ 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  TIDE  EUROPE.AlJ  COli[l'!IUNITIJi;S, 
HAVING  REG.~-'L.'!ID  to the Tredy establishir.g the European Economic 
Comnuni ty,  in particular .Art :i.cle  113 thereof; 
HAVING  REGARD  to the proposal  from the  Comcissioni  · 
NHEREAS  the European aircraft  industry should  be  able to offer 
its products on the G1arkets  of third countries  on terms which 
are  competitive,  i.eo,  not  less favourable  tban those  enjoyed 
by manufacturers  in third cou1rtriesi 
vJHEREAS  .the  commercial  success of transnational aircraft  construc-
tion prograElmes. carried out  in more  than one IiieDber  state is 
closely linked trrith  joint action 1zy  the Henber  states,  resulting 
in the taking of effective. meo..sures,  in accordance with uniform 
principles,  by the public authorities of the 11Iember  states con-
cerned; 
HliEP.EJ..\S  in the  cn.se of trans11c1.tional  civil aircraft  progremes 
such measures  presuppose  not  only the adoption of common  rules 
laying down  a  frrunevwrk  for: ·credit  insurance but  also the 
adoption of identical conditions to  ensure that the  charges 
arising out  of such credit  insurance are proportiol"..al to the part 
played in construction by the  industries of the various Menber 
states concerned; 14  -
HHERZAS  the authorities  should by all e-pprolJric:,te  ueasu.rcs 
facili  t2.te the  procurew~lTl  of export  credit  in accordance  l'l"i th 
uniform principies,  in order to place Thropean producers  in c>. 
position not  less favourable  than th<d  of  p:::-odv_cers  in third 
S·ktes. 
V.THER.Et.S  the  competitiveness of tl1e  industry requires that  firu 
prices  'be  fixed and r.:t<lintninod  and  Europcecn producers  should. 
accordingly be  guaranteed against  fluctuations  in exchance  rates 
and  almoroal  and unforeseeable  cost  incree.,ses, 
HAS  ADOPT:8D  THIS  DIRECTIVli:: 
Article  1 
The  provisions of this clircctive are  .::~,ppJ.ic:c.blo  to  sales 
operations outside the  Cor.-!mur..ity  involving civil tr2-nsp8rt 
aircraft  and  engines  e.m:  sub-a::;secblies  conr~tn,_cted under 
transnational  programmes. 
Transnational  programmes  shall  be  considered to be  progrBL~es 
carried out  bJr  associated or multinational undertakings 
pursuing their activity in not  less than two  Member  States 
of the  Cormunity  and in which each of the parties concerned 
underwrites  a  proportion of tho technical  e.nd  conmorcial risks 
involved in the  overall project  o 
The  companies  raferrod to  i:n the foregoing paragraph shall  be 
entitled to benefit  from  the measures  provided for  by this 
directive in proportion to the part  pla,yed  by  0ach of them in 
the  production process. - 15-
Article 2  ___  .,_-_......,_._.,_' 
1.  TllG  applicntbn of the  joint  croclit  insurance policies 
provided for  by  the di::-ectives  adopt  eel  by  the Council  on· 
27  October  1970  (70/509/EEC  and  70/51 0/EEC)  to  the  sales 
operations referred to in Article  1  shall entail in all the 
ITem-iJer  S'tates: 
(a)  the  same·  guaranteed pro rata aDount; 
(b)  the  sa~e term for suretiesi 
(.c)  .the  same  rate of repayment 1  in accorc.ance with the 
principles of the  Berne  Union.  The  dataof commence-
ment  of the  rep~ment period shall be that  laid down 
by the  Berne Union. 
2.  The  provisions for applying the  foregoing paragraph shall 
be  laid dmm in accordance with the  procedure  set  out  in 
Article  113  of the  Treatyo 
Article  3 
The  uniform principles relating to the degree  of and methods 
employed  in the action taken by the Member  states for the 
purpose  of financing the  sales operations referred to in 
Article  1  shall be  determined in accordance with the procedure 
set  out  in Article  113  of the  Treatyo 
Arti<":le  4 
1. In order to  insure manufacturers against  the risk of 
fluctuations in exchange rates during the period between 
the conclusion of a  sale and  pqvment  of the  price therefor, - 16  -
the Mcober  States shall  apply  a  system of exchange  guarantees 
in order to  compensate  for acy  dauage  suffered by: 
(a)  the various parties  concerned in the  event  of a 
change  in the  parity of the  curr0ncy used in the 
contract  of sale; 
(b)  the parties in a  Jl:eBber  State th8  currency of which 
undergoes  a  ch~nge in parity in relation to the 
currency used in the  contract  of sale. 
However,  the  guarantee  specified above  shall not  be  applicable 
to und.:;rtakings  established in the  country vthose  currenc;/ is 
used in the  contract  of sale. 
2.  The  arrangements  specified in paragraph 1  shall be  appli8d 
in accordance with the  co!J!llon  principles set  out  in a 
Council  directive  concernir~ exchange  guarantees  for  exports 
to third countries  (:prJposed  by  the  Coumission on 3  August 
1971  - Doco  COM  (71 )260),  with the proviso that  the;;r  shccll 
be  applicable to  contracts of sale in -convertible  currencies 
and in US  dollars. 
At'ticle  5 
1.  In order to insure manufacturers against  the risk of abnormal 
and unforeseeable  cost  increases during the  period betvteen 
the  conclusion of an export  sale and payoent  of the price 
therefor,  the I1aember  States shall apply  systens of price guar-
antees  in order to  compensate  for the  losses suffered. r- 17  -
2.  The  provisions laid down  in paragraph 1  shall be  applied 
in accordance with the  common  principles set  out  in a 
Couucil directive  concerning guarantees against  cost 
increases in respect  of commercial  export transactions 
with third countries. 
Article  6 
The  Commission  m~ consult  the Advisor,y  Committee  on Credit 
Insurance  for Expor·t s  on any  quest ion concerning the applica-
tion of this directiveo 
Article 7 
This directive is addressed to the l::ember  states. 18-
Text  No.  4 
Commission  communication to the Council  on the 
tariff situ~~~~~ds  aircra!t_and_related 
eqpipment 19-
1, In its cornnu.nication to the  Council  concerning measures 
relating to  industrial and technological  policy to be 
undertaken by the  Community  in the aviation sector,  the 
CoLTinission  described the  currerrt  situation as regards 
customs  duties  on products  in this sector,  in particular: 
(a)  the mcintenance  of Protocol XVII  agreed at  the 
secession negotiations  (Article 49  (2)  of the 
Act  of  Accessioni 
(b)  the declare.tion entered in the minu.tes  of the  Council 
meeting of  31  January  1 <]72  accordi!l.g to which  "the 
Community  institutions will  in the  course  of 1972 
·examine the  situation,  on the basis of experience 
gained and with a  view to adopting  ~casures designed 
to further th8  de-velopment  and  competiti-veness  of the 
European aircraft  industry,  due  consideration being 
6iven to all the  interests involved,  in particular 
those  of aircraft .operators". 
2.  The  Comnission proposes that the  Council  should undertruce 
the  examination provided for in this declaration without 
further delay on the basis of the information documents 
S'..l.brrri tted to the  Council  by  'th~  Commission.  Moreover,  it 
states below its position: with regard to the. possible 
::aeasures to  be  takeno. 
In 1971,  the  Cor:ununi ty  1 s  aircraft  companies requested "the 
reintroduction of duties on aircraft with a  tare weight 
exceeding 15,000 kg and the  arnend.ment  of the provisions 
of Protocol  XVII  concerning the  grant  of Community  quotas 
for aircraft with a  tare we~ght exceeding 15,000 kg and - 20-
for  hcd.ico~ters with a  tare weight  e}:ceeding 2 9()00  k,?;". 
The  conpanies also  stated that ·11the reintroduction of duties 
on aircrc.ft  competing v1ith  those built  in tho  Cc,nr.mnit;y- is 
basically a  E1cans  of subsequently  nebotiating the  cm1plete 
dismantlin,g· of custoos duties  on aviation equipraentn. 
The  Comnission shares this point  of vie-t·!  as to the desirc:tbFity 
of negotiating the  conplete abolition of customs  duties  on 
avint ion equipment.  It hopes,  hm,rever,  that it will not  first 
be  necessary to reintroduce cuties in order to arrive at this 
result. 
The  Cor.11aission  considers that,  to  strengthen the  l'..uropean 
aircraft  industry effectively,  protectionisrJ and narket 
preferences  should be  avoided,  since these wculd be detri-
nental to the essential conpetitive effort., Noreover,  an 
actual reintroduction of duties would  impose  a  heavy  bu.rden 
on European buyers  of equipment  not  produced  b;y  the European 
industryo  Priority should be  given not  to the actual  intro-
duction of the duty  but  to the  early opening of negotiations 
vJith the  me.in  competitors  outside the  EEC  with  a  vie~·J to the 
mutual  abol:\.tion of custorJs  duties  o 
The  main  competing  countl.·ies  should  be  informed of the 
Connunity' s  fundamental  position on the natter,  which oight 
be  expressed as follows:  recent  developments  in the  Eu.ropean 
aircro.ft  industry· have  fundamentally  chang·cd the  existing 
situation and the  Comnunity  COl13iders  that it is not  noroal 
for its market  to be deprived of  customs  protection an,y  longer, 
\vhilc the  conpeti:ng non-member  countries retain their ovm 
protective machinery.  In view. of their specific nature,  European 
aircraft  \1-nd  related products  should,  in e.  s:rsteo of free  COii1pe-
tition,  be  cor.1petitive  on the markets  of non-r.1ewber  countries, 
just as those of non-member  countries  should be  on the  Community 
market. ANNEXES ANNEX  I 
ANNEX  !I  _  _...;;_:.._ 
ANNEX  III 
C 0  N T E  N T S 
THF:  HA"RKET 
A.  The  market  for  civil aviation 
aircraft 
B.  The  tr~nspcrt aircraft market 
Additional data broken  down  by  country, 
and  sources  of  the  data  given in Annex  1 
TEE  PRODUCTION  APPARATUS  --- ~·----~--.-~----
1.  Level  of activity in  the  principal 
producer  countries 
2~.Analysis of  turnover 
3.  Manpower 
4.  Structure 
5.  Research  and  Development 
6.  Production process  and production  costs 
MAJOR  AVI!i'!:ION  PROJECTS  BASED  ON  ElTLOPeJA.N 
com%AA'Tl::0i'i*'------~,--.--·~·-~ 
- MERCURE 
- F  28  Fellowship 
- VFW  614 
- CONCORDE 
- AIRBUS  A 300 B 
- Engine  projects 
1 
7 
10 
16 
16 
20 
27 
29 
35 
39 
43 
43 
45 
46 
48 
49 
52 This  AJ:mex  ssts ou-t  the  charaderistics of: 
A..  the  commercial transport  air·0raft market 
B.  the air tra..'1spo:::-t  market,  i.e., of air traffic. 
It is necessar;y· to relate the evolution of the  demand for  aeronau-tical 
ey_-uipment  to tha.t  of the demand  for air transport. 
1.  Aircraft  in use by the airline compa."lies  consist of  jets and 
turboprops.  Since the value  of the latter - so far  ao  aircraft in use 
in the  Western  World  in 1970  are  concerned - no  longer represents more 
') 
than 8.6%,  the following considerations  appl;y  only to  jets'-.  T!':ere 
are  two  major  categories of jets:  the intercontinental long--haul 
aircraft  and the medium  e.nd  short-haul  t~rpes,  and the  s9cond category 
can be  subdivided into aircraft ranging from  transoont.:.nental  jets 
(Locleheed 1011  or DC  10-10)  to regional aircraft  (i~N 614). 
Th'='  distribution of aircraft betv-Jeen  these  tt-vo  major categories in 1970 
rtJas  as  follo,.;s: 
Long--haul 
Mediwn  a..nd  short-haul 
number 
~ 
1478 
1995 
~1~~ ($m,  at  current rates) 
10,937 
It is noted that  55j~ of the vaJue of aircraft in service  in 1970  was 
accounted for  by long-haul  cdrcraft,  the  aver2.ge  u.ni t  value  of t,hieh 
was  65'}~ higher them i.;hat  of the medium  and short·-haul  t;y:peo. 
1General  aviation excepted  (1a)  Som·ces  end additional  informat.:i.on 
at the  end of  ~1nnex I • 
2
The  importe.nt  role of the Fokker  F  27  on the  short  and medium-·haul 
turboprop market  should,  ho>'mver,  be noted:  580  F.27' s  sold as  at 
18.11.71. - 2  -
1ri1e  V-J,luo  of t:i.19  aircraft in service in 1970  in the various oi  ",.ril  air 
fleets of the V'-festorn  \'~orld  t-ras  as follows  u~m,  current :rates): 
EJliC 
UK 
Other  Europc3..n  countrj.es 
Europe 
United Stc.tos 
Rest  of Hestern  ~forld 
Weste:n  :~orld 
2,523.8) 
1 ,on. 2) 
3~601.0 
1 ~524.4 
5,125.4 
15,o16.4 
3,6o6.o 
~-:r~  ..... ~ 
241437.8 
%  % 
10.3)14.7  49.2 
4.4)  21.0 
6.3  ~"! .8 
'1---;-:-,.:'" ........ ~~ 
21 .o  100 
63.9 
.. ~1 
100.0 
The  ve.J.ue  of the civil  ai:i.~  fleet  of the United States  :is  thus 
a:pp:r·o.xiL'l.tely  t~tm~thi:rci.s  of ti.le.t  of the fleet  of the  t-Jestern  t-rorld. 
The  value of the  EEC  o.ni  UK  fleets  exceeds tr:ro-thirds of the Eurouea.n 
to·i.;al. 
The  origin of c:oircraft  in service in those fleets in 1970  1·~c.s  an 
foJ_lC1tTS:  (percenti:1f;O  CJf  "':;:1e  valv.e  of :flee·!;s  repr0sentc:::i by aircraft 
prod.~.wer.:. in v3.T:.o·ccs  countriE)s) 
15.2 
10.6 
Ot~'te:r  EuropP..:m  countries  18.0 
El.U'OPG  12.8 
0.5 
R(~r;·t  of  Western  VJorl i  5. 2 
kic.~tci.~n  ['Jor:J.d  3.8 
1 fleet 
UQ.I.<; 
1.4 
71.9 
22.4 
5. 1 
17.3 
1 • 6 
7.0 
5-7 
Ori.,dn cf a:trcraft 
~_..._..,.~.-....~~..._,..;....,_-.,..~,~  ... 
TP ..  -~.,- +  UK  {):3  '1\j§l  ~l'!.·G 
~:.-·~~= 
16.6  G  3. L!.  100 
71.;1  28.. 1  100 
33.0  67.0  100 
23.1  76.9  100 
jt_;4 1  69.9  !00 
2. 1  97.9  100 
12"2  87.8  100 
9.5  90.5  100 - 3-
'l
1he  following pc:::rcentages  should be  emphasi~ed: 
(a)  90.5%  of the value· of the Ito/estern  fleets is accounted for by 
aircraft  constructed in the  US?  9.5%  of the vahva  of the 
ltlestorn fle&t s  is accounted for by  Community  and UI{  nil'cre.ft 
(5.7~ UK  aircre£t)7 
(b)  the  shE'.I'e  of  Comnnmity  and UK  equipment  in the 1Jiggest markett 
namely the US  market,  is  :i.:-1significa.n·~? 
(c)  in the  second largest market,  that  of the  Community,  American 
aircraft predominntc  (83.4%) 1  ••h0reas  Comm·,:mity  aircraft represent 
only 15. 24%  of the value of the  Ccmrr:u...VIi t;)' fleet' 
(d)  in the United Kingdom,  the  shD.x·e  of British-built aircraft is 
very considerable,  namely 71 .9%. 
The  differ~:mce noted bettveen the position occupied  em  their respect:l  ve 
markets by the  Community  industry on the  one  hand  anrl  the UK  industry 
on tho other,  is due  to the fact  that the British industry supplies 
c-,ircr.aft  of every ca-tegory,  wherecs until  ·1971  the  Community  industry 
supplied only medium  c:md  short-haul aircraft.  Horeover;  the  Comrnuni ty 
industry supplies only  37;:{,  of the medium  and short-h;;ml  aircre.ft 
required»  v1hereas  tho UK  industry covers more  them 92%  of Britain  1 s 
requirements in tho.,t  categor;y·. 
Tho  introduction of the  Concorde  should improve  the situation on the 
long-haul market  1  and that  of  th~ Air  bas  1  the  Mercure  end the  VF1l  614 
(as well  as  nev1  sales of the  F  28),  shou~d do  th0  same  for the  medit:u-n 
end short-haul ma;-ket. 
The  relation botvioen the relative size of the various marke-ts  a."ld  the 
position occupied in the market  of the  vJestcrn Wo::"ld  by the pr·od-::tGts  of 
tho various· industries needs to  be  emphasized~ 
'.  ;. EEC  +  UK 
Oti1er  Eu:ropeon  countries 
LU:rope 
United States 
Rest  of the  ~IJcstern Ho::.'ld 
Hestsrn lilorld 
-4-
Size of market 
d 
-:z===·~. ~~~ 
14.7 
6.3 
21 .o 
63.9 
1 5. 1 
~~~ 
100,0 
Position occupied on  the 
r:l<:~.rket  of the  ~-J.:;stCJrn  Horld 
or; 
~~....,..~~·~c....:u-~.:&..:~.~- ... 
9.5 
9.5 
90.5 
':......=:.-~~ 
100.0 
Europe is thus  shotem  as  a  consuFter rather then as  a  producer  of 
a8:-onc::,1~ticc.l  equip;,;ent~  the  Gn:Lted  St8.tes,  on tho  other hand,  supplies 
a  s·nu:ce  of the  me.rket  vJhich  feJ.,  exceeds  i-ts  o1tm  st. are  in the total 
demo.nd. 
l'Je  ~·-ave  seen thi..::L  EsC  products  ,qccount  in value  for  only 15. z%  of  EEC 
rec.fuirsmcri;3  ~  tho :-err;o.inder  being imported frc:n  110.:1--momber  countries. 
Of this 15.2%1  X.f•:;;>rox.i.mately  half ccnsists  of purchases  m£'i\e  within the 
prc;~_;:_c(;r  countries  ( Cc~ravGlle  i:1 France  1  F  27  and F  28  in th8 
Net~1erl3.nd}3)  illli the  other half of purchr.ses  of such  circl,<-'.ft  by other 
Commu:1i ty countri8s. 
'Inc  brcakdovm of orders  fo:>:>  Eu.:':'O~Grul  ccircre1ft  vrar,  as  follows  (nur:.1bor  o:£' 
orJors as  e1t  18.11.71): 
Hation:.tl market  Other  Community  Exports  to  Tot2.l 
markets  ncn--r!lOi.1uer 
C<)U  .  .~.VJ.t ri  e s 
c.=oc~-e:...=a.-~~~  ~  .. .:..;·~.- ... ~-¥..:-~-~ 
F  27  1  L~- 50  5
1 6 
1  580
1 
F  28  2  18  27  47 
Ce.ravGlJ.o  63  37  179  279 
12::10  o:f  these  \-Jere  built by  Fr.:,irchild in the United States - 5-
The  ·Dreakdovm  according to typo of purchaser is us  folloNs  (in 
percentage of value): 
Nation<1l  mnrket 
· Government  purchases  8.5 
·Purchases  by national 
airlines  85.5 
Pu-rchases  by privo..te 
airlines  6.0 
~ 
100.0 
Intra-Comm:..mity 
--=~j_m.P_~;.~ 
8. I 
50.0 
41.9 
~~-=-" 
100.0 
Imports  from  no:n-
me:rJ,sr  ~ount  T':i.es 
~~~~---~"'"'~ 
.1 .o 
)0.0 
9.0 
..:;.=.r.:...=:..&-T~ 
100.0 
The  value of  intra~-Comrm.mity trade in aircraft is around 200  million 
dollars  ( 1968).  This  level must  be considered as  J.m-.r,  since that  of 
trade  with countries outside the  Corrirm.ini ty is around  6CO  million 
doJ.J.ars  ( 1968). 
It must  also be pointed out  thnt  tho _Community  market  is completely 
open to free  e7.:ternal  competi  ti9n1_ customs  duty on  nircrr~ft of  ovm~ 
15  tons hewing been suspended up  to  1 January 1973,  i'lhe}~eas  tl:e United 
Stdos c..pplics  a  5',1o  duty and the United Kingdom  a  7%  duty. 
·.  As  we·  hc.ve  seem,~ European aircro.ft play e  smc:,n  per.t  in external 
markets  (in %  of value): 
In other European countries 
In the United States 
In the rest of the \•{estern 
Horld 
18.1 
0.5 
5.2 
5.1 
1 • 6 
7.0 
However,  the  lGvel of exports  from  the EEC  and the United Kingdom  to 
n0:n-memher  countries is far from  negligible in relc:tion to  thoi.r 
turnoverz.  These  Gxpor-~s represented the  follovTing peroe.ntnges of the 
turnovers: - 6  -
19.§0  ~  12..61  .1268 
EEC  23  16  22  23 
u"T{  30  24  33  43 
USA  11  9  10  10 
These  figures  shoN·  the relatively greater  importe.nce  of European exports 
in relation to tu=nover,  altho~gh in absolute figures· European exports 
(EEC  +  UK)  amount  to only  1 ,ooo,0001000  dollars  (1968),  whereas  United 
States exports  amount  to  2,700 7000 7000  dollars. 
The  EEC  shows  a  consistently negative  h::tlance  of trade  in aeronautical 
p:!.'Od".lots  (  t:..~ade  1-1i th cou:1tr:i:es  outside the  Commnni ty).  the  average 
doficit  ( 1964·-19G8)  heing 153  million dollnrs,  owing to the difference 
be"t1Heen  the  following  items: 
in regn.rd to the United Kingdom:  50  42 
in l'':gax·d  to the Unitr.::d  States:  -· 297  461 
in  :reg:~rd to the rest of the 
world:  +  194  +  252 
-.:o:.o---=-=-.-.:::o ..  _......,..._  .... ~ 
- 153  - 251 
Howeve:r. 1  the position of the tvm  principal European producer  cou..'1tries 
(U:ci. ted K:LngCJ.om  and France)  is very d.ifferent  from  that  of the  Community 
those  co1.1.ntries  h2.ve  a.  positive trade balance  which is 
fni:-Jy  small  in a.bsolute  valua  in comparison. with that  of the United 
States,  but  is consid.erable  in relation to  tur:c.over. ~ 7-
.ll£191tn.L<?.:f....L9§i.EY2....E.e:J. artC.3.  ($m,  currdn:t  rates,  end  H1F  r2,te  of  c:x:c  'J.~mge) 
~2 1 of turnovsx  ]!;  ~ c f  turnover  J..~~~~.:.3<  IJSA  !usif.:-_i.w:~~ 
1964  266  30.5  165  11.8  1  "i~ 8  '-'"  .  7.3 
1965  302  30.5  291  18.4  1 A59  ~7 .o 
1966  341  30.7  447  27.5  1 '370  5.5 
1967  315  25.0  262  16.7  1 ,961  7.1 
1968  283  22.0  141  9,0  2?661  9.1 
1969  327  26.1  102  6.2  2,831  ( 1)  10.8 
1970  434  32.4  231  15. 1  3,092  '12.4 
In the  enlarged Community,  therefore, it will be necessary to tc.ke 
account  of the producer  and exporter  2·tatus of France  and the  United 
Kingdom  and of the status of the  other  B~ember States  as  importers  a.."ld 
consumers.  In view,  hovmver,  of the participation of Wact  Germany, 
Italy a."ld  the Benelux countries  in the major civil aviation progrc_:unmes 
the situation will not  be  a  static one. 
In 1969  the  .!?.._Q}1§<!_u],e~L~j}.'Un~~f{ig  _  _9_~,th~.J  ~ICAQ..,.I].£m1?_e~_£.oun!"J:.~~ 
("i.:!SSR  excepted)  <.1.mounted  to 43,128  million tonne-km  (pessengers  and 
excess  baggag~~ +  freight  + mail) 1  which  cc~responds to  c.  249%  increase 
over  1960 1  or an  avorc..ge  a.nnu2.l  increase  of 14.9%  for the  v1hoJ.e  decade, 
a  higher increase than  t~at recorded for the period 1950-59  (13.6%  a 
yea!'). 
The  itemized  aver~ge annual  gro~nh rates for·from  1960-69  were  as 
follmvs: 
+  11.8  +  13.7  +  12.8  +  16.9  . 
tctal t-km 
E.£El~lll'l'i. 
+  14.9 - 8 -
Traffic development  between  1960  and 1969,  broken  dO'I\'11  by  m:1jor  regions 
(0omestic  and international  services of ICAO  countries'  airlines),  was 
as  follows: 
North !.unex·ir.a 
Europe 
Far East 
Sc,u:th  J\.rnerica 
Africa 
VJorld 
Aver~e ~ual~o~h 
rates 
( t-km  pc:;r;;~;ed) 
+  15.1 
+  14  .• 8 
+  22.2 
+  8.1 
+  11.3 
+  14.5 
i"rJ8.6 
+  14.9 
in~ of toj_g.l 
12~2  1.9li.2. 
61.5  62.1 
22.6  22.4 
3.5  6.0 
5.4  3. 1 
3.6  2.7 
2.2  2. 1 
~  ~-L!6 
100.0  100.0 
In 1969 the domestic traffic of the airlines of  ICi~O member  count:des 
rop:r:-esent&d.  more  than half (55.5%)  the total traffic,  but  d.u::'ing  the 
dso::J.d.e  tb.e:t'-3  was  a  g7e2.ter  incr<'>ase  in tonne-km  performed .in the 
internati:Jnal services  (+  16.1% ngainst  + 14.o%). 
T;·,e  participation of major  States or groups  of States in o.ir traffic 
in 1969  was  as  follows: 
USA  57.2 
E:2'J  11 • 2 
UK  s.o 
o·chel·s  26.6 
~.a.:.o·c.:.....-.:=-"'0 
100.0 
1  .  .,.  f  1' ~.gure  or F'rance 
27.1 
22.4 
10.3 
40.2 
~~ 
100.0 
'fa  of domest  ~  ·-:; 
i_~f..ic~ 
81.3 
0.9
1 
0.8 
17 .o 
~=-=-..  --=-
1CO.O - 9-
Tot. al traffic  Int. crm:t  ional  b~a.ffic  Domes+ ic t.r:J.ffic 
~  .... "T=·--·  n-==:c=.>  P"""?'m·  ..,;::::o-,====e-·;c='#:r··;;;.;~.-:zo  .:=  =-=--=--... - .,..,.~=-~.~ 
Traffic, million 
t-·km  43,128 
100 
19,175 
The  United States ai:i:·lines  thus  aOCOul1t  for  57. z%  of J'!O.:rl.d  ka.:!£is.,  but 
US  o.ircraft  0.ccount  for 90.5%  of the vaJ.ue  of  the  v-mrld  fleet.  As 
.:::.gninst  this,  the EEC  and  UK  airlines account  for  16;/o  of world traffic, 
although Europe  au aircraft account  for  only 9. 5%  of the va.l ue  of the 
world fleet. 
I+;  is noted,  moreover,  that the European airlines held their position 
in internationd tr:1ffic because they a.ocount  (EI·\~  +  UK)  for  a  largGr 
shCl.I'e  of "10rld traffic th2:.11  the United States airlines. 
l>niong  the major international cdr  routes~ the North A·!ilantic  l"G.:::l  E:hould 
be mentioned for the  importv..nce  of the traffic it carries:  in 1969  this 
li11..k:  accounted; in tE:rms  of passenger-km - assu.'lling  an average  distance 
of 61000  km  per passenger- for  27)'0  of the  vmrld international total, 
or for  10.  3%  if' all domestic  and L1ternational  servit:es.  ·  are considered. 
Moreover»  in 1969  the number of tonne-lan  of fr-:dg:.1t  carried on North 
Atlantic routes repres0nted 42.9<;b  of v.rorld  international tre:.ffic  and 
25.  11~ of all services comb5.ned. 
The  great  i.mportance  of the  share to.ken by United States airlines in 
world traffic is due  to the vast .mag(litude  oJ Uni  te•i States domestic 
traffic (81 d% of ·the  world total of dome2tic traffio).  American 
· ;internal traffic repreoents 45.2%  of the total world traffic,  and it 
wi.ll  be  recalled tt.o.t  Eu.ropean aircraft  account  for only  2. 1%  of the 
value  of the United States civil air flest. 
Regular  i~®JZ.<?,E~.cmj~rr.;:tfi£ of Ef..RB 
1 
member  cdr  lines,  amounting to 
2 9 127.5  million t-km performed in 1969 t  makes  up  about  5%  of vJor ld 
traffic  (domestic  eJ1d  international ,services)  c~1d 11% of IGAC'  int~:;r·national 
serv:i.ces  alone.  Nevertheless?  its relative share has  diminished,  since 
in ·1960  it accounted for  5~5% of  the totul nnd for 13.  7'fo  of t.oTOrld 
1  European Airlines Research Bureau - 10  -
international traffic,  From  1960  to 1969  the  intr&-·European services 
of the EtiRB  airlines developed at  a  slower rate  th~ world traffic 
(+  13.4%  egainst  14.9%  a  year),  the  contrast being still more  marked in 
rela.tion to international services:  ·+  13.4%  against  16. 1%. 
lls  regards passenger-km,  the  average  annuc.l  gT01rrth  rate of the traffic 
of the airlines of the  119  countries belonging to ICLO  'lrras  13.7%  for 
the period 1960-699  nevertheless,  a  reduction in the  annual  grm·rth 
TatE's  has  been noticeable in recent years:  1966·-67:  19%7  1967-68: 
14%9  1968-69:  13%.  Compared  with 1969,  the  1970  rate of 9%  is 
decidedly below the  average  for the ten preceding years. 
rate is very  low1  n::.'mely  3%. 
The  1971 
FoT  the years  1972-~0, the FAu  confirmed in  1971  a  1969  estimate 
acco:..'ding to  which tho  annual traffic gro1-rth  rate would be  8%.  fli!long 
the many  forecasts plotted in graph  form  by  ICI·  .. o  ~'.l'ld  American 
constTuctors,  the most  closely packed set  of curves  inciicates  a  grO'Ilth 
of  sche-:'l~.l.J.ed  t.;:'affic  from  386,ooo,ooo,ooo  passenger-kin  in 1970  to 
approximately 1  ,oc~o~000 9 000,ooo passenger-kin  ir. 1980,'  .. rhich  would mean 
em  average  annual  grD\,Jth rate of around  1o%.  Despite this decline  in 
th:3  gl'Ov:tl1  rate of traffic in passenger-kin,  it must  be  emphasized that 
at this rate of inGrease the  growth of deme..nd  during the present  c.l.ecade 
tv'Juld  be  much  greater  j_n  absolute value  thEm  that  during tho  l.ast: 
1960:  109 ,ooo,ooo,ooo passenger-km9  1970:  386,ooo,ooo,ooo 
Under  these 
cc!:·.rlitions it is clear thc·.t  in the  long term  the  increased de.mc.nd  for 
air tra;.1sport  is likely to  generate  substn.ntial expansion of aircraft 
production  • 
.£Jjdij;ional  C\e;t?.  b:ro§e~l!:n.c!S"'fQ  __ bx  c_01£'1jir;x:L  9J1-d  ..  _E,o.wc~s of  __  t_h\3  j.c:~tc. 4?- ,Z~ 
.~~~.1 
So-urce:  SORIS 
Sou.'!'ces:  Fli.gltt,  18.11.71, 
Statistical Office of the  LUI'opean  Communities  -
t~alytical table of  imports  a~d exports,  1960-68~  SORIS .  . 
§.~.q.~l.C?t1  ;~,.3. 
11  -
·.  i',.. 
SORIS 
For tll.e  EEC  it is e,. question solely of  expo:r~s 
to non-member  countries;;  the percentage is t:Z:us 
lO'vlel'  tha...'1  tho,t 
Annex  II. 
1  •  I:'r2AC::)l...c¥2Sl2.,ort s.  (Source:  USILS)  ($m,  cm~vont rates) 
1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  ~969  1970 
Ordors 
( excl.  t<:'..X)  346  299  355  305  387  514  341  571  384 
Deliveries  202  223  251  293  337  386  398  420  435 
The  1970  export  turnover  (533  millioi:1 dollars)  clcolared  b~,r  the  firms 
exceeds tho tote.l for  deliveries  (453)  recorded b;'t  the US!AS  export 
service  e.t  the beginning of 1971.  · The  former  inolud.es  doli  varies 
under tbe headi1"1g  of oooperati  ve  ventures  vJhich  are  nc t  included in 
USinS  stntistics. 
The  share of civil ord.r:1rs  vms  approximately as  follm·rs: 
1968: 
In 1968  thcr breakdow·n  of deliveries Nas  as  follows~ 
civil equipment:  06c1  L  ;o, 
break down  as follows: 
1969 
1970··. 
17.1  . 30 .o 
.6 •. 6  6.8 
militc:,ry  equipment: 
4.3. 
.1.3 
74%. 
The  breakdovm  of 1970  orders is as· follovlS  (%): 
Orders  recei78d 
32.4 
8L3 
992 
453 
.  .  .  .  elG!?- equip-
q_tl:;.,f"!.:Qi.'l~,S~ct  ,q.O.WJ.~e.:t  ~.-,.airq_re.fi;  ~~~~  ~lJg~~_:g  ·!Jli s sjJ.e~ !_1_".;'1Dif-~  mll:'1~~ 
57.4  10.7  .  G.: 
h  ~ 
~'•)  3.4-"":'  12 -
Only direct  orders  axe  included for.equipment  and electronics.  Tho 
ordGr  figures  for  1970  (992 million dollars)  take no  account  of options. 
As  ror;nrds  cooper  at  i vo  prod\1-ction ventures  9  only the  French shnro,  not 
offset  by the  foreign  sha:ro1  in included.  Foreign components 
(en5lnes,  O~lipment,)  included in exported aircraft  are  not  deducted: 
they represent  only  26.4 million dollars,  since the majority of the 
orders relat0 to military aircraft  which  are  almost  100%  French  (871~ 
of the contracts  signed in 1970  concerned milit  2:ry  aircraft) • 
Three  sets of statistics  (~~m,  current rates)  have to be  considered 
1968 
1969 
1970 
783 
732 
667 
Official figures 
(b) 
738 
784 
625 
Official figures for 
(c)  "turnover" 
478 
607 
528 
(a)  SR~C ngures,  based on  Customs  and Excise  figures relating to 
avj.ation  P.::L'oduotG~  including some  manu.fCt.ctu.rorl  by other i:1.dustries 
(ao-::'ono.utical.  instruments~ for air navigation,  launching equipment,  etc.), 
(b)  These  are  aso  basod on  Customs  and Excise  Overseas Trade Statistics, 
but  they exolucJ;!  c..irborne  equipment  unless it i'orms part  of complete 
a.irc::L'o.ft,  C'.J.'ld  they may  0r may  :rwt  include '!.lsed  oircraft  (sGe  PRge  32 
of 
11S<ITvey  of the United Kingdom  Lorospr.::.ce  industry11 ,  July 70,  2.ncl 
Air  (2)  2  Stcttisiics - STI(7·i/3).  'n1e  abovo  figures  inclnde rr;-e),_-ports, 
but  exo:'_LA.d.e  usee'..  airordt  (see p.2) of docunJGnt  SR  (71/3). 
(c)  lli::pr:;rts  of aviD.ti.on products are much  highe:P  than is sho<m  in 
the  "turr:.o,.rer"  fi[,'U.l'es;  for the following reasons:  used products are 
includ.ecl3  the prieo of Spey  engines  sent  to the United States for 
assenb!_y  in Phanton:s  intended for the RLF  L?Xe  included,  although 
considor0d by the  const.ructors  as  goYernment  sales~  the products  sent 
cibJ:-oad  with:Ln the context  of collaborative construction ventures  are 
C8Esidsred as  exports 1  although no  actual sales are  involved. -- 1J-
United Kingdom  eJ::ports  (b figu:rcs)  sinc.e· 1961  h~ve been as  follows: 
122.1  .1.9J:i.2.  1_9_6~  J..2.?.4  .1.2§.2  .:12.62  1,9£.l  2.2.98  .1.99.9.  1521S!. 
425  339  348  317  449  ..  644  596  7 38  784  625 
The  breakdown according to 'se.ctor  tvas  as  follotvs: 
1960-70 
1970 
complete  aircr<:·.ft  airm.•aft  engines 
.BS!.~£.9.JO.Q/.t  £=7::t.<L ..  :18 1%. .•  ,.Tl.lS  ~d.-n  .,..E;,S~'£.~ 
23.9  .. 24.0 
31.4 
16.9  13.4 
1).  2  9.5 
17.9 
21 .1 
The  milit11ry share in aerosp11ce  exports  tvas  as follows: 
guided 
missiles 
~~~ 
3.9 
5.1 
100.0 
100.0 
new 
.?J.r.cr~m 
used 
aircrc£1; 
new  used  airframe  aud 
~'lfQJt~  ~r~iE.ei?  ~Sf~J1G_  '"':m?.-rs..s 
guided 
missiles 
~  e- a..~~ 
1969:  '% 
1970:  % 
40 
19 
37 
19 
7 
20 
27 
64 
57 
56 
100 
100 
)'~rq(~,11t.l1AO  ()f_,i~1,!:  militury exports  in 1969:  40%?  1970:  44-%.  The 
militr~y component  in aorosp~ce exports vnrics oonsiuerably from 
yev:r to yea.:r.  Export  destinc:liions  t,rere  as follov.rs,  in percentages: 
Sterling  North  USSR  and  Latin  Fest  of 
aroa 
r  •  EFTA  EEC  .P.f:S;J;~P.J~  1\mm'J.ca  JE1:±2_-=-
.t~mnrlca 
.....,....,_...._~,~ 
~~  ~  ~  - ~re-·---'Q'  --
1969  20.8  28.7  2.1  22.8  1.7  6.3  17.6 
1970  19.9  24.2  3.2  34.8  1 • 1  5.5  11 • 3 
This  breakdor-m vcries greatl;r from  yee.:r  to year except  for  exports to 
the  EEC,  Nl~ich are constantly increasing. 
Tot.· 
c.;:,~-.:.. 
1QI:, 
10~ ·' - 14  -
-~.  ~LS.:t~te  ..  s.-~9.~t.s  .. ~J.  ·(source:  Aerospace  Facts  and F;igurcs  1972/72) 
_1..266  .12§1.  1968 
~  .12.?2  191.2 
totd  1,672.6  2,248.1  2,994.4  3,138.4  ~,400.0 
~'a  %  %  %  % 
,!Il}:.l_i_t_~_j£~}1  ).8  ...  _1.  38._6  ~~  J.2d:  ,26.£ 
comvlcte aircraft  13.2  14.4  13.6  19. 1  13.8 
engines  1.9  1.2  1.0  1. 6  1.3 
spu.re  pu.rt s  15.0  13.7  6.5  9.7  7.9 
rrissiles  8.0  9.3  4.5  5.0  3.2 
.9kdLJ.o.~~1  91.,9  £h.4  Jj.  Ll. 
~'I  §A~g  ]3.] 
complete aircraft  33.0  35.1  46.9  39.5  45.0 
engines  4.6  4.5  3.9  3.3  3. 3 
spu.re  pc.r-'0 s  24.3  21.8  23.6  21 .8  25.4 
l.n  upTtm.rd  trend is noted in civil c:..ircrcft  exports  from  the Unit od 
Stdes.  The  percento..ge  of oivil exports is higher in the Unit.r-d.  States 
(approxiw:ctely ?a;{,)  than in the United Kingdom  (o.pproximately  607~)  n.nd 
in Frcr.ce  (approximately  3~~). 
The  value of nm-1  civil tr.:msport  nircraft  oxpo:c-tod  from  the United 
Stat0s Has  as  falloN's  (~~m): 
420.8  611.4  1,200.2  946.9  1,294.7 
Eximb~~ credits and guo..rnntees  ~~ounted to: 
131.1  811.2  400.9  318.1  736.4 
Gnd  401.2 million dollars for the first  six months  of 1971. 
The  breakdown of credits and guar2.11.tees  vms  as  follmm: 
EJ"im b"'.Jll(·  ( <':>!Y'J  ~-=.: wtc  ':;;- ~~l  "  ,9_rce,di i:; 1:!  ~:r;:Cl1t.~-.~~~ 
.  +  others  .1':.-tE  other  ..  ~  ..  l.~  ...-- ..  - -o·. 
1966  94.4  4.9  27.9  4.9 
1967  789.1  11.2  2.2  2.7 
196G  336.8  50.0  13.6 
1969  197.5  7.2  111 • 2  2.2 
1970  598.2  38.0  79.2  21 .o 
6  months  1971  200.7  4. 7  181. 1  14.7 
.· - 15-
]i)'_?,nc.~  l!EJ-j ed.,Kt.~ 
19.613  12.§1  121Q  122:~  1122.  .1.2.l'J 
Exports 
Civil  109  15.2  103  443  470  350  2228  2027 
Military  JJl  l8~  ]§Q  492  )14  ill  _7.9.9..  1111 
420  435  463  738  784  625  2994  3138 
..  Utogcther,  French and UK  exports for these three years  amount  on 
<w,::rage  to  3G.Z;~ of United States exports  (24.8% for civil  exports~ 
6~% for military exports). 
Section A.4.  X:r~d.D.qlSl!lcEl_jo_r  _r:,:cigjJon~i,Pm~:q! at .~..Q  level9 
~§2.\lr,_q_e ~~·  s.OJ~[§ 
Section B.  Sourco:  ITA  1971/4  F. 
:Psg_e~:Er2!';Q,.~:  Positive trade balance for  1964-69: 
- These  are  civil and military eJ.:ports. 
- The  imports are  of equipment  inte?J.ded for 
French cqnstructors for  inco:t?oration in their 
products  1  vli th the exception of pu."':'chases  by 
Fronch air transport  compmdos. 
In 1970,  French exports totalled 452  million dollars,  of 1kich 103 
m:i.llion  vJere  c.ccounted for  by. the civil sector; .  since  imports 
intondcd for constructors represen-ted 18.4 million dollars,  the 
posi  tl  ve  balance· cul1ounts  to approximately 434  million dollars for  a 
turnover of  1~339 oillion dollars  (Source:  USI.ll.S). 
2508 
_§92 
3400 - 16  -
Cho.raote.t'isU.c  of the general  situation in this sector in the  lr!estern 
~Jorld  1  is the  strength of tho  United States  industry.  Turnover figures 
for  1970  are  as  follows  ($m,  current rates,  UlfF  rde of  exchange): 
United States2 
· .  0 ::o:ne..cla 3 
EEG4 
U  .. 1i  ted K:i.ngdom5 
Other European countries3 
Hedern Europe: 
EEC  +  UK: 
3  Japan 
3981 
3817 
~.ble 1 
24,848 
645 
2, 293 
1 '524 
82.9 
2.2 
7.7 
5. 1 
0.5 
1.0 
l 
13.3 
12.8 
"'r~  13  -·-"'rae 
306 
100 
87 
o. 3  I 
0.3  I 
.,.  -'1  °  3  ( 1069)  .t.r..~l a  1 ;; 
--~------~-~---;_;_,_9~67_"_~=----·=-J 
The  aerosp:1ce  turnover of the  United States,  vrld.ch  had  shown  a  continuous 
it)c:rease  since  1955,  is deciining and will proba'!Jly  continuo to  do  so 
until 197 36•  The  decroase  iu 1970,  as  CCli1pm·,;d  ui  th 1968,  nmouu-~s to 
nr~Ianufacture:rs of large civil ai!'craft,  together with their 
supplisrG,  can  m  ..  TJect  turnovers to resume  their upward trend in 1975. 
r4anufacturers  of other aircraft types  and their suppliers can expect  an 
impro7eme~1t as of 197 3.  In the  case  of spacecraft  2..11.d  missile 
manui'o.cturers~  no  i~provement is expected cefore  1972r~7. 
The  footnotos to each Section will be  fmmd  at the  end of the Section 
C011Ge:cned. - 1-7  -
Short-term development  p:::-ospects  include the fu.lfilment  in 1972-73 of 
most  of the  orders for  the  DC  10  nnd  a  good many  of those  for the 
Lockheed  1011.  J.s  regards the Booing 7  47,  numerous  deliveries have 
8 
alroa~ been made  • 
I  DC  1  0  .  1  3L1,. 
I Loc~1eed 1011  105 
95 
49 
Deliveries 
~~-=-.~~<a 
13 
Boeing 747  207  162 
~=--=--------=-=----------~-~---------j 
As  f~ as  Europe is concerned,  the trend of the total turnover  in the 
aerospace  industry (aviation,  civil nnd military space  operation8) 
d1..U'ing  recent  years has  been  c..s  follows  ($m 1  current rates and  III1F  rate 
of ex:chnnge): 
n~  I  I  ~-r;  + tr•  niB,  F 1 I,J:>TL  EEC  USA 
1 
(§)  1c1o)l c1·1)  lc12)  (13) 
~ (14J  I  ~~~  T15) 
11967  i 4191  49  11 26 51160  60  I  1953  1565  3518  27,267 
h68,414!  4211281,171  97  2005  1558  3563  281959 
!1969  500/  42  1250  208  105  2105  I  1644  3749  26' 126 
f  I  '•  l  I  j1970  1 5671  40  1339  232  115  12293  1524  I  3817  24,848  .  .  I  I  I  I  l  .  i  I  .  I  I  =-=== ,....,..,.,=··== ===  '  --·.~ 
·c-==-=o  ....,....... 
Taking the  average  for these four years  r  the  ~~EC  and  U:'C  tu:::-novers  e:mount 
respectively to 7.8  and 5  •. 9&  of that of the United. States.  The 
turnover of the enlarged Community  is.  th11~  1 3.  7%  of:  that of the United 
States  (ovqr  a.  longe~ period,  i.o., 1960-1968:  14.3%).  A slieht 
incroase in the EEG  +  UK  turnover is, however,  d,escerni ble in comparison 
,  .  - .  ' 
with that of the United States over the periods 1960-61  and  1969~-70, 
nomely  12.7%  for  1960-61  D.nd  14.8% for ,1,969-70. "':"  18  -
Thes<'l  values  can be  placed alongside  a  comparison of certain Europe<m 
end .:mericcn overall  economic  indicators: 
in 1969 the  GNP  of the  EEC  plus  th~t of the United Kingdom  was  about 
57%  of that  of the United States  (GNP  at current  ma~ket prices and 
16  rates of exchange)  3 
in 1960  vnd  1967  the  relat:i.ve  she.re  of the  aerospc~ce industry in 
17  the valuo  added by  manufacturing industry  t-.ras  as follows .  : 
0.6% 
o.9% 
It emerges  tho.t  in 196'(  the  she..re  of the  Europec.n  o.erospace  industry 
in tho  value  addod  by mwnufacturing  indust::.~y  1  c.l  though  on  t}1e  incree.SG 
since  1960,  w.::t.s  still only a  quc.rter  of the  corresponding figure  for 
tho United States. 
1.  Tho  present  report is concerned only with the Hestern market9  it 
should be  borne  in mind,  however r  that  the USSR  has  a  p:)1verful 
aviation and  space  ind.ustry:  590 1000  employees  in 19683• 
2.  f,IL  - !...orospa0o  Foi:-ts  and F'igurcsy  1971--1972. 
3.  In-!;eraviel.  data  IJ!J"""D. 70-A-1 ~  .  Swedish  shC!.:re:  135. 
4-.  :CI..!pa:..-tments  of the Commission,  see  Te1.ble  2. 
5 •  .ll.ir
2 
2  Statistics,  SR  (71)3. 
6.  ll.T../1- EstimC!.te  for  1971:  23 1 300~  forecast  fc.r  1972~  $22!900. 
l~oc:>rc.ing to  fJ.A  tha reduction is due .to the  decl_ine ·in salos of 
comnnrcial aircraft  o.nd  space hn.r·dwoJ.'O.  For the  f,merica.'l  industr~y-, 
19'(2 is ozp0cted to me.rk  the "na.dir11  of the  decade. 
7.  US  lndustrid Ou.tlook1  1971 
8.  Sources~  Flight,  18.XI.71  and Ir..teravia Data.IND 71-S-12; 'to bo 
acl.ded  for the DC  10:  3  :DC  10-30's ordGred in Jo.nu.:.ll'y  1972 by IBE::.UA 
+  5  options. 
9.  BDLI:  German  airfr~e, engine  and accessories firms  only; 
ozcluding  cquipmc:/~ firms. - 19  -
1  0 .•  GEBECOM.ll 
11.  USIJ;S 
12.  1967  mid  1968:  SORIS  ~ 1969  nnc1.  1970:  f.ssociaziono  Industria 
Aerospazialo. 
13.  196'7:  SORIS9  1968,  1969,  1970:  estimates. 
11~.  Lir  (2)  2  Statistics,  SR(71 )3 - 1970  - ~  pro":isionaJ.. 
15.  :~r:  ...  - Aerospace  Fact13  and. Figures,  1971~~729  it sl1ould be noted 
that the United States  o.erospaoo  i.ndustrjr supplied non-aeroR:pace 
services  and products to the  following values:  1967:  $m2,5799 
1968:  $m2 15499  1969:  $m2 16997  1970;  $m2,676. 
16.  Statistical Office of the European Communities,  National  accounts, 
p. 2. 
17.  Ve.luo  added by manufr1.cturing industry.  Source:  Departments of 
the Commission.  Value  added by aerospaco  industr;;r.  Source~  SORIS. 
18.  l.~.ccording to tho  "Survey of United Kingdom  l.erosp.~ce Ind.ustry11 , 
July 1970,  p. 38,  the value  added to materials  by  tho production 
process in the United Kirigdor.1  aerospace  industry represented  3%  of 
tho  corrospo~ding value in 1968 for the entire  m~1ufacturing 
industry  (not  output) 
19.  "Aerospn.ce  Facts  and Figures
11  1971-721  page  7?  the  t'lkrE£~~ (sales) 
of tho United S·cates  aerospace  industry  cvJcounted: for tho  fo!.lowing 
percentnges of tho turnover in manufacturing indu.stry cs  a  v,'hole: 
1967:  5%;  1968:  4.8%~  1969:  4-.0%?  1970:  3.7'/c. 2,1  In 1968  the breet.kdm-m  of tho turnover -~~~J.l~~ecjors W.0E.  ~s foll,o~r~ 
.  20 
..;L_  Yl J2._GX:,<?.,~.nt  <;&Q ~ 
,Tnb_l_g,_5 
I  Ge=~-·-· 
I  Bole;:i.'JJn 
Frr.:r.0e23 
-=  ~'D"'C  ~~ 
.Lirfr9J1lQ.£ 
77.4 
....... 
lli.s.§it?.~  En"'ines  --=;&-1  -·-
8.4  14.2  ( 21) 
I 
It2-ly 
!Te-therla..'lds 
EEC 
2L1  lJK  r 
United Stdos25 
39.4.22 
49.2 
5'1. 5  0 
100.0 
57.6 
49.7 
39.8 
18.8 
11 •  1 
14.7 
6.0 
19.5 
60.6 
21.5 
24.5 
19.9 
38.6 
0  22.4 
10.5 
12.9 
18.3 
Int~J~no.tj.onal  cor.1pnrisons  are difficult hero  Ot•ring  to the  lo.ck of 
unif:::mn:i.~y in the  dofiJ::.:i.tion  of sub-sectors.  Some  degree  of uniformity 
in thC>  definitions,  hot-rever,  allmvs the  follot-ring  comparisons  to  be  mD,de 
(percentages of the  to-tc,l  for the  sector): 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
58.6 
61.2 
60.1 
61.9 
20.7 
20,3 
19.8 
18.2 
~  (24) 
47.7 
50.8 
48 .f.. 
46.5 
37.9 
37.3 
38 01 
40.2 
43.5 
47.2 
45.1 
46.4 
13.5 
12.9 
13.0 
I  I 
le::>-.--..:=IL-.Cft:-...........  __  ~~~- -~=-~-=~·~--~=-~~=-~.a:...--=~-~-~~-----~--=-.,~-=-~ - 21  -
Tho  11aircra.ft11  sector has  developr::d to roughly the  same  extent  in the 
three countries  (slightly further-· in Franco).  The  "ongineil  sector is 
somewhat  more  highly developed in the United Kingdom  than in Franco  and 
the United States.  Tho  "missile and  space"  sector is much  more  highly 
developed in tho United  St~tes than in Europe. 
2, 2  r.1oreover,  the final turnover of aerospace proC.uction is broken 
do\m  on tho basis of setlos  to users  (percentages for  1968). 
27  Table 7 
4'-S.:::.C...~-..:-:> 
Military  Other 
and  space  Military  Civil  no.tionnl 
R&D  pru:ch::1sos  R,~m  Tote.l  · clie1:ts  Exports Total , 
··~·~~~- ......  --~---,~-~-~--+=--·:a:.,.""'*'~...-=c&T*- e  •  *""X'::;·-··--y••~-........... :=,~ _..,.  ........  ~  .....  f.~~~=-~---~- - ..... - •-=w;·~~-, 
Gormo.ny  29 .  6  60 •  6  2. 9  9  3  •  1  j  6 •  9  1  00 •  (: 
·:Oelgiuril 
Frc.ncG 
Italy 
~rQthorJ.ands 
EEC 
lJl( 
United States. 
3.5 
19.9 
12. 1 
34.4 
26.7 
64.3 
21..3 
37.4 
30.8 
44.7 
10.8 
4. 7 
7.7 
10.7 
0.4 
34.4  ,' 
57.9  4.0 
67.8 
26.3 
65.0 
53.6 
71.5 
2.9 
2.8 
15,0 
17 0  2 
65.6 
38.1 
29.3 
73.7 
32.2 
31.4 
11.3 
L  comparison with tho relevant  data for 1960  gives rise to the folloNing 
remarks: 
.The  State is·by far tho most  importn.nt  client for: 
military ptirchases: ·  30  to  6Cf%  of ti:1e  tot&l,  according to  country 
(Benelux  e}~r,wptod), 
Milita;ry, .and.  sp1:l.ce.  R&D:  12 to  29;~ of the. total,  according to country 
(Eenelu.::c  excepted), 
Civil R&D:  2  to  11%  in Europe,  ver-;;  loN in the United States 
- Purchases by other no.tional clients  (c!1iefly airlines)  are very  lotv 
in the EEC 7  but  nlmost  as considerable in the United Kingdom  as  in 
I", r'  <  •• 
the United States, 
100.  C;, 
100.C 
' 
100.C' 
i 
100.0 
100,C 
1  oo. (, 
1oo.c: - 22-
- Europcu.n  exports  exceed  30%·  of the turnover,  while United States 
exports rcproscmt  only 11rs  of the  tu...""'!lover  of the US  aorospc.ce. 
in~1u:Jtry (in e.bsolute va.luo,  hm,revor,  United States exports  amounted 
in 1968 to  21995 million dollars  r,-rhoreas  those  of tho  EEC  +  UK 
totallecl 1,138 million dol1.:1rs)  (27o.). 
For certain countries,  data are available for  1969  nnd.  1970  (in 
·percentages): 
·=  ~~·- r 
- ~~  ... ~  e:=e=  -~-- -~ 
.I 
~~~~ 
er  .l ~oris I 
I 
I 
R&D  Puxchases  State participation  State  Oth· 
in civil R&D  a.r,d  ~onc:.l  ,  n2.t · 
I 
· produdion  eli  ents  1 
'.  ~+  - -
I 
,.,..,.::.co- -~·~·-·~ 
23  I 
'l  u  nited Kingdom  I  1969  11.7  26.6  12.1  50.4  1 2. 7  36.9 
prov.)  1970  12.6  27.6 
' 
29  o.nce  \  1969 
I 
1970 
u  nitcd States  30 
E-~A  an_cl ,o,i'r:er 
£0.Vt~  _pgenci.})  ~ 
1969  1  Lto 2 
1970 I 
13. 3 
12.6  52.8 
( 13.5  57.7 
(  56.7 
.P.,?.o. n. 
67.3  I 
81.5 
66.0  l 79.3 
1 
j 
l 
1 2.6 
2.6 
3.5 
.£21~ 
~ct 
18.5 
20.7 
It will be  seen that the role  of tho  Sto..te  as client is still fc:.r  more 
impor-t.".nt  in tho United States tho  .. n  in the  United Kingdom  nnd Frcuice. 
In Hcct  Corm2-ny,  State cxpendi  ture  on the aerospace  industry vras  higher 
in 19f:i8  and  1969  than the turnovers of Germo..n  airframe,  engine  and  . 
accessories firms  ( exluding  o~ipmcnt):;  the breekdovm  lvas  ns  follor,-m31 : 
34.6 
39.7 
39.8 
~~~~-·-·  ~--~~~  ...  ~-~  .........  .___.  ....  ..,..~~-~~~-~-~~~-- .. ~~,~--........  ..., 
1  .£~rt), ,P,C!::Q  ji1:i._:r-ist£.Y._=C?J  DefE![Lc.2  .§J?.A9£ 
'  I  __ 
2.9 
3.9 
88.3  8.8 
86.9  9.2 
, - 23-
2~3  For  France,  the United Kinedom  and the United States,  the 
documents  available  allm·r an  estimate to be  m2.de  of the breakdc\'m. 
betviGen the various  items constituting on tho  one  hand tho 
11r:-d.litt.ry 
a."ld  spMc  turnover"  and on the other the "civil turnover
1
'  (percento..ges 
relate to the  average for tho years 1968-69). 
~*Fqo-=r·e--=r-ee:--._- -==e·  .•. &;?T  =  ·-
.  T'"  -·  a-rc-·  -
I 
jl\Iil.  and r  --
'Mil,  pur- Nil.  M:i.l  &  Civil Sales  Civil 
space  R&:D  chases  o:x:ports  space  R&D  to  ex-
turnover I  ndionallports 
~lients j_  _ 
&  '*'=*  -
-.  ..  _  _j 
-2  12  29  13  !  54  j  12  14  I 20 
:.nce33  Frr:  13  ! 
33  27  73  12  3  12 
I  ")4  I 
I  I 
'ted st-:tes..) l  18.  ..  57  fl  •  79  5  7  I 
i  :  i  i 
l  I  I  I  ....... ., ...  -
..,.*  ..  =- em-==m  --.:~  = 
~  ~  ·- "''*Kl:F"  ...............  .  ........ ~*'  ... 
Un~ 
The  following comments  can be made  on this breakdown of the turnover: 
the most  balanced distribution bet1rreen  11milito.ry and  spo.oo  turnover" 
tll'ld  1'ci  vil turnover"  exists in 'the  Uni  tefl Kingdom35; 
- exports pley the gJ:'odest role in France:; 
sales to national clients other than the  State are relatively 
highest  in the United Kingdom  and  lowest  in Fr2.nce, 
Tho:r.e  j_s,  however,  one  f~ct which  seems  to be  of even greater 
importance,  notably as regards the development prospoects for European 
civil nviation: 
'l'he  nmgnitudc  of gover:r:tr.10nt  military purchases in the United States is 
such thnt,  not~athstQUding the high percentage of tho military aDd 
9 
:-e=• 
spc.ce  ttt:'nover in E'L1.ropia  (in this case  Frcmce  nnd the UK),  the difference 
betvroen the  amount  of turnover in the United States  and in Europe  is 
. crenter in the military nnd  space  sphere  thrill in the civil sphm:-c: 
.j 
..,  .:~  Civ.' 
tD.:r·. 
OV0· 
---
46 
"'7  L! 
21 
I 
.h  -.-s; ,_ 24  -
The  average  turnovers  during 1968-69  wero,  in fact,  .~s  follov:s  (!3m): 
'fL}.  o.:n.d  space 
turnover 
Civil turnover 
!...,...........  =-· 
~  . ,, . 
. ,. 
1,790 
1 ,076 
The  percentage breakclovm  ::;.s  given beloH: 
11  35o.  J'J?:n_7 G . 1  Q 
19 ,6l].6 
5, 272 
In vie-..r  of the rele-tionship  bet1·men the size of the turnove:r-s  of tho 
a;:.:::-ospcce  industry of thG  United S-tates  on tho  one  hC~...Yld  and of Frc:::.1ce 
c.:nd.  the:  United  K~.ngclom  on the  other  ( 12%) 1  in acldition to  tho  ::..~eo..s·:;n 
fo::..~  t~1e  groe.ter d.isparity betHecn the turnovers  in the militc.ry ;.url  sp0ce 
sphere  -th2.n  in the civil sphere,  v1e  note  the very grea.t  :ir:1porL::mco 
acqui:cod by  11liJu.ropG.olXlt 1  mili  t2:.ry  exports  e.nd.,  to  n  lesser extent,  the 
impo:;:ot<mce  of civil e:x:ports9  moreover,  the extent of tho  effort made 
by the British a:ncl  French  governments  in civil research c.nd  cleveJcpiiiEmt 
is o·.ridont'  and thj s  constitutes  c.  gun.r3...'1toe  for tho  future  in viov.r  of 
::b'::  groHth o:' civil ar::tivitics in relo:tion to the  whole.  This  fact  is 
cof.lfi;:·'l10d  by the bl'cnkdovm of the civil tu.rnover  bohreen R&D  a..v:.d 
Pl'oduct irm  ( <werage  for  68-69  - E&D  in l<'rc.nce  nnd UK,  public funds  only.) .  r--· - a.woe  <:.1!!\ 
R&D  31 
Production  69 
I 
100 
h .......... 
- 25-
United States 
~- ................... ..,..~ 
26 
74 
100 
l~part  from  the effort made  by the t-vm  gove:z:runonts  in the  c:i.vil field, 
it should be  remembered that  l'>Jhoreas  major civil progremmcs in the 
United States and the United Kingd.om  Here  in the prod·,)  .. ction stage in 
1968  and 1969,  French civil production  t..ras  then relatively low  (France: 
R&D=  44%,  production= 56%). 
In the military and space field,  no  great  difference is noted in the 
breakdown between R&D  and production in the United States on the  one 
hand  and in Fr[mce  end the United Kingdom  on the other9  the volume  of 
DOD  purchases in fact  offsets the  size of the  N~SA badget.  In both 
cases,  approximately  24%  of the military and  spr:.ce  turnover is accounted 
for by R&D  activities  • 
.E29.t.~eE?, i;o  r~tt_g_p,.J..: 
20.  Source:  SORIS  - ( 2·1)  not  included - ( 22)  includes  space 
activities  a~d missiles 
23.  USILS  Heports:  the  broakdo"t-m  in percentages vras  as :follov;s  on 
turnover  (exol.  tax),  excluding electronics: 
ro  ..  Y!..*Q'-:s~tLtill'..n£ve:r_  (including  £,.n,_J:i~~Lt~r  ..  n~y_e..k~  (excluding 
transactions betvwen companies  transactions betvJGen  companies 
vli thin tho field  vri thin the field 
ail·!.'r<l.mos 
iG~J.I~~  £EE.tP..9  .. ~  2.9:!li~m,9.11t. 
f:iyf)·.l'!.!l~ 
~.E.~  l ~s  ~p_giA~.?  .. ?..m!i,P,~~. 
1967  58.6  20.7  20.7  66.4  23.0  10.6 
1968  61.2  20.3  18.5  67.9  21.6  10.5 
1969  61.0  20.0  19.0  67,8  20.8  11.4 
1970  62.0  18.2  19.8'  69.0  19.4  11.6 
In 1969.,  187~ of the overall turnover  was  accounted for by m.issiles 
and  s:pr:.co  ho.rdv;are  and  8z%,  by aviation equipment,  whether  or not  airborne. 2Llro 
25. 
- 26  -
il.ccording to  S:iJ/.C  the  breakdovm.  was  as  folloNs: 
i\ircraft  !.oro- Other  Ihssilos 
... ~r~~ 
.en_gj£n,_e~  ~.ffilJ  .PJ!.W.!  .f£1C1  S£9££ 
1967  47.7  37.9  4.1].  10c0 
1968  50.8  37.3  4.8  7. 1 
1969  48.  f.~  38 01  4. 7  808 
1970  (prov.)  46.,5  40.2  3.9  9.4 
In Table  5,  for the  U!1itod  Sto.tes:  ~~Tissiles +  spnce vehicles. 
Ac.cordb.g to  1li1~  (Lerospa.ce  Fc:.cts  and Figures,  197"!-71),  tho 
gen0ral  t:-cacdotcm  is as  follovrs  (excluding non-c>.crospaco 
activities): 
Spc:~e 
J~iJ'  sr:.::"':f.i  Missiles  yc  t  i.9.l~!i!  Total 
~- ......  ~-.-.gL...~;.=I  ~-.,;..;;. 
1967  60.7  17.9  21 .4  100.0 
1963  62.8  17.9  19.3  100.0 
19C9  60.2  21.6  18.2  100.0 
1970  59.7  24.2  16. 1  100.0 
Space  Oth0r  aero-
LL~T 0 2:'.:~  .  :CnP·ines  .  ~{.~~  J~ssj.J~o~  S.P,;:1S£  ac-t,  i.~'"tt j. c s, 
1967  43.5  13.5  29.0  1!~,0 
1968  47.2  12.9  26.4  13.5 
1969  45.1  13.0  25.8  16 0  1 
1970  46.4  14.3  24.6  14.7 
26.  Li."':"'fl'at:ws  nnd missil0s for  Frc...'loe 
27.  Source~  SORIS9  Civil E&D  =· governrnont  funus  made  [l.Vail(.~blc to, 
nnd rcpo.yc:ble  by~ tho  corrmcrcial  u.\d.r,tion  sector 
27a  U:1ited States:  Aeroapnce  Facts  cmd  Figcres5  EEC  +UK~  SCIUS 
~ir  St~tistics SR(71)3. 
29. USI:;.J  report ,  1970-71 
il.0:cospo..ce  Fac-ts  and  Fit:,urcs,  1971-72 
D'}D  Department  of Def0ncc 
31.  Deutschrar Bundestag.  Drucksc..cho  Vl/1 044 
32.  Ii'rom  tho  follo~ring cloc1.1DV:mts:  Surv0y of UK  Ler0space  Industry -
..:"uly  703  l\.i:i.~  Ste1.tistics  SH(71)  3~  information supplies  by  S:S/1C. 
Tho  item  11Civil  R&D 11  (Govcrn-nent  o..ssistc:moe),  v-rhioh  runounts  to 
26-27js  of the civil turnover,  does not  include  comp::my  funds,  whioh 
might  themselves  amount  to  5-6%. - 27  -
33.  From  the follot-ri.ng  docwnonts:  USI!i.S  IV-3ports9  L' Industria 
aoronautiquo et  spatiale francaisG  (1971) 113  Vlc  Plan,  Rapport 
du  Comito  de  L 1Industrie acronautique et  spati~le 
34.  From  JJ~ - ~erospace Facts and Figures,  1971-72 
35.  Estimates of UK  civil turnover for 1970:  46% 
35c. For Franco  and the UK,  the  item Civil R&D  includes only public funds. 
Tho  total labour force  of the  aerospace  industry in 1969  and  1970  was  es 
follol'.rs: 
1969  52,000 
1970  56,000 
~ 
-·a..:..aa:.....-~ 
4,500  97,000 
I 
Italy 
(39) 
27,000 
4,700  ~03,000,29,500 
l  I 
I 
'1"'"""  •  •·ee  =  ....  .,....... vmr  ...... 7- .......  ~-==-r  -- .--Gre' · .,.._......,.....  .,._~...:;rl· 
Nether- I  J
1 
UK  EEC  US1~ 
lands(401  EEC  (41)  +  UK  (42) 
7 7000 
1
187,50, 247,000  434,500  1 ,354,00C 
8·~000  1203r  20~ 237,000  438~  20C  1,159  100C 
'  ! 
-v'  -e=  ..... .,_ .......  ?  - ...  - .......0=-~~  ........  -..~~-~---..__  ..... ~..~o•-t  .....--,..,..-.cr-.,-...  .,-...,_,...  e===--..... 
Internation<1l .comparisons of the turnover per person employed are very 
difficult to give at the present  stage of the statisticsl  t-~.'Ork,  owing to 
the lack of international definitions of turnover  and manpower  in the 
aerospace  industry.  Similarly,  comparisons of value  added per person 
employed  do  not  appear to  be  relio..blo  because  of the lack of unifo:t'lrii ty 
in the definitions.  As  a  result, it is difficultto present  compc..risons 
on "productivity" as far as the E!Jropea..."l  procluoer  countries are  conce~cd~ 
compo..rcd  with that of the United States,  Europca.."l  11productivity"  would 
e.ppea.r  to be  approxime.tely hc,lf as  great. 
Although Europe  oomp2.res  unfavourably in this respect,  this d.isadvontnge 
is partly offset by lmvor  labour costs  (index for  1968)4~:  . 
EI~C 
~ 
53  37  100 
~ccording to information from British sources ldthin the field,  the United 
States/United Kingdw  r::1tio  of average  annual  labour costs  (total employed) 
was  3.2:1  in 1963.  Hovwver,  if account  is taken of the difference in - 28-
the  qv.c.m-titios  produced,  th0 United States/United Kingd·')ffi  productivity 
ratio,  as  ddermincd by various  indepcnclent  methods1  is but:"Teon  1.2:1  end 
1 • 5:1 ,  e.nd  t.hi  s  repr-esents tho true mc.npower  1; officioncy11  ratio  between 
the  i;wo  count:r.ies.  No  comparable figures  on data for  1968  c·..rc  available, 
bl·,t  it is believed tbat  tho  si  tuc::~tion is in general unchanged..  It is, 
howr;vers  2.mpo:!'t2.l1.t  here to define  -v;ho.t  is mee.nt  by  11labour costs11 • 
Fco·cnotes  to  Section  .3:  .- ....  ~-~~-~~~~~--~ 
36.  EDLI 
37.  GEEE00NL.'\ 
38.  m~~:~.-~.S  RG:port  1970-71 
1.  sur\·ey covering  SO%  of the labour force  sh01•!S  the 'trcakdmrn to be 
as  follows  (31.12.70):  dosi@l office: 
procluctio:':'l.:  48,  s;:~~  genoro,l  services: 
18  ::;.:1' 
•  --,V) 
20. 11;. 
protoypos: 
Tho  l:ro<J.lcdown  by  firr:1s  r:nd  by  omploymon'b  oe:togorics is as follm·rs: 
SNIAS  and branches:  38.9%  workers: 
DaGsau}.t.-:Jreguot: 
Roims  lJ.viat ion: 
Rob5.n  l.ircraft  ~ 
'hJ.rbomecc,: 
SEP: 
Hiscelln.neous: 
0.4% 
r  2?/  u.  /~ 
tochnice,l  suporvisor~r 
grt~G.os: 
clor:i.cal  grades 
qtlalified engineers: 
22.0~:;  nationalized sector: 
12.45S  private  sector: 
4.~ 
1  6d 
•  ,a 
39.  Lsso:::inziono  Indue.tria Lerospazinle 
40~  Inter<'..vie. data 70-L·-·1 
41 •  .i'..ir(2)  2  Statistics SH(71)3 
Ilistribut:ion of m::1npo1wr 
53,000 
23,500 
13,500 
12~000 
12.9.2. 
aduiniRtr2.tivo1  technical  cmd  office stc.ff 
:i.ncludinc  1·l,O'.J0·-'4~0GO  sciGntists,  engineers 
o.ud  technologists: 
'1051000 
tr;:olmical  suporvic:ory grRdes  and skilled 
lVC'T' 1:G r s 
- athol'  employees 
831000 
29 ,ooo 
30w000 
j.2J.Q 
107,000 
so,ooo 
26,000 
25,000 - 29  -
Distribution of manpo'l'rer  by scetor in 1967  cmo.  1970 
, airframe ftrms  E}__l}.J?,::j.,P..G.  L:b.rr~  ~gy.  i P.m en:t..f~T,:£1)  s 
~  .......  -
production 
personnel  35  32  30  27  37  35 
design office  12  14  11  n  20  23 
indirect  labour  53  54  59  60  43  42 
42.  !JA.  Lerospaco  Fn.cts  o.nd  Figures 
1969:  93,600  engineers  and scientists in  ~orospnce activities 
1970:  nero  space total  ~n-~  missiles &  s..t.P~ 
"'SjJ~.~  ..  r=====n-
( 1000) total:  1  f 159  511  :  '}  101  479  169 
of vrhich:  production 
workers:  578  282  53  212  84 
others:  581  229  48  267  85 
43.  Source:  SORIS 
43a.. The  exact  mcmpower  figures  of tho  Gorman  aviation a.nd  space  industry 
~~ounced on  11.2.1972 by BDLI  are as follows: 
JJ§.6  1221  1.29~  .1.9=69.  .321Q 
Total mcnpmver:  43,745  45,373  48,182  52,076  56,206 
of \-Thich:  airframes  32,470  33,517  35,249  38,352  40,670 
engines  4,675  5,856  6,133  6, 1.2'1  6, 336 
equi:pmont  6,600  6,000  6,800  7,600  9,200 
4.  §t.ru£tW~ 
In the United  St<:~tes,  npart  from  cortr:'.in mergers,  toke  overs or regroupings 
~.g., MoDonnel-Douglas,  Republic  and H5.llcr vlith  l!'airchilc~9  Sikorsky 
and Pro.tt  &  Hhitney vlith United  t~ircraft),  the  fa:::tor  vrhich  contributed 
most  to the  development  of the  enterprises  1-lC:.S  the  concentr.:~tion of 
public orders  on  a.  fe1'1  firms  (with consideroJ1lo recourse to  sub-contra.ctors) 
and the· programming of government  orders over  a  number  o·f  yca.rs. 
In Europe,  during the pnst  t'l-tenty years,  there have been  e.  m.1!l1ber  of 
regroupings,  cl1icfly  c.t  a  national level:  in the  Commuxli ty (0f the Six) 
the nw11bcr  of. airframe  companies  dropped  from  hmlve to three in Germ:my 
between 1963  Md 1970  a.nd  from  five  to  two  in France between 1952  and 
1970;  in Italy there are still five  groups,  one  of which is m~oh la.rgor 
than the others  as  a  result of a  movement  tovrards  concentr·ation.  In 
the United Kingdom  the number  of aircraft manufacturers  dropped  from  16 - 30  -
to four  betvmen 1959  wd 1961.  In the  engine  sector thoro  is only one 
largo firm  left in GermaD.y,  tt·Jo  in France  2..11d  three in Italy tvhic::1  work 
pertly under licence,  In the United Kingdom  we  h<~vo  vd tno  ssed the 
conccmtration of elmost  the entire  engine production potential in 
Rolls-:l.oyce. 
Mu.npower  cm.d  turnover  (excluding tn.xed)  of the most  importcmt  of these 
firms  are  as folloHs  (turnover in :;i;m,  current ro.tcs,  H'IF  ro.tes  of 
oxchcnge): 
~--~~-~~~-~wk~~~:~~r}~.G:  s·c·~--~- --~fll2;;--~ 
.1.9JQ  .25L~2  1  )3£2  _19.72 
'S  liJ  I  . /  t .  - !1,4  6  39~  170  513  i  o.L"  •  •  L~J:::'OSpa  J.a1.0  37 7420  00 
87,000  723 
I  "5  iRoHs-l"{o;yce't- 88 1000  645 
!
IB<:tw~.~:o:C',.Sj_cld.eley  /.viat_ion46  49 ~000  496 
Ll7 
!
'  I3 .L  o c  0  I  36 ? 600 
,  Dm; ze.nl  t-Breguo-t  48  11 , 5  36 
VI:'H-i.''okkr;.r.4-9  DUsseldorf 
18,944  "1']'1:50  1  5qo..  J:.·  :·:.LJ  O.J1C  "' 
I  S'·=c~", 51  ·  lu!-'  "'11. 
I  r",I'Do'f1f~LT ,,52 
..LJ.·.!.JJ.-L...,i...  •.  J.  •'·lJ. 
13  i 154 
n.o.. • 
n.  n.. 
n.a. 
12 '7  57 
20,300 
19,602 
16,500 
8,500 
412 
441 
258 
229 
230 
229 
n. a. 
283 
258 
250 
216 
128 
7,043  99 
i  5'1  5  ~  iD0E.1ITE~.- .J  2nd  9""  6,053  97 
L~~~=-~~-, C*,t ~~~=~~---- -----~-~- ..... ,-~-~-~~~~~-~~~~-~-~~.J 
'IJ.1.e  o-tll.or  fj  rr;ts  :ia the  o.irc.L~~..ft  sector are  u.s  follovrs: 
Ital~r:  Costruzinni  r,eroncmtiche  G.  f.gu.stn,  .t\.ormacchi,  Pic.gcio  c:nd  SILI 
r.'i;)XChdti. 
UYJ.:i.tod  K-].nzdom:  Hcstland Lircraft  o..nd  Short  Bros.  & Hc::.rla.nd,  the 
lutt  'Jr  lFJillg  69)~,  sto.:i; e-m,moc1. 
In the  ongino  sect  or,  the  othm~ prin::;j_pe.l  firrr s  a:::·e: 
Germany:  r1TUJ  Fr.:~oe:  Tu.-rbomoca;~  Haly:  Fiat,  Llfo.-Ilomco  end Piaggio; 
Belgium:  li'o,briquo  Nc..tiono..le  d' L.rmes. 
.. . - 31  -
J:Ioreover,  the aerospace  sector i.ncludes  equipment  firms,  missile firms 
(e.g.,  M!l.TRA,  vd  t_h  a.  turnover in 1970  59.  million dollars  a.nd  an 
nerospaco  le..bour  force  of  3  t 1  oo54)  a.nd  firms  specializing in R&D  end 
the production of space hardware  (e.g,,  EITNO).  In Britain~ moreover, 
tho industrial classification includes the fina that produces 
hovercraft55. 
The  turnover figures  in 1969  and 1970  for the three .lnrgest firms  in 
the EEC,  the United Kingdom  ru1d  tho United States respectively were  as 
follo't-rs: 
·&z=mter  ..,.  ..__. .•  ,.  .. .,...._4  •  -...-e-e  ·t::e·  -•"7"F  .~.,- ..,  s=  • 
SNI.tl.S 
.CoJ!lmupttY 
_196.2_  J.9J.Q 
513  600  nn57  522  llf.D.D,  3024  Boeing 3677 
412  ~-96  BoGing  2835  Lockh,  2540  i 
I 
D!.SSAULT-
BREGUET  258  283  H.s. 
VFlJ-FOKKER  .,2?.2 ~  Bf:..C  ...MJ.  ~SBN  .l'.  .• R.  26t6l  N .L.  R •.  24J 1 l 
l---------------------------1-4-39  _______  1_4_59  _______  s_52_6 ______  s  __  62.8 j 
Total:  1000  1141 
TaJcon  on the  average  for the years  1969-70,  these totals represent  the 
following  sha.:::·es  in the turnover of the respective  aerospace  industry: 
EEC:  49.1%~  United Kingdom:  91.5~~3  United Sto.tes:  . 33.6%. 
1~  comparison bett·•een the turnovers of the EEC  and UK  firms  on..the  one 
hand and US  firms  on the other,  also provides the follovnng information 
(averege,  for  1969-1970): 
N.B.  Tho  above  figures  represent  tho turnover figures  of the companies 
~d  not  their value  added9  their purchases  are  included,  ru1d 
consequcmtly the tnble  carmot  be  compared with total turnovers 
of tho industry  (Table  3)  \'rhieh  contc,in no  double  accounting.'· 
Tn.b.le .14  is  i~toresting for the  compnrison  bet~:reen i;ne  CommtL'lity, 
tho United Kingdom  and the United StGteso - 32-
Uni  tccl  St<:'..tcs  firms 
~~  ...... ~--.a..-....  -c-..a.=.c-.-c;.=~.:,.&..,.;;~ 
PcrcEmtagcs  of the  industry's aerospace turnover 
5  leacling firms: 
6th to  1  Ot~1.  firms: 
10  loading firms: 
60.  4-5~ 
2 ~  7c? 
l.r •  I  ;0 
52. 55~ 
26.  7?~ 
'fu.rnover  of EEC  and UK  firms  as  a  percentage of the turnover of United 
Sto.tcs fi.rms: 
Entire  aeroRpnce  industry: 
5 loading compcmies: 
6th to  10th  comp~;mios: 
10  leadirg compnnios: 
16.  s~b 
19.  o;:~ 
~?if 
17.7% 
Concentration in tho:;  aerospace  industry has  thus  gone  fur·thor  in Europe 
than in the United Sto_tos,  prcrticu.lc"rly in the group  comprising tho  fivG 
It should,  hovJe\"or,  bo  emphu,sizecl  i;hC"..t  the  avorc:.go 
turnover of tho fi  vo  loadinc; E-c_ropeo_n  firms  is 455  million dollars  7 
whc:re£~s tbe,t  of the five  leading Unitocl States firms  is  2, 392  million 
dolla.rs. 
It is the  relo_tivo  sizo of the firms rather than tho  ctegree  of 
concc~nt.-:.~ation thc:t  shows  the  limi  tc;,tion  of potential from  vJh:! ::::h  the 
Eu.rupc:::w.1  industry  :Ls  s~fcring: 
avo:rC'?::S.:l  -turnover of the fi  vc 
leo.d:!_ng  firms: 
the next  five  firms~ 
tho ton bi;;gost  firms: 
$mi'r55 
186 
320 
2f392 
1 '219 
1,uo6 
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The  average  size of the five  loading firms  is thus 5.2 times  as high in 
the United States. 
The  average  size of tho next  five firms  is thus 6.5  times  as high in the 
United States. 
In the aircraft  sector,  the avercgc  size of the  s~Jeading firms  is 
5.8  tir.1es  as high in the United Sto.tes. 
In the  engine  sector the  average  size of the two  leading firms  is 6.1 
times as high in the United Stc-.tes. 
In view of the  investments needed in this sector;  a  restructuring. of 
European firms  would appear to be  nocoss<:'.ry,  particulc..rly in the  case 
of companies  vrhose  turnover is still belov1  200  million dollars a  year. 
Moreover,  the possibilities of balanced cooperation with United States 
firms  are reduced by the excessive disparity of size betvrecn potential 
partners,  as is shovm  belovn 
Number  of firms  in each range of turnover  (1970 
Turnover  S~m  1  00···200 
200-300 
300-.:WO 
400-500' 
500-1000 
1000-2000 
2000-3000  and over 
EEC  and UK 
~~ 
4 
4 
2 
2 
United States 
••  •  ,. ,.,.  "MT' 'I'  •=  -=e·  __ .,. 
6 
4 
3 
5 
3 - 34-
In the  engj.ne  sector tho potentials  e..re: 
RR  r.  ~;600  (1971);  SNE:CMA  = $m216  (1970)9  MTU  = approximatoly  ~m131 
(1970) ~  together  with thc·se  of other  (Italian and Belgian)  firms.  In 
vie>..;  of tho  size of engine  firms  in the United States  (General Electric: 
$T.1  t660),  the  forme.,tion  of  a  European-scale  engine  corporation would 
appear to  be  indicated. 
In the aircraft  sector,  the firms  of Dassault-Breguot,  VF'...r-Fokker  and 
IV'!BB,  which  aro next  in importance to the three  loEJ.ding  compc.nies  (SIIT.i~S, 
Haukor  Sid.deley J.viation -:md  B_·.c),  are definitely not  large  enough9 
tl1ey  co:,.1panl  in size vJith United States  compru1jes  uhich  do  not  act  e.s 
principals  i~ major civil projects. 
44.  Repo:c ~  by  the  Board.  of Directors to the General  Meeting of 
28  Juno  1971:  NB:  turnover  (excl.  tiU)  of the Group,  inclucli.::::.g 
su"b:sidiaries1  for  the  fina:1ci'1l year  ·1970~  640 million  dollars~ 
labo~r force:  45~680. 
!,5.  Lab:mr  fo:;:·:Je  and  tu:-nover  for all RR  activities,  including 
non-aerospc:.ce  activities:  Intere-via dc,ta  DID  70-T  21  Rolls--Royce 
Ltd.  Revie'N of J.cti,ritios  1968-699  Rolls-Royce 'Ltd.  "Power  for 
Fht::;ht",  March  197 0.  In 1968  the  turnov~;r of the aero-engine 
dlvisj.ons  amounted. to  626 million dollars9  in February  1970  ·~he 
lo..bour  force  in these  rlivisions  s'tocd  o.t  74,000.  In 1971, 
c-~c·:,i.vities  were  not  res1.1.m~)d..  The  company's  laoour  force  is ar01md 
63,080  and the tuTnovor  for the first  yee:r  is estimated at  600 
millicn doll;;,rs. 
46.  Lo..bour  force:  estimated..  Turnover:  Interavia data IITIJ.70-T.2 
47.  Lebam·  force:  Intcravia data 69. s. 2.  Turnover:  Pr0sid.ent  1 s 
f?,opo:;:'t  1970. 
48- The  Fronch o.viation and  space  industry. 
reports. 
USL'.S  1971  and USLlS 
49.  ~ 970  iL."lnuo.l  Report •  Labour  force  in Lpril  1971:  21,280 • 
.)'J.  Labour  force  1969:  Intoravia data 69.8.29  1970:  est:Lmated. 
ri\u:·rwver:  l::at cravia dat  e1.  70  T  I. 
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51.  SNECIVIA:  1970  labour  force manpower  is that  of the group  a11d  not 
of the  aviation division,  which  stands at  only  13~500.  The  tu.r:'.'wver 
is for  "all  activities"~  the aviation turnover was  198  milli.on 
dollars in 1969  and 180  million dollars in 1970. 
52.  Leritalia. 
53.  Interavia data. 
54.  French avic,tion and  space  industr~r.  USIAS  1971.  1970  aviation 
turnover:  52.2 million dollars. 
55.  British Hovercraft  Corporation. 
56.  Interavia data 70-T.2.  All activities. 
57.  Estimated aerospace turnover. 
58.  1969  turnover. 
59.  Percentages calculated on  the  average for the years  1969-70.  For 
United States firms,  where  Interavia data IIID  70---T-2  indicates 
turnover for  11tota.l activities", the figure  has  been  reduced by  10% 
to  obtain the aerospace  turnover  (of.  terospace Facts  and Figures 
1971-72). 
59 a.  BDLI.  Table of 11  February 1972. 
Turnover,  $m:  12.§.2  .12.€.7.  129.§  1.9£2  191.Q 
M.B.B.  136  174  178  212  236 
VFW-Fokker  (Bremen)  80  84  101  107  150 
Dornier  28  73  54  85  91 
5.  E~!?2  a:;:,cll, an_j.  P~~J.9Jl.m  ent 
I 
It wduTd  be  ina.ocurate to  say that in the fiGld of aviation generally, 
Europe  lags behind the United States technologically$  the most  that  can 
be  said is that  certain sectors of tecrillology have  reached a  greater or 
lesser degree of de;.relopment  on  one  side of the l1tlantio than on  t}~e 
other. 
The  overall funds  for  aerospace  R&D  in 1968  vtere  as follo\-TS ~ - 36  -
Ta.ble  1q 
~~ 
60 
~·m 
($m)  EFC  United Kin2'dom 
~--~~~-~  ~d  s_~n~ 
Militm·y projects  559  456  3,857 
Spo,ce  II  247  1~5  5,348 
Cbril  "  210  22.2  _L.g5] 
~---._ 
Tota.l  1,016  726  10 ,Ll58 
%  of public funds  93.0  92.1  89.0 
A portion of those overall funds  is absorbeQ by offiGial institutes 
~l~ hy  sectors of industFJ  o~hor than  a.erosp~ce 9  so that the  aerospace 
industry• s  R&D  expenditure is much  lower,  as is shovm  belo~or  (1968,  $m): 
Public  funds 
Com::;>(111y  funds 
Total 
T..'lili tQry projects 
Space  proj~ds 
Ci vU projects 
Totd 
EEC 
559 
=11 
630 
339 
81 
11Q 
630 
415 
171 
19 
.f.?j 
415 
7~066 
.L  14.§ 
8'  214 
3,008 
3,953 
J..,1,5). 
8, 214 
It emerges  th.;::,t  the  ':GEC  +  UK/United  Ste1tes porcentnge 1  1:orhich  ~oras  16.6~l 
o~ the  overe.ll  funds?  is only  1 2.  7%  of R&D  expenditure  in the  aerospace 
industry. 
j:J[oreovE:r 1  the  EEC  +  UIC/Uni ted States percent.:,ge  of R&D  expenditure  in 
the  ao~ospace  indus-'cr~r  ~oms 8.  7;:~  for military and  space projects  und 
34.7%  for civil projects. 
In 19 69  a,Dd  1970,  R&D  expenditure  in the  aero  sprswo  industry in the 
U.~1. ted I(ir"gdom  and  in the United States was  as  follo~rs: 
: - 37  -
~lli8  ?_1 
~--~·-=-----~--------=~~~·u::,..-~-=c....,._..,........_, ~--c;~~ 
($m 7  current rates)  ,llili_t~~fl._Kingcl':?.ill.  ~  t.:?AJit~~ ::J 
Public  funds: 
1969 
1970 
"fiff.D 
192 
192 
"M..§.:i.S...!:.<J;:t:;9..9u 
199 
192 
Federal funds  ~x...:f,'>:E  ~~ 
4,524  1,277 
n.a.  n,c.. 
For  1969,  R&D  expenditure  in the  aerospace  industry on civil projects 
can be  estimated at: 
($m,  current retes) 
Public funds: 
66  Private funds  : 
Total 
20 
n.a. 
173 
66a 
199 
66u. 
392 
.128 
520 
180 
.1~.211 
1 ,457 
The  R&D  expondit,.l.re  of these  European countries  in the civil sector is 
relatively high,  nomoly  35.  ?~fa  of the  corresponding expGnd::. ture of the 
United States. 
For  France  and the United Kingdom,  it can be  estimated that  in 1969 
civil R&D  expenditure  (public  and.  private funds)  runounted to  39%  of the 
civil turnover:;  the percentage wov.ld  thus be slightly higher than the 
corresponding percentngo for the United States7  i.e.,  32;-;?  in 
absolute terms,  hoNever~ the French and British industries together would 
have  had only about  450  million dollars  at their disposal  as  against 
the United States industry's  1 ,457  million dolle.rs660• 
Ifuov-ring  tho.t  only some  of the civil projects are carried out  jointly by 
the  tv:m  countries,  we  can estimate thn.t  the resources  available per 
civil projvct  in the French and British industries are greatly inferior 
to those  available in the United States industry  (except  in the  caso of 
Concorde). - 38  ·-
Tho  importtmce cf  st~te aid to civil R&D  should,  however,  be  emphasized. 
By wcy of ox<Jiilple,  the  amonnts  of tlw project  authorizntions in FrMce 
shows  the following trend  ($m~  current  rates): 
Total  credits 
Collo.borati  ve 
projects 
83 
75 
143  159 
136  152 
168  180  177  254 
177  173  254 
Of the  254  million  do1l.:~rs  for  1972,  Concorde  ncco1mts  for  158.2 million, 
~.~erc'.lre  for  31.3 mi.lli.on  r.md  Airbus  for  6~  .• 5 million. 
In the United Kingdom,  Stnto  c.id to civil c.viation construction hc.s  been 
as  foll·.ms  (~~m,  current rdes): 
92  143  168  199  192 
In GermOJ"y,  according to Gov0rnment  estimates calculated in 197064,  tho 
tot2.!.  a":'ov.nt  of Fecleral  Government  aid to civil aviation construction 
shoulcl  evolve  as  follcn'!s  ~ 
.19£~~  ..  ~.C?  •.  JS'!~9.  J.21Q  .13_11.  .:121?.  ~19~U  .1.9.11  ($o 1  current rates) 
60.3  52  52  62  62  62 
The  mc.jor pa:·t  of these  appropriations is intondod for the Lirbus:  57 
million  dol-~arc  j  Y1.  197 2  c·".fl  CO  mHlion dolL1rs  in 197 3. 39 
60.  Source:  SORIS 
61.  SORIS 
Air Statistics SR  (71)  3  - Non-aerospe.ce  ~vork and development · 
.. 
carried 011t  v-d th company  funds  excluded.  According to  S:!JLC, 
·only  a  vory  low percentage of gover11ment-fine.,nced R&D  is accoun+,ecl 
for  by civil projects.  "Assistance" refers to development, 
testing and produc·bon of trarwport  aircraft. 
63.  :~erospc..ce  Facts  c.nd  Fi~-ures:  it is estimated that in 1969 
approximately 4%  of US  Federal  funds  v-rent  on the  SST. 
64.  Deutscher Bundestag Drucksaohe  VI/1041;  .• 
65.  ~1e French aviation  e~d space  inill1stry,  USI!~ 1971. 
66.  Estimated. 
66a.  Can  be  assessed at  40-50 million dollars both in Fra..."lcc  and in 
the United Kingdom. 
66b.  It should be noted that the  share of R&D  in the civil t~nover 
cf the United States veries greatly from  year to  year~  1968:  20.8%; 
1969:  32.2%;  average for  1968/69  = 25.7?~ of Table II. 
The  complete  cycle of aerospace  activities  (be.sic research,  specific 
research and development,  production,  marketing)  is exceptionally long 
cc•r.1:mred  hri th that cf other industries  (bet1rreen  10  Cllld  20  years).  This 
shows. the  imp,')rtanco  of long-term planning and underlines the magnitude 
of tho  industrie.,l risk involved in aerospace production  • 
. TheJ•e  is little d.ifference  bet't-reen  the United States and Europe  as 
rogn.rcls  research rmd  dcnrolopment  lend-:-times  for  similc.r  n.vic.tion projects 
(o.g.,  Trident  and Boeing 727)  up  to the flrst flight. 
The  lend-~time up  to the first deli  very,  on the other hand,  is much 
shorter in the United States.  This represents  a  decisive  advantage 
e..nd  is  a~l the more  r2markable  in that United States pro<luction is 
I 
US'L'.o.lly  geared to longer runs than in Europe,  and this involves more 
extensive tooling. In viov!  o:F'  U1.c  ch::w:·c:,cteristi::s  of aircrrSt production,  automdion of 
a:osombly  line:J  ;_s  not  c.s  ad.vCU'lccd  <:'...S  :i.n  the  nutomobilc  inrl.ustry,  for 
:i.nsto.nco:;.  finC.J.l  as80mbJ.y requires much  speciCl.l  o.nd  costly tooling and 
a  lc.rge  nnd  skilled.  lc.bocu~ force.  Under those  conditions,  constructors 
are  gro..duc.~~ly  o.b2..."'1do~ing the production of parts  end sub-assemblies  and 
a:.~o  spccL!.lizing increasingly in pl'-Jjoct  definition1  Ht:D  v,Tcr·k1 
This  division of latour 
me.:>::o8  it posui  hl. c: 
to  S;;'J~:e:ad  R'},]J  r.nd produc:tion risks over  sovercl  firms3 
to affect  conniclernble  s:w:i.:!.t;s  on  special equipment  c...Yid  products 
as  a  res1~.:L  t  of specia.li  ZilL.on~ 
to rcclu.ce  overall prcclu.ction times. 
The  i:o.cr;:;c.Eing  cor:1pJ.oxi ty of ;:.ircraft  moans  that  tho  aviation industry 
normd.ly  OE1ploys  hotween  25  2.::1d  35;;~  of its mo.npovrer  in R&D. 
T~e  clev(~J.opment of  !7l~.litc·:.r~r  aircraft is a  very lcn[;thy process  (4 to 
5  ,;n>nr:c:)  end is very costly:  tho total developmcmt  cost  of  2.  nc:::w 
co~·nbcd;  airc:"'ai't  (incl:1d.ing  cmgine,  equipment  tmcl  production tooling) 
US1}.:.oJJ.y  omoDt:.ts  to  2:)0  t7!illion doll3I's. 
In the case of  higr.~--perform2..11ce  circrclt the  cost  may  cx,Jood  //'0 
millicn dollc..rs. 
suoh  C:LS  the  MRC~l. 7  5,  e>,re  much  hi.:;hor. 
to  GX9crt  military production in orcler to  fe..cili  ~;::,,te  the  arnortiz(1,tion 
of such  m:.ms. 
The  sw11;:;  o,pplios to civil  tr~;,:r,.:;po:rt  aircraft,  tho  comp:.c~~i  ty  o:!-- vJbich 
incl~eas;:;s  \ri.th  tho  levois of porformo.noe  E'..Ylcl  sc..fuly. 
Concorde  holds tho  recor-::1  for procluction  costs~  \\rhich  j_n  th:i_s  c-:=o:;e 
represent  60  to  7'J  times  tho price of tho pro1luctim1  .:::.J.rcrQft  ( 3l, 3 
million dollc:crs  x  6,;_  =  ~~2 1 00J million),  o.nd  <J,] so  for tho pro-prociuction 
lcad-ti!1lc:1  T:Jhich  exceeds ten years.  Even for tGch  ..  '1icQlly  lesr.; 
O..'Ttbit:7_CUS  airc::co..ft  P'J.Ch  G,S  the fd.:cbJ.3 7  ill'cD  COStS  c.J:'C  ::::till  30  to  /:.0 
times the price of tho productj on aircraft,  oncl  th0  development  timos  c;ce 
around five years  (sirailar figures  C'.j,jply  to the IJC-1C). - 41  -
In the  cn.so  of engines,  the  development  cycles of which are also 
protracted (5  to 8 years)  c,nd  which call for very hoa.vy  investments 
(notably for test beds),  the ratio, between the  R&D  cost  and the price 
of the production engi:no  may  run into values  of the order of several 
hundreds.  It should be  ~.ddcd,  however  1  thc..t  n.  successful  engine 
normally spatms  an entire f.::unily  of :engines,  different versions of 
which are mounted in various typos of {l.ircrc..ft,  end that the· turnover 
in complete  spare engines  n.nd  enc;ine  components is higher than that in 
engines  instQ,llod as  original G:quipment  (about  one  o.nd  c  ho.lf times 
highcr}67  and 67a. 
The  evolution of launching costs in overall aircraft construction costs 
is  e..n  important  feature of this activity,  and the following ra.tios  are 
" 
notGd between the various costs as  a  function of the ntimber  of aircraft 
68  produced  : 
.lWJJ..S.....PE.Q.SLu..o 2i!  J'.r9d,1Actt tqJ:t_,c_qs..!.~ (a)  ai,.q_u,n~_iJ1;e: q9.ozs}.s (b)  _!().t~l;  costs  .. 
1  9.63  200.00 
30  8.35  6.66 
100  8.00  2.00 
200  7.85  1.00 
(a)  Direct  work,  ra-vr  mnterials,  pe..rts  and components,  general 
production costs  (variable  e..nd  fixed),  overheads. 
209.63 
15.01 
10 
8.85 
(b)  R&D  jigs o.nd  tools,  sales and promotion costn,  nloarni.ng costs11 • 
It is clear that the critical factor  in uny aviation project  j_s  the 
amortization of launching costs.  Th,;  noe<l  fOJ:"  suffioiontJ.y long 
production runs to absorb these  lavnching costs is evident. 
Unfortunately,  the averc.ge  length of civil e.iroraft production runs 
in Europe  bet't,reon  1955  and 1968  wo.s  138  units,  as  against  492  in the 
United States69. - 42-
Furthermore,  apn.rt  from  the  length of tho runt  only n  high ro.;!;e  of 
production cnn  justify b.rco-scalc tooling?  · fc:'.ilure  to undertake  such 
tooling because  i-t  ,,rould not  be profitable for  a  lov-r  rate of production, 
entails tho risk of being u.:::::blc:  to meet  the  demnnd  c:ct  the riGht  timo 
ano.,  eventually,  plo..nt  moc1Grnizt.tion is compromised.  To  give  OJ.'l 
exClJnple,  150  DC-·9' s  Here built  dur:!.ng tho first  two  years of production, 
as a0dnst  only nbout  <~0  Carc.vellos  during tho corresponding pcriocl70. 
Foot:1ot8s  to  Section 6 
..,...,.~;........,._  -"""""'--~-=*'  .-._......_  --.-·..!:".-.....:oc...;~_.Q:"~-·-"'" 
67.  :?rom  ;":Unppcrt  du  Corr:ite  c.e  1' industrio  eeron':'..utiquo  et  spdic.1o -
67a.  Lccording to certc.in cstimc.tos,  the total development  cost of 
the RB  211  vlill  exceed 600 million dollars. 
68.  smns. 
69  ~~d 70.  SORIS. - 43  -
Most  of the major European aviation projects, particuln:rly for civil 
aircraft,  are carried out  on  n  basis  of international  coopera~ion. 
Such  cooperation takes vnrious  forms v  and  v;e  shall  examine  the pr6jects 
according· to the _type  of cooperation entered into. 
Several firms  in vaxious countries cooperate  in the  implementation of a 
project,  sharing both construction work  and  financial risks.  This form 
of cooperation is o.dopted  vJhen  the principc..l is un<:!.ble  t~ shoulder the 
entire financi<:!.l  burden himself.  The  partners m~  obtain State 
assistcnce?  but  the State is not  directly involved in the project,  ncr 
does it intervene in relations between the partners. 
This is the  form  of cooperation entered into in the  case  of the  Mercure, 
the F  28  and the  \T.F'V'f  614. 
1.  MJ!±?.~TJ.Rl!  _(short-haul aircraft,  approximate  seat  i:ng  capacity 150, 
. at. flight-t_~sting stage). 
In 1966,  Societe des  Avions  Marcel  Dassault put  in h~d a  study to  design 
tho best  short-haul civil transport aircraft  with a  seating capacity of 
60  to 180.  This  company  then formed  an association with FILT,  Sf.B:)ll. 
(BelgiUt"TI)  and  CASA  (Spain)  for this  '1-TOrl::. 
The  Mercure  is a  short-haul aircraft  seating 134  to 1553  this is a. 
,.Pri,rate-sector project  which  is supported by.the French Government. 
Aeritalin. and  SAC!~.  (Italy),  Sf.BCA  (Belgium),  CI~.SA  (Spco,in),  the  Svri.ss 
Federal Lircrnft Factory at  Ehmen  and Conadair participate in production 
and,  with the exception of the  Swiss  firm,  also share the financicl 
risks in proportion to their particip~tion in pro&1ction. 
*Footnotes are given at  end  of the lJrnex. - /:.-4-
DMsault-Brcguet  is entirely responsible  for design Hark,  prod.uction 
nnd sales. 
T'.i:lG  French  shn.:ro  in produdion is 70;1.,  of the total cost,  the  Government 
assuming  Go%  of this  s~1n.re  ~  i.e.,  567~ of the total.  Dasse.ult  bears 
th~J  y•emaining  2if;£ 1  i.e.~  1t.,1%  of the tote.l.  Itdinn po.rtidpc::tion is 
16.  G%  of produr.:t ion and  approxir.1c.tely  1  0~~ of financing9  the Spanish 
she,re  slightly excos-rls  107~?  tho  Belgian  sho.re  is epproximo,teJ.y  65~  ond 
the  C311adian  she.re  C>,pproximat8ly  576.  'l'he  Swiss  share  in production 
1 
is incluclc::·d  in the  cmount  covered by  S!..ECA  • 
Tbe  development  costs of the  r,rercure,  including the construction of h:o 
pTotot:;rpes  and  static test  ±'r.:unos  are  arovnd  200 million dollors2• 
The  first  of the  two  prototyp.;;s  mCl.d.e  its first flight  on  28  May  1971 
and.  the  :3eccmd  protot~rpe vli 11 fly tv:i.thin  a  few months.  Hark  on the 
pro:l.uction .s,ircraft  has  st.'1rted9  the  ini  tinl rnte of prod.uction will 
be  three aircrnft  n  month and mo.y  possibly be  doubled. 
Cs:difioation vi:!.ll  tolce  place from  Mo,rch  to  September  1973  ClXld  tho 
first ai  :>:>or aft  s~-tould be  d.o li  verc  d  to AIR  INTill  in October  1  97 3.  The 
ten a.Lrcraft  ordered  -b~r  JJR  INTER  to a  to~c:.J.l  value  of  approxime1toJy 
78  m:Lllion  dollo,r3  (1972)  should be  delivered before the  end of  1975 
( 2 1 )  and  ( 211 )  • 
A stre  i; chec1  version of the  ~1ercure Ni th seating for  180  could be 
ccnstj~1.J  .. :.;t oc~  o.t  ninimurn  cost;  it would not,  hcemver,  be plannod for 
pY.'ocbct.ion before  1978.  This  new  aircraft  vmuld not  be pm·10rod7  as 
is the present  mociel 7  by Prc,tt  a"ld  \·,T'hitney  jot  engines  (SiJECI11fl. 
p2,rticipati'm approximdo:::ly  20f,),  but  by the  22 9000  lbs thrust  CFH  56 
engine  dev8L:,pped.  b;r  SJ:JECH  ..  II...  and Generd  Electric~ possibly with 
Rolls-P.oyce,  VcJ.vo  F'lygmotor  and  MTU  particip<}tion3• - 45  -
Tho  mo.rket  for  aircraft  of this type is estimated at  aT.Jproxi:nately 
1 1500 units.  In addition to the  LIR  INTER  order,  it is likely that 
numerous  Ca.ravelle  ai.rcraft  will be  replaced by the Mercure, 
particularly in tho  French and Spanish fleets. 
1rhe potential French market  for this aircraft is estimated at 30 units. 
The  total market  for the  Mercure  is estimated by its constructors at 
approximately 300  aircraft. 
Export  credits could amount  to 30-84% for  a  period of seven to eight 
years,  with a  7;1a  interest3• 
2.  The  F. 28  Fellowship  (tv:in-jet  short-haul e.j_rcraft  7  at series-
production stc.ge) 
Tho  Al prototype of the  F. 28,  for which  Fokkor-VFW  (Ams·terdam)  is the 
principal,  rr.ade  its first flight  on  9  M<w  1967  D  .• nd a  type certificate 
was  issuod on  15  November  19684•  The  first version,  the F.28-1000 9 
allows  60  passengers to be  carried over  a  distance of 2,000  km~  the 
new version  ( 1970) ,  the F. 28-2000,  can carry 7 5  passengers over  a 
distn.nce of 11360  km5. 
The  F.28 project is carried out  jointly vlith VFiv-Fokker  (Bremen),  N:S:S 
and the British·firm of Short ·:srothers  &  Harland. 
bought  from  Rolls-Royce. 
The  engines  are 
BThe  Netherlands  share  amounts  to  671;  of the  development  costs  and 
represents 40.5 million dollars.  Netherlands  Government  financing 
cove~!?  50%  of thc..t  share,  l·rhich  wi  11 be  repaid by Fok.'l(er-VlVF  fro::J  the 
proceeds of the  sale of the  26th to the  215th n.ircro.ft.  For the 
remaining 5o%,  Fokker-VFt-.f  had recourse to the capi  tc.l merl<et,  net  ably 
by issuing a  State-gua.rc.ntecd loan1  the interest  on which will be 
repc.id after the  sale of the  126th. aircraft176 • - 46  -
The  F.28 project  ~dll in principle be  amortized as  from·  the  175th aircrnft5• 
According to  the most  pessir:1istic market  studies,  tho  firi!1  cc.n.  be  cert.:..in 
of selling at  least  250  e.irnraft  during the nEJxt  ton ;;re2.X's 1• 
In Jo.nuc.ry  1972,  50  orders had been placed for the  F.28  and 35  aircraft 
had been cldi  VG1'ed
8
• 
On  18  November  1971 7  47  ardors  were  placed for the  F. 28,  the  broiik:dm-m 
being as  follm•rs  ~ 
NothGrlwds~  2 
Ot!ier  Com~nun-i..t;y  mo..rkets:  18 
Non~nember countries:  27  (8a). 
3.  it£!;!  6.1_4  ( h1in-jot  aircra.ft for regional  service  and feeder  lines, 
40  soatst  a.t  flight-testing stngo). 
This project  ts co.;;.·.r.ie-1  out  on  a  bo.sis  of intornc,tiom1l  coopcr2:tion 
behi-3en the  foJ.le;,.Ji:ng  firms:  VFH  Fokker  (as pdncipal),  ~ffiB,  s:.BCL 
and Fl.:!:RliJY  (B,::;lg:.llin) 9  Rolls-Ro;yrco  and  SliECI:I:l  for tho  ~~  45  H  jet  engine. 
Tho  form  of cooperation adopted :or the  VFH  61/:.  project  is  sllovm  bclov~' 
the ·oreu.l<::down  of Gosts is based on the  cost  of the  o.ircraft: 
Poxticipation by the voxious  cou.Yltries  in tl1e  development  costs of the 
c~irfl~an1o v  eng:i.ne  and  equ  i.pm0.nt  ~  a.s  Noll  as in cxpcmditure  on market 
rof38n:::':)h  and the  set·bi!lg-up  of s2.los  end a:fter-s2.los  services,  is o.s 
100: 
Gorm<:'.:'ly 
J..~.:t~c'frnino 
.._:~~~·  ....  --~11!--S 
54d 
70 
NGthorl~nds  16 
Belgium  8 
Un::.ted Kh:gdom 
Fra1'1CO 
United Stntes 
6 
100 
72 
28 
100 
J!:Sl!:~J2t!l3nt 
~~2..1 
35 
8 
53 
100 
100 
100 - 41  -
The  Governments  of the participating countries bear  60  to 80%  of the 
amount  of these  R&D  costs. 
Development  costs,  including production installations and the manufacture 
of three prototypes 1  hEwe  been  estimated at  165 million dollxrs,  of v.1h.ich 
80  million is for the airframe  and systems  and 85  million for the  jet 
engine.  The  Germ,m  Governrnent  is gronting aids of So%  fo:t>  the  airframe 
and systGms  and  50%  for thG  jet  engine  10  As  a  result of the  increase 
in final  development  costs,  hovmver 9  the German  Government  has  agreed to 
roloaso  an additional  35.6 million dollars by 1975  and  ~-1ou.ld also agree 
to give  a  gue..rcmtee  of 41.4· million  dollars~  subject  to approval  by 
the Finance  Con~ittee of the Bundestag,  tho  German  Goverr~ent would also 
provide  a  sum  of npproximatoly  68  million dollars neodecl to fincnce the 
sales of the aircraft11 • 
The  final. development  costs of the RR-SNEC:f1il  r.~  45  H  engine have  increased 
by approximately  33 million dollars  and no\..r  amount  to inore  than  109 
million dollars  •.  The  Gorman  Government  would be  ready to pay its share 
of the additional costs provided that the constructor obtains performance 
and price guarantees  from  the  engine manufacturers  and that the question 
of  .:1,  purchasing guarantee by VFliv--Fokker  fm·  a  minirnum  number of engines 
is settled11 •  To  our knowledge,  this problem had not  been solved by 
the  end of January 1972. 
As.  regards the series production stngo,  work on the  airframe vtill be 
apportioned as follet-:s:  Germc.ny  64%,  Nethorle:.nds  22%,  :Celgium  10;(;., 
United Kingdom  41~
10 • 
The  world market  for  aircraft of this type is estimated at  1200··1400 
units,  and  VF'Vi-Fokker  consider that  -they can toke  one-third of tkd; 
mo.rl:et.  The  breal<:-even point  l..rould  be  around  175  aircraft  12• 
The  first protot;:;po mado  its first  flig.."'lt  on 14 July 1971 r  u:1.fortundely, 
it crashed in tho course  of flight  testing on 1 February 1972. - 48  -
Several governments  and the mcmufacturors  o.re  asoociC'.ted in inter-
gove:rnme:1tal  cooperD.tion.  The  govcrnmontr~ play the  leading role:  they 
def~:ne  n.nd  f'incnce  the projects,  select~  supervise  and C-ssist  the 
m<:iXlufacJv·u.rers. 
The  tt-ro  principal Europoan projects carried out  on the basis of 
intergoverru~ental cooperation arc the  Concorde  and  l~rbus projects. 
1 •  .Q.89.S~cl~  (m.::;crsonic  lont;-hc.ul  aircraft,  sonting capacity 128  to  1Ll.4) 
The  Concordc  p:r'oject  wc..s  orgc:.nized  on  a  fully integrated. b<:sis1  tho 
pri:1ciples of ti.::lioh  t,rere ldd do-vm  in nn  l..:1.glo··F'I'ench  in-tergovernmE:ntal 
agreement  in November  1962.  Costs  and  revenue  are  to  be  sh:.wcd  cquc..ll;r 
bott.,reen  the  tvm  c:mntries in rOSl)ect  of the entire progrc:-mme.  The 
B-::·.itish Aircraft Corporation .:md  SNIJ~S m·e  jointly responsible for tho 
d'wdopmen-t  nnd production >mrk  (SNL:1S  6CJ%3  BL.C  40%)?  the Bristol division 
of Rolls-P.oyce  e:mcl  S:NECidi  are  sharing the rcsponsibili  ty fm7  tho  Olymp'.ls 
jc.t  eng:.nc  (liE  67)';3  SlJECr11'.  33~,'!.,).  Each  firm  hew  rosponsi  bili  tics for 
systems  dovelopmcmt  c.nd  produ.c·i;ion.  Concorde  R&J)  costs  ru.~c  assessed at 
2._9I'ro:cimC-tely  2 1000  m:'.llion  dollo;;_os  (1971). 
In addition to tho hiO  protot;y-pes  (001  cmd  002,  uhich hcwe  bGr.:m  flying 
since  1969)  w.d.  two  p:;:e-.-;jroduction  G.iroraft  (01  is already flying),  the 
pro<iuct ion of 10 units hc..s  been unclcrt -:ken  ru1d  the  so  are  nt  vo  .. rious 
r~-';r~ges  of mrmufact'n'o  at the  B.'J::  cmd  1lorospatial8 factories  ( Concord.e  2 
has been roUed out) • 
I-t  is envi8::1...gOd  th2:6  flight  testing t-rill  be  completed at tho  end of  197 3 
a.n.cl  that certification and.  the first deliveries will t2.ke  place in tho 
l'..t  the;  bc"gi:cning of December  1971,  the  to-m  prototypes 
ha~l c:,.npleted 700  fly:~:'lg' hours,  of >.;hich  200  Nero  at  supersonic  speeds. - 49  -
nccording to present  estimates,  18  ~ircraft  ~rill be  delivered by the  end 
of 1974,  313  by tho  end of  1975~  73  by the  end of 1976  and 150  by the  end 
of 1973.  Production of three aircraft  a  month is planned for  197:6"13. 
Fourteen airlines hold a  total of 74  options  on  Concordc. 
options were  renevmd in 1971. 
All the 
li.t  the beginning of  Decomb~r 1971,  the ;French  and British G.ovornments 
agreed on  a  price formuln  covering the entire production cost  and.  a 
p::U't  of the  Rc''.:D  costsj ·  the price  ~·ms to be  in the region of  33  million 
dollars  (1972). 
B1~C  and Lerospa:tiale  estimate that there is a  potentio..l market  for 
approximately  250  Concordes  over the next  ten years. 
The  1  ..  300  B  i~ a  medium/short-haul  ai:::-crnft  t-vith  seating  cap::~.ci+,y for 
250  to  300.  The project is at an  aclv2..11ced  stage of construction of the 
first prototype. 
The  ngreement  of 29  M;s,y  1969  concluded between the French and German 
Gover:r::.:ilonts  has  since been supplemented by agreements  wi-th tho 
Netherlands  and Spain. 
According to an estimate by Deutsche .Airbus  (6o%  MBJ3  a.."ld  4o%  VF1-'i-Fokker), 
development  coots for tho  l~irbus  runou11t  to 479.21  million dollars,' 
distributed as  follo1rm  14: 
ilcst  Germu.n.y 
li're.nce 
Sales of prototypes 
Netherlands 
Hmko:::-,Si ddo ley 
. ~~193.80 
~'193.130 
~~  32.39 
million: 
million: 
40.5% 
40.5}b 
$151.84 million: 
$199.57  million: 
million:(  6~8%  ~  10,3~ million: 
cncr1ne  anct  nc:.:.;elle 1 
i~  29.64 million;  ~.cj~  $  18·.31  million: 
~  29.58  million:  6.2%  $  22.01  million: 
31.65% 
41.70% 
2.16% 
3.821~ 
4.59~& - 5~ -
'l'ho  percentages  do  not  as yet  take  c:.ccount  of Spwish participation, 
vJhich  trill  amount  to  2'};  of the  financing 
15.  1~  1:-. z:;  pc.:r:ticip:c.ticn by 
.  16  Spanish industry in the manufacture of the L  300  B  is  env~sc.gcd  •  ':Phe 
CAS.il  compc.."JY  o·iOUld  then be  entrust  eel  v-ri th the production of ccrtc.in 
components  of tho aircraft. 
All the aircraft  c·l'ill  be  equipped with tuo  jet engines  of /lmoriccn 
design,  the Gencrr.l Electric  CF  G-50,  vJhich will develop  a  thrust  of 
botwoen  22  and  23  to:rmes,  depending on the version.  SNECH.h  ,,rill  be 
respomlible for the  nssembly  of theso  engines in Fra.YJ.ce  and :'las  boon 
allotted a  30%  manufe.cturing share  7  while  ~he Germru1  COEipany  f\TU  ll~tS 
16 
been allocated a  1lf~ share  • 
On  30  October  1971,  c::.ll  the partners betv;een them  -vmre  employing 
10,523 persons  on work  connected vJith the i>J.rbust  rend  approximately  300 
million dollnxs  ( 1972)  had bean spent  16•  Tho  first protot;ypo  is in 
the final  assembly  stage at  Toulouse  end will be rolled out  in June  1972. 
The first flight Nill be  mc:.do  before tho  end of tho year.  Tho  first 
delivery t-rill  take plc.ce  in 1971)..  Accordin£ to official estimGtes, 
ton aircre.ft Hill hcwe  been deli  vored by the  end of  197 L]-,  40  by the 
end uf  1975  and 73  by tho  end of 1976.  r.rhe  prod.uctio:n rata  onvi:::c.god 
1  ") 
is bett-reen  6  m1d  10  aircraf-t  n  month  ; • 
lJ.ircraft  No.  1,  noH  in the process of assGmbly  nt  Toulouse,  corresponds 
to thu version designated  ~·-..  300  B1,  Hhich can carry  259  passcmt:;ers  over 
distc::mces  of  2r 200  km.  Version A  300  B2,  chosen by l.ir Frnncc  in 
november  1971  (six orders  2nd ten options),  cM carry  270  to  290 
passengers  over tho  S2l1le  distance  as  tho  B  1.  The  B 4 version  , 
cLoscm by Immv.  (4 ordors  and 8 options),  will be  cap~'blo of carryin.:s 
270 to  290  passengers  over maximum  distc::mces  of 4,000  km,  o'·1ing  to tho 
use of the wing  centre--section 2-s  c;,  fuel  tank in acldi tion to the other 
16  four  1-1ing  tmlks  •  'l
1he  clevelopmcnt  cost of the modified versions is 
estimo..tcd at  Lj.0.3  million dollars  (1972) 14o - 51  -
The  market  for l.irbus t'l'lin-jets is ostima.tod by various  sources  8.,t  850 
to 1050 units,  and Airbus  Industrie  (the
1:Groupcr:1ent  d'In€0ret 
Economique  de  droit  fra.ncais11  '1-rhich  coordino.t.::;s the' work of tho 
partners),  hopes to sall at least 400  and possibly oven  600  (70 to 80 
of them to the li.TLAS  group) 'l5. 
On  21  December  1971  n  loan agreement  was  signed in L~embourg by the 
President of the  Europccn Investment  BMk and the:  Cha.irman of 
J  .. crospatiale.  This  agr.oement  provides for  a  loan of 14.4 million 
u.a..,  repa;y2.ble  vlithin  12 yer:..:rs.  It Kill be used for fino..ncing the 
inv0st,,wnts needed for the construction Md testing of the l.irbus in 
tho fl.orospatialo  factories at  Toulouse,  Uantes  and St.  Na.zo.iro 16• 
On  22  December  1971 ,  tho  Gorraan  Government  deoidod to give  a  financing 
gu~J.rantee for the  series production of eight aircraft  end to  ~pprovo tho 
fincw.1cing  of derived versions.  · The  GermC:ui.  shc:.re  of the  guc.rc..ntoe  for 
tho financing of  ~ales runounts: to  620,000  dollnrs  (1972)  por circraft  14• 
_3.  _This  l.nno:x:  considers  ·o~ly tho major  c±~il avi8.tion projocts 
undertaken on the  b~J.sis "-oi  European cooperation·.  It docs not  dce.l  t'l'ith 
the characteristics of big nation~l projects such·as tho Caravello,  the 
BAG  111  or the British ':Prident ,  nor with the progrrumncs  cc.rricd out  in 
.L  ' 
cooperati.on with non· ·:nember  coillltrics.  In this connoction,  hot'lovor, 
it should be mentioned thcL-t;  the Itc,lian Government  recC;ntly  8-t.,""''eod  to 
the  construction  join·Gly by Lori  talL::.  o.nd.  Boeing of ·a s-hort  tcli.:e-off 
aircraft with 100  to  150  scats,  to be  av2.il:.:cble  as from  1975. 
1.  In~eravia datc.,,  15 XII  71  ,_ 
·  .. ·,. 
2.  Aviation week  end Spe..ce  Technology,  31  Nay  1971. 
,?!  Lc.  ~iiond~,  1  Februu.ry  1972 
211•  Handelsblo.tt,  2  February 1972 
3.  Interavi~ dat~,  15.XII.71 
4.  Interavia Monthly,  6.1970 
5. ,idr and Cosmos,  16  Mc:~y 1970 
·'·' 
6.  SOTIIS  studies,  Lr.ne:x:  4, p.  120 
7•  Internvic:.,  10 l969,  p.1630 8.  Interavia dato, DID  71-S.12 
8c. :b,light'  1E3'. 11 .1971 
9.  Interavia, · 3 · 1970 
- 5.2-
10.  Aviation Heok  end Space  Technology,  31  ~y  1971 
11.  Intoravi~ Air  News  Letter,  27  September  1971 
12.  Intero,via data,  15.XII.1971 
13.  Intorc:.via data,  15.XII.  197·1 
14.  Flugrovuo,  2  1972 
15.  Intoravia data,  15.XII.1971 
16.  l...Orospdh>lo  - Honthly Review,  Januo.ry  1972. 
To  do.te,  interno.tionc.l cooperation o.t  L'uropean lcvei has not  gone nearly 
as fnr in the  engine  sector as in that  of complete aircraft. 
'l11c  RB  211  is a  British project)  tho  nmv  SNECI~'ili.  project for  r.n  engine 
with  o.  thrust of 10 tonnes,  tho  CFM/55,  1·rfll  bo  carried out in 
cooperation 1-vith  General :Clectric  and it is still not  certain that it 
will become  tho  subject  of European cooperation.  This  engine is 
believed to be  intended primarily for  a  second version of the  !~CURE 
and possibly for  STOL  o.ircruft projects. 
The  t\tro  principcl civil aero-engines for  \'rhich  European cooperation hn.s 
boon responsible  o.re  the Olympus  593,  i.e., the  Concorde  jet engine, 
and the M.45  H,  the  jot  e:.1gino  for the  VJ.i'H  614.  These  tvm  power uriits 
are being developed by the  t~-ro  leading European firms  in tho  engine 
sector,  n01nely  Rolls-Royce  e.nd  SN1BCM1~. 
~.PP~.:  Rolls-Royce is responsible for hro-thirds of the· dc'sign 
and development,  SNECM.l!.  for the  exhaust  system  of the: engine  17. 
R&D  costs lverc  estimated in September  1970  at  240  million dollars for: 
SNECI:Jl~  ( 1969  value,  excl.  tax)  end at  440 million dollars for 
18  Rolls-noycc  • 
Twenty-eight  engines  have  already been employed in the test flight . 
procsrcmmc.  Tho  construction of n  further  16  <mgines has been 
r.~uthori?.ed.  Moreover,  another  11  engines  a.re· being used f'or tests' at 
soa level,  altitude tests and flight tests in tho  Vulcc~. - 53 
A series of 40  proc'luct·ion  enginos has  been pu.t  in h:md, 20  of <·Thich 
uill be  coubined ui  th the  clevolopi.~ent  enGinJs for the cortificc:..tion of 
tho  tHo  pre-production aircraft  anc,  tho first three production. aircraft. 
The  other  -~~mnty will bo used in proc:.uction ail'crcl't  No,  4  onwc.:<Xds. 
From  the  41  s·~  mrcr2.ft  on,  the  J.Tic  621  Olyr.1pus  eneino,  't'lith  a  thrust of 
39:~940 lbs,  1-rill  be  av2.il::cblc  and i·Till  bring F-.cr;mkfort  'l"lithin tho  rr.mge 
of Concorde:' s  trensatlantic flights  19. 
The  t~~e certification of the engine is expected in 1973  D£ter  32,000 
hours of flight  and bench teGts. 
Rolls-Royce  and  SNEC~/JL have  set  up  a  joint  subsidiary,  "Ccncorde 
Ensinos Support  Orgcmization Ltd  .• ;1 ,  with the task of negotiating and 
administering supply coc1trc.cts  for instc.lled ore  replacor.Jent  Emgines 
and for  engine  Gpnres, 
Derived from  c..  milito..ry  eng:l.nc,  the r.-1.45  II is a  c~vil 1.:mgine  procluce;d 
by  Srv!:CHL.\  in cooperation  ~,;i th Rolls-fLoyce.  It is in the  31'500  kg 
thrust  cdogol'Y•  It in  pGrticul:u-l~r. s1.d tnble for  short-haul transport 
<:\.ircr::-.ft.  It  .Hill be .used for tho  VF;r  614.  Itl;l lm·t noise level idll 
enable it to  comply  "Tith the  n3w FI  •. A and  IC!~O  spocifico.tiona20• 
Tiolls-Hoyce is assuming technical responsibility for the project.·. 
SNECM .  ."  ...  is responsible for tho  dcsi5n,  finc..l  clevelopwent  a...'1d  production 
21  of the  low-pressure  assembly  • 
Th0  final  dev8lopmont  cost  of the engine,  estim[d;ed in 1967  o.t  50 
million dollars,  amotL'1ted  in 1971  to 82  million dcllcrs22• 
Tho  breakdown for  the  development  of the M.45  II  engine is,  in principle, 
as folloHs: Finf'.llcing 
Design and 
mcnufacture  55% 
54  -
so;.:. 
,, 5(!1  "'+  /..:.·. 
The  omon.nt  cnvisc.,t;ed for  tho final  development  includes the  supply  cmd 
testing of  21  cnzincs  (6 for bench testing nnd  15  for flight testing, 
bt:t  0xcl·.1des  the  lJ..unchi:::-'-€:  of sJrijs proc".uction. 
Although certain sources mention the possibility of  211  ""o"Teenient, 
discussions  bet~·roen the  Germon  ct.uthoritics  c.nd  Rolls-Royce  rcgu.rding 
tho financing of tho  engine  1 s  development  2.nd.  incroc.,:::;ed  costs lw,d  not 
bocm  concluded. up  to tho bocinning of Fel,ruo.r-.t  15i72. 
1£:cept  in the  case of  VF: :-l"cld<:er,  collabc:cd  i vo  opcrd  ionfJ  kNe  so  fc.,r 
tckcn the  fon:1  of .::l.GTOE:monts  botvmon  firms  Hhosc  o..cti vi  tics  DrG  confined 
to the  execution of  .:1  project~  they have  not  involved the  settin.::;-up 
of  ~uropoan tr2nsn~tional structure. 
17.  J C'J::..o 
1 s  :  ... 11 the  Horld' s  Lirc:c2-f-c,  1967-68  c::.nu  1969-70 
18.  Symposium  on th0  problums  of suporsonic  commercic.l  nviation, 
Toulouse,  Lpril  1971 
19.  Flight~  22  April  1971 
20.  1 1 industrie  c;,oronautique  ct  spatiale frwcaiso 
21.  Interavia, 7 1971 
22.  Intoravia,  6  1971. - 55  -
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ANNEX  IV 
Legal  provisions~applicable in  the  aeronautical 
sector  and  current level  of  duties  on  products  in this sector 
I.  Protocol  No.  XVII  annexed  to  the  Accord  on  the  G List 
a)  In  the  case  of  finished aircraft  the  provisions still in 
force  lay  down  the  following  main  requirements,  namely, 
that: 
"· ••  the  reintroduction,  at  whatever  date  in  the  future, 
of duties  on aircraft weighing  more  than  15,000  kg 
unloaded  shall  be  accompanied  by  the  creation  of  a 
non-dutiable  Community  quota,  decided  as  of  now.  The 
volume  of this  Community  quota will  correspond  to  the 
total import  requirements  drawn  up  by  the Governments  of 
the  different  Member  State§. 
"All  types  of aircraft may  be  exempted  from  the  quota 
if similar aircraft fulfilling all the  required 
conditions  of competitiveness  are  produced  within  the 
Community". 
"Applications  for  exemption  from  the  quota  must  be 
suhmitted  and  justified to  the Council,  whose  decision 
shall  be  unanimous''. 
The  customs  duty  on  aircraft  weighing  more  than  15,000  kg 
unloaded  is  completely  suspended until  31  December  1972 
(see  B1  below). 
In  the  event  of  no  other  decisions  being  taken  by  the 
Council  for  the  period after  31  December  1972,  all 
interested Member  States  would  be  entitled to  invoke  the 
provisions  of  the  above-mentioned Protocol. 
b)  Provisions  similar  to those referred to in point  1  above 
~lso apply  to helicopters  weighing more  than  2,000  kg 
unloaded.  Currently,  however,  no  tariff measures  (either -2-
in  the  form  of  a  tariff quota  or  suspension  of  duty)  are 
in  force. 
c)  With  reGard  to 
- spare  parts  and  components  (tariff heading  88.03)  for 
aircro.ft 
- engines,  jet  engines  and  gas  turbines  for  aircraft  and 
their  spare  parts  and  components  (tariff headingG 
ex  84.06  and  ex  84.08), 
the  Protocol  lays  ciown  that 
11the  imposition  o-:  customs  duties 
is  tem~orarily suspended  for  articles imported  for  assembly 
on  aircraft  which  have  themselves  been exempt  fro~ duty 
ox·  have  been  built in  the  Communi ty
11
• 
II.  ']:'..;;:E]Jf_~osi tion  as  of  1  January  1972 
A.  1)  Aircraft: 
In  accordance  with  EEC  Regulation  No.  2780/71  of  the 
1 
Council  dated  20  December  1972· 1  the  independent 
customs  duty  on  powered  aircraft  wei~hing more  than 
15,000  kg  unloaded  (tariff heading  88.02  B  II  c)  is 
completely  suspended  for  the  period  1  January-31  December  1972. 
2)  Certain  e~uiDment: 
Tariff  No~ 
In  accordance  with  the  aforesaid  regulation  independent 
customs  duties  for  the  products  listeci  below  are 
completely  suspended  for  the  period  1  January  to 
31  December  1972: 
Description  of  goods 
ex  38.19  T  Amines,  of unspecified  chemical  composition,  intended 
for  incorporation in the  construction  of aircraft  or 
;for use  in aircraft maintenance  or  repairs; 
1
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ex  39.01  c  VII  Epoxy  resins in  the  form  of  liquid,  paste  or 
powder  intended  for  use  in  the  construction  of 
aircraft  or  for  use  in aircraft maintenance 
or repairs; 
ex  40.11  B  New  tyres  intended  for aircraft maintenance  use: 
type  of  tyres - 24  . 7.7;  14  PR; 
ex  44.15  Wood  panels  covered  on  each  side  with  aluminium 
foil  and  intended  for  use  on  aircraft; 
ex  62.05  C  Evacuation  ramps  and  passenger  lifejackets  for  use 
in aircraft; 
ex  73.24  Containers  for  use  in  the  pressurization  of 
aircraft; 
ex  89.01  B II a)  Lifeboats  for  use  in aircraft; 
and  b) 
ex  89.05  Floating rescue  appliances  for  use  in aircraft. 
3)  Engines,  jet  en~ines,  etc. 
By  virtue  of  the  provisions  of Protocol  No.  XVII  on 
spare  parts  and  components  for  airc~aft (tariff heading 
88.03)  and  for  engines,  jet engines  and  gas  turbines 
for  aircraft  and  their spare  parts  and  components 
(tariff headings  ex  84.06  and  ex  84.08),  the  imposition 
of  customs  duties is  temporarily  suspended  for  articles 
imported  for  assembly  in aircraft  which  have  themselves 
been  exempt  from  duty  or  have  been  built in  the  Community. 
B.  ~xemotion from  duties  of certain  products  used  in aircraft 
maintenance,  ~irs  or  construction 
Other  tariff measures  taken  by  the Council  provide,  under 
certain conditions,  for  the partial  or  total  exemption  from -Lt-
rluties  of  a  certain  numher  of  products  listed under  67 
tariff  ~eadings  or  sub-heacings.  A list of  th2se  products, 
co~piled in  a  single  text,  can  be  found  in  Annexes  I  and 
IA  of  the  common  customs  tariff
1
• 
These  Annexes  contain: 
1)  the  list  of  products  allowed  in  completely  free  of  customs 
tariff duties,  where  these  products  are  use6  for  the 
maintenance  or  repair  of  aircraft  wei~~~n~ more  than  15,000  kg 
unloo.ded; 
2)  a  list of  products  allowed  in  complc~~::·  or  partially free 
of  common  cc:stoms  tariff duties,  ·::':.e~~,,  ·c:·v:·.  e  _--:-·;ducts  are 
:-:c_::::opters 
.. <.). 
These  lists  ~1vc rise  ~o  t~e  followinG  observ~tic~s: 
1)  ~  ~  ... c;ducts  useci  :or  t~~e  n:air.ter..a~ce  or  re~_c_,.., _r:..irc:raft 
:·~:>:!t~~·ore  than  15,000  lw  un::_oaC.ei 
Cor..!':'U?' .. v'"  industr,y  aild  its c.ncilla::-:·  in:-:us:.·-· .--:;,  tt.e 
provisions  laid  down  icitially by  C~~ncil  Deci~ion 65/?-./=3C 
dated  22  Dece~ber 19662  cover  a  li~ited period  of  three 
years.  For  practical  reasons,  however,  aGreement  has  been 
reached  e~~hling the  complete  suspension  of  these  customs 
duties  to  ~e tacitly renewed  for  successive  three-year 
periods,  unless  one  or  more  ~ember States  f~~s notice  to 
the  Council,  at  least six  months  before  t~e expiry  of  the 
initiol three-year  period,  of  their  opposition  to  such  a 
rene;sal.  7his  opposition  may  be  directed  aGainst  all  of 
the  prodGcts  or  ~erely acainst  some  of  them. 
The  me~s~res provided  ...  . 
.1 or  ~n  1966  have  heen  re:1ewed  for 
a  first  tine  so  as  to  re~ain in  effect until  31  December 
1 o~r·  ·  l  11.1c~a  Journal,  No.  L  1/72,  1  Januar:·.'  1972 
20fficinl Journal,  No.  246,  ~1  December  1966 
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.2)  Products  allowed  in  completely  or  partia;t.J;..Y  free  of  common 
customs  tariff_ duties  and  intended  for  in.£2_E_QQ.fatioQ__in 
!_he  construction  of aircraft  weir:shing  more  than  12_,_900  kg 
The  provisj_ons  setting up  a  system  of  conrplete  or  ;>ar:~iaJ. 
exemption,  ini  t.ially for  a  period  ;::-,f  three·  yea:..~s,  by  virtue 
of  Council  Decision  68/261/EEC  dated  18  June  19681,  have 
been  tacitly renewed  iD  accordance  with  t~a procedure 
laid  down  in  (1)  above  for  an  equivalent  pe~iod expiring 
on  31  December  1974.  The  provisions  app:y  cnly  to 
certain  pr~ducta intended  for  incorporation  1~  ~he 
construc~ion of  the  type  of aircraft  which,  as  on  ~  July  1968! 
had  completed  their initial flight  tests. 
Sinc2  1  Jan1.J.F.1ry  19'?1  these  provisions  ha·,re  also applied  in 
the  8Rs~ of  p~nducts intended  fo~ use  in  the  manufacture  of 
spA.re  pa.l~ts  or.  components  to be  emplo:red  j_-,1  the  construction 
of aircraft. 
The  p~~visicns listing these  products!  i~i~ially foT  s 
ner.i  cc:.  of  thre9  vears  ~-v- virtuE:  of  Ccun,.:j_:,_  0e::;isi  or:.  68/26!/EEC,  ~  v  ~  . 
shall  only  apply  to products  intended  for  ~ircraft registered 
in the  Community  after  1  July  1958.  Notwittstanding  the 
expiry  of  these  provisions  on  31  December  1971  and  the 
absence  of  any  automatic  renewal  procedure,  in  the  case  of 
most  of  ths  products  the  provisions ha7s  nevertheless  bEa~ 
renewej  up  to  31  December  1972  and  maf~ effec+ivs  i~res~active 
of  the  date  of registration of  thc  ai~~raft. 
____  ,__. __ _  .  ., 
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ANNEX  V 
Existing  forms  of  assistance  to  this  sector in  the 
Hember  States 
Several  t·lember  States grant  financial  assistance  to  the 
sector  in  the  form  of  organized  aid,  most  of  which  is specific 
in character  and  relateG  to research  and  development  before  the 
industrial  production  stage.  State  involvement  in  this area  is 
motivated  essentially by  the  need  for  aircraft manufacturers  to 
be  able,  while  research  and  development  are  going  on,  to tie up 
large  sums  of  capital  for  periods  extending  over  several years  on 
projects  which,  by  reason  of  their  importance  and  the  commercial 
risks attaching  to  them,  could  not  be  financed  through  normal  credit 
channels. 
During  this stage  the  involvement  of Member  States  (mainly, 
France,  Germany  and  the Netherlands)  which  grant  aid  to  the  sector 
according  to  the  importance  of its place  in  the  national  economy 
takes  the  form  either  of interest-free credits repayable  in the 
event  of  the  projects  financed  turning  out  to  be  commercially 
profitable,  or  of  outright  grants  (see  tables  attached). 
In certain  cases  the  extent  of  this involvement  covers  the 
entire cost  of research  and  development  and  is determined  by  the 
public  authorities upon  consideration  of  the  importance  of  each 
project. 
More  recently  the authorities  have,  by  and  large,  been  paying 
particular attention  to  joint projects  carried  out  at  Community  or 
international  level. 
The  types  of  involvement  mentioned  above,  in  each  case  of  a 
specific  character,  constitute  the  basic  essentials  of  state  aid 
to  the  aircraft manufacturing industry.  However,  certain  Member 
States  also  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  sector  hy  enacting 
reGulations  of  a  general  nature.  Particularly in France,  and 
with  an  ey'  on  the  foreign  export  market,  aircraft  manufacturers -7-
enjoy  protection against  the risk of  price  increases  through  the 
COFACZ  insurance  scheme.  (As  a  rule  this  system  is  not  applied 
to internal  trade  among  the  Community  Member  States.)  In  West 
Germany  credits are  allocated  for  civil aviation  development  under 
various general  schemes.  In  the  case  of  important  projects  the 
Federal  Government  and  the  LMnder  also  provide  guarantees  covering 
series production. 
Finally in  Belgium,  where  the  sector  enjoys  no  specific  forms 
of assistance,  the  public  authorities  implement  various  general 
measures  for  the  benefit  of  the  sector.  In particular,  under  the 
Belgian  laws  governing  expansion,  assistance is provided  i~ the 
form  of  acivances  repayable  under  certain conditions  and  intended 
for  the  development  of  a  civil transport  aviation  programme. 
"In  the  field  of  civil aviation,  however,  the  role  of  government 
is closer  to  that  of  financier  than  that  of  customer.  It has  :;_  ng 
been  UK  Government  policy  to  support  promising civil airframe  and 
aero-engine  projects  which  require  funding  on  a  scale  such  that 
it would  be  unreasonable  for  a  commercial  company  to  lock up  so 
large  a  proportion  of its available  funds  in  a  single project; 
hence  Government  is prepared  to  step in and  bear  part  of  the 
equity risk.  Under  the  present  system  of launching  aid,  which 
dates  from  1960,  the  initia~ive lies with aircraft manufacturers 
to  submit  a  proposal  for  Government  assistance  on  a  particular 
project.  The  technological  factors,  commercial  prospects  and 
total  costs  of  the  project  are  then  thoroughly  appraised  by  the 
Government  and,  if it is  decided  to  support  the  project,  the 
Government  normally  agrees  to  contribute  up  to 50%  of  the  estimat~d 
total launching costs  - these  comprise  the  cost  of  rlesign  and  ti 
development,  jigs  and  tools  and  "education",  that is,  the  higher 
labour  costs  which  occur  on  early  production aircraft.  Government 
launching  aid is  ~iven within  a  fixed  maximum  which  is not  ~ormally 
increased if the  project  costs  exceed  the  initial  estimate~ i.e., 
the  company  bears  the  risk  of  overruns. -8-
the  Gov~rn~cnt to  recover  its  i~vest~ent  by  tLkin~ u  3h~rc  of  ~t~ 
the  launctinG  costa  is repaid  when  a  pre~~ter~~ne~ nuffiher  of 
aircraft  are  sold.  :;::  ~10"-"C:  th:?  .. ::  the-t  nur~::.er- c.rc  ~~o:_t:,  Sover:lr:·.er.t 
if less,  the  Sovernmcnt  will  recover  onl!  a 
Proportion  c:  its outlc.y.  Launching  aid  is thus  a  ri~k-sharinc 
it is  not  inter.  de  G.  to  be  a  subs  i d  :r • "  (~xtract 
:ror::  a  :Jepartrr.en  t  of Trade  and  Industry  d ccur:.cn t.) 
Dlfr2rences  in  the  r0~ources emrloyed  as  w~ll  ~~~  ~i~e variety 
of  ~ercenta~es ir:  rcsp0c"t  of  the  costs  covered  add  to  t!"1e  consideror.:.S> 
disparities  exi3ting  between  the  various  syste~s  of  nation~: airi. Aid  enrn1arkert  !or  th~  ~anufacture of  aircraft in  the  ~EC 
r 
~£~:L 
1.  Crecii ts  entered in  the  national 
bud~et  for  the  ~evelopment of civil 
ai.rc!·.:,ft  rr:Jtotypcs 
production  dta~e. 
up 
2.  ~ut~·v-er:tion.s  from  lJublic 
State  and  the  LHndcr. 
to  tr,e  series 
funds,  the 
I  I -
I 
I 
France 
Credits  entered  in  the  national  budget  for  the 
research  and  develop~ent of  civil aircraft 
equipment. 
Credits  ~ranted in  accordance  with  the 
so-called 
11 .f~rt .90"  pr0cedure  for  the  develop-
meLt  of certain aeronautical  e1uipment. 
,_  I 
Und?r  the  headinG  of  development  and  in  the  1
1 
case  of  larce-scgle  pro~rammes of  national 
interest in  the  field  of  civil aircraft 
manufacture,  assistance  ~ith series  production! 
is available  in  France  in  the  form  of 
I 
I 
Forrr.  of  aid  I 
Intere.st-free  loans  to  rcc:nufacturers  or  ,' 
Frants  to  a  maximum  of  60%  of  the  devel-
;rment  costs.  This  figure  may  be  I 
exceeded  in  the  case  of  experimental  J 
projects  or  projects carried  out  jointl;y1 
at  international  level.  I 
~avment~ 
Aid  is repaid  in  proportion  to  sales 
succes~.  In  the  ev~nt of  failure 1 
the  lo&ns  may  be  converted into 
outright grants. 
Treasury  loans  and  govern~ent guarantees  in 
the  event  of sales losses. 
Form  of  aid  ---------
State participation in  the  costs  of  research 
and  development  on  a  sliding scale baais  (in 
some  cases  up  to  1005~)  depending  on  the  nature 
of  the  programme  under  consideration. 
:ie~•avmen  t 
Repayment  of  state  loans  takes  the  form  of 
deductionG  on  the  proceeds  from  sales.  The 
number  of  sales  required  for  total  repayment 
of  state  loans  can  vary  according  to  the 
crogram~e under  consirieration. 
I 
Netherle!!.ds  ---------
-
11Revol ving
1
'  funds  dra\':ing  on 
state  resources  and  placed  at 
the  disposal  of  a  s;ecialized 
a:ency:  "Dutch  In.stitute  for 
Aer.-::neutical  Develour;:ent  ::I'J" 
(civil  and  military-aircraft). 
This  agency  w~s set up  by  act 
of  law. 
Form  of  aid  -------
Funds  placed at  the  disposal  of 
the  ~IV enable  this  a~ency to 
direct  and  facilitate research 
and  the  production  of aircr8ft 
and  aeronautical  equipment  by 
placing  orders  with  industrial 
firms.  Projects  approved  by 
the  ~IV receive  100~ financial 
backing  from  this  agency. 
Re2avme~ 
Funds  corr.~itted  by  the  NIV  are 
recouped,  as  far  as  possible, 
o~ series  producti~n sales  and 
throuih  the  grantin~ of  licences 
on  aircraft  manufactu~ed as  a 
resu  -::t  of  an  r:rv  order. 
I 
\.[ 
I Aid  earmarked  for  the  manufacture  of  aircraft in  the  ~EC 
,.., 
~l e  £.~l.£!lJ:. 
Basis  in law 
1;  Directives  of  15  July  1968  by  the 
West  German  Ministry  of  Economic 
Affairs  ( Btindesanze:i.  ~;er, 
26  July  1968•  N6.  13~)o. 
Annual  figures:; 
1967  ~  DH  30  million 
;' ;~ ..  1968  :  DM  54 million 
'1969  :  DN  79  million 
... 1970  :  .DM.  150 million 
:2:~  t>irecti  ves. of· 29  Hay  1969  by  the 
1llest  German  Ministry  of  Ec anomie 
,~,Affairs  (Bundes~nzeiger, .. 
.  :0".1.1  June. 1969,  No.  '"104).  · 
r--------------
1 
I 
j 
l  France 
l 
Basis in law 
I 
I 
Netg~rland~ 
Basis in  law  ----------
a)  Overall  budgeto1·y  provisions. 
b)  :\p;:: ic:~ttion  orch:rs  :Ln  the  Co;,;;.;,:,L:.  d'Etat. 
February  1955.  I  Law  of 24 
Official Journal  N~o  107i 
29  March  1955. 
c)  lnter<.1.•:::.'o.rtmento.l  application  oJ·  :.::,--~~. 
d)  Crc~its granted  in·accordance  ~jth  tba 
so-c;,;} led  "Art.  90 11  procedure  (Art.  :;  of  the 
amended  appropriation  hill  No.  63,1293 
of  21  Decembe1·  1963 1  superseded  by  Art.  90 
·of. the. appropriation bill No.  67.11~  of . 
21  December  1967,  applicatjon  orrlrr 
No.··  6!~.1123  o.f  12  November  1964,  supersed-ed 
by  order No.  70.388  of  24  April  1970) o 
32  milliort  francs  earmarked  for  1970. 
(civil aviation) • 
.  ~  1 Overall  budget  for  1970  ( coverin.r::?  in  pF..i.l'L:i_ cul.'"lr .,l 
!  the  ConcGrcl.c;  Airbus  and  Mercury  pro,jc,:t::.:) '·  I 
ll'f,'  ·1  ,  .... , ...  1  •·  ·'  .,  1··  -th  ·  · ·  t· h  ·  r  .... , ...  ,,,, ''  .l  ·'.  .  ~,· -'·.  ,ri.L.L ..  lOrt  Bl~  Orl.ZJ.Tlf!:  ,  e  p  O[:,t ctf,,.t·.,_,  l  ,  '"'  .  '  i 
~.::·-; 
~-·  ....... .  ··~ -~  ··--··~··. 
J 
. ......) 
0 
6 .  <>ener~rcc<i2"~1..J:2£-"he_gonufactu:c~2fiircraft in  the  EEC 
1 
- I  I 
Be.:!:..r;,;hum  Fra~  Netherlands  i 
1,  Credits in the  form  orl  Under  the  law  of  Existing rasional  aid  The  sector is not  subject! 
loans  repayable  under  'l?  July  1959  governine;  1  is  not  lur:;ped  to(!;ethe:r  j  to  the  regulations 
Ger.:E:'~~ 
certain conditi  ')rus  expansion  the  aircrnft  ! with  aid  cranted  for  1  governing  general  or 
for  the  development  manufacturing  sector  specific  purposes.  I  regional  aid. 
of civil aviation.  l  (development)  received 
2.  In  the  case  of 
important  projects 
it is intended  that 
the  Federal  Govern-
ment  and  the  Lhlnder 
shall provide 
guarantees.  These 
guarantees  will  also 
cover  series 
productiono 
aid  mnounting  to 
FB  30 million in  the 
form  o:f  a  loan. 
In  1970 1  under  the 
same  law~  aid  totallin~ 
FB  452  million  was 
granted in  the  form  of 
a  repayable  advance. 
Ital.Y. 
The  sector is not 
subject  to  the 
regulations  govern-
ing  general  or 
regional  aid. 
I 
..;;, 
.:... 
I 